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ABSTRACT
This study charts the development of statutory minimum wage policy between
1906-1939. Unlike other works touching upon the minimum wage theme, this
study makes extensive use of trade union and employers' organisation records.
Indeed, the fate of official minimum wage policy can only be understood by
giving full consideration to the views of the two sides of industry, especially
with regard to the inter-war period. The sensitivities of employers'
organisations and the TUC played a crucial role in influencing the character of
government policy in this field. Trade boards, representative of employers
and workers within a strictly defined low-paying sector, were a 'lowest
common denominator' minimum wage policy that suited the interests of
representative organisations on both sides of industry. The TUC, never
wholly comfortable with the notion of government 'interference' in the
unions' sphere of wage-rate determination, recognised that in sectors where
organisation was difficult to foster, a legal minimum rate could help safeguard
the wage standards of all workers, including the higher-skilled. Likewise,
employers may have been wary of 'red tape'; but those suffering from
undercutting by non-federated rivals appreciated a basic legal 'floor' to wages.
Thus, in those sectors where voluntary collective bargaining could not ensure
minimum standards, both sides of industry could embrace trade boards as a
substitute. Thus, in seeking to account for the absence of a uniform national
minimum wage until 1998, the attitudes of both sides of industry, and the
TUC in particular, should be borne in mind as much as inertia on the part of
government. Chapters One to Three provide a chronological analysis of the
development of minimum wage policy between 1906-1918. Chapters Four
and Five cover the inter-war period, dealing with the vicissitudes of trade
boards and the unsuccessful fate of 'universal' minimum wage policies,
respectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Britain's first statutory national minimum wage was enacted in 1998.1 This
achievement may be interpreted by contemporaries as yet another instance of
Britain belatedly following the lead of European Union states in the
establishment of basic minimum rights for workers. However, it is 'something
of a well-kept secret" that Britain was the first modern nation in the Northern
Hemisphere to initiate state intervention in wage-rate determination. The
Trade Boards Act of 1909 established boards comprised of equal numbers of
employers' and workers' representatives, together with independent members,
for the purpose of fixing minimum wages in a handful of notoriously
'sweated' trades. Subsequently, trade boards were expanded significantly
both in function and in number after 1918, and again after 1945, when they
became wages councils. In fact, this study will demonstrate that wages boards
provided the template for all peacetime legal minimum wage policy initiatives
in Britain until the abolition of the wages councils in 1993.
Historians have tended to neglect the question of minimum wage
regulation in favour of analysing the formation, development and effect of
state welfare provision during the twentieth century.' The modest coverage of
the first Trade Boards Act, together with the relatively quiet and unspectacular
development of official minimum wage policy over the following decades,
probably accounts for this oversight. Indeed, from the outset, the minimum
wage question was often 'crowded out' from party political discourse by other
welfare policy initiatives. More widely-applicable welfare reforms such as
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Asquith's provision for non-contributory Old Age Pensions in 1908 and Lloyd
George's National Insurance Act of 1911 naturally won more attention from
Edwardians than the trade boards. Minimum wage legislation did not even
feature as the most pressing concern for Churchill at the Board of Trade in
1909; he and his officials focussed primarily on plans for labour exchanges
and the unemployment aspect of National Insurance.
The Trade Boards Act was notable for breaking a widely-held taboo
concerning the appropriate level of governmental responsibility for the welfare
of its citizens whilst at the same time enjoying cross-party Front Bench
endorsement in parliament on account of its limited and experimental nature.
However, it was not unique in this respect; the non-pauperising 1906
Education (Provision of Meals) Act was of a similar character.
Nevertheless, the decision by the state to guarantee a minimum wage
to certain workers in private sector employment represented a greater
challenge to conventional principles of political economy than any of the more
famous Edwardian welfare reforms. This was recognised by R.H. Tawney,
who asserted that,
the silent abandonment of the doctrine, held for three generations
with an almost religious intensity, that wages should be settled, as it
was said, by free competition, and by free competition alone, is one
of the most remarkable changes in economic opinion which has
taken place in the last hundred years."
In addition to shaking the foundations of Victorian political economy, the
semi-autonomous nature, and representative constitutional structure of trade
boards helped circumvent a major logistical challenge to the ability of the state
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to intervene in wage fixing. After all, the skills of a tightrope walker are
required to perform the task efficiently. A minimum rate set too low to
provide stimuli to the living standards of the lowest paid workers in society is
of little use, whereas a rate fixed too high risks aggravating unemployment
and worsening the condition of precisely those for whom the policy is
intended to benefit. Leaving the negotiation of statutory wages minima to
representative interests from the sectors concerned therefore minimised the
risk of embarking upon such a radical intervention in the labour market. In
addition, wage systems in many British industries were far from
straightforward. The myriad of localised piece- and time-work payment
systems, and sometimes a combination of both, together with various forms of
bonus payments, could make the task of calculating an individual worker's
wage packet taxing even for an experienced trade union official. The role
played by trade union and employer organisation personnel in the
determination of trade board minima was thus a crucial feature of Britain's
minimum wage apparatus. This theme will be explored in later chapters.
Of course, it should be borne in mind that throughout the period of this
study, for the majority of British workers not members of a trade union and
outside the coverage of voluntary collective agreements specifying standard
rates, wage determination was effectively at the behest of individual
employers.' For lesser-skilled workers, only the law of supply and demand,
an inadequate safeguard wherever pools of unemployment existed, and the
informal 'moral minimum' of local customary rates tempered employers'
freedom in this regard. 'Sweating', recognised by 1890 as a phenomenon
embracing a combination of low wages, excessive hours of labour and poor
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sanitary conditions'' occurred in many of these unorganised and unregulated
sectors.
Historians devoting attention to sweated labour have given
consideration to the first Trade Boards Act, but too frequently only in terms of
an apparent settlement of the issue towards the end of the Edwardian period.
Constricting analysis of the trade boards within the sweating paradigm
neglects the wider question of the development of minimum wage policy in
the decades after 1906. It also fosters the illusion that sweating had somehow
ceased to exist after 1914. Arguably, the poorest workers in Britain continue
to this day to endure long hours of labour in unsatisfactory working conditions
for meagre financial reward. Thus Duncan Bythell's plea that the Trade
Boards Act 'deserves more than the brief passing mention which it usually
gets from historians' should be interpreted as a criticism of his own work. He
considers the 1909 Act fleetingly, merely within the context of a belated
legislative response to a, by then residual, system of outwork. 7
Jenny Morris identifies the Edwardian recognition of women as
amongst the chief victims of sweating as the crucial factor behind the decision
of the state to intervene in the wages contract. However, whilst her study is an
efficient articulation of the 'conservative' motivations underlying social policy
formation, it is tarnished by an over reliance on the simplistic notion that the
concept of 'social control' alone accounts for the 1909 Act.s Whereas Morris
attributed the minimum wage innovation in terms of the interests of larger
factory employers seeking both social control and the elimination of
unregulated competition, James Schmiechen emphasised the role of the well-
connected women's industrial rights movement' In particular, he credited the
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Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) and the Women's Industrial Council
for the subsequent campaign by the National Anti-Sweating League (NASL)
for a wages board solution to the sweating problem.
By contrast, Roger Davidson interpreted the Trade Boards Act more as
a rearguard victory for civil servants than as a triumph of pressure group
campaigning.l" Emphasising the refusal of the Board of Trade to compile an
adequate statistical database concerning the extent of low-income poverty, he
attributed the minimalist nature of minimum wage policy to Whitehall's
disapproval of the principle.
Sheila Blackburn similarly regards the 1909 Act as 'a timid and
hesitant measure with many flaws.' 11 In 1988 Blackburn seemed to endorse
Davidson's thesis that civil servants were to blame for this.12 By 1991 she
qualified this point by arguing that the NASL was equally culpable in limiting
the form of minimum wage legislation.Y Eight years later Blackburn blamed
the propagandising of NASL veterans such as R.H. Tawney and J.J. Mallon
alone for the long-term survival of Britain's system of minimum wage-fixing
boards and the exclusion of the 'alternative' policy of a uniform national
minimum wage. 14 In the view of this author, her conviction that the incipient
movement for such a national minimum wage was damaged by the
unjustifiably favourable publicity surrounding the trade boards is
unsatisfactory, and detracts from her effective critique of the shortcomings of
the welfare consequences of trade boards in action. Later chapters of this
study will demonstrate that there was barely any nascent movement for a
uniform national minimum wage policy to suppress until the 1980s, let alone
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prior to 1939. Generally, Blackburn's arguments are most convincing when
confined to an examination of the factors contributing to the 1909 Actl5
At least Blackburn has attempted to relate her scrutiny of trade boards
to the wider question of general minimum wage policy beyond 1914. The
importance of the sweated labour issue should not be underestimated with
regard to the initial decision of the British polity to sponsor minimum wage
legislation in 1909. However, this thesis is concerned more with the
development of minimum wage policy in its own right after this date. Crucial
to the character of this study is the fact that in the debates concerning
minimum wage policies after 1910, and especially during the First World War
and throughout the inter-war period, trade unions and employers'
organisations were far more vocal and influential than they were before
1909.16 In order to understand the course of minimum wage policy
development after 1909, shifting standpoints regarding the usefulness of trade
boards amongst the trade unions, employers organisations' and government in
turn will be considered more important than their performance as anti-poverty
agencies per se.
In Vivien Hart's opinion, British minimum wage policy failed to
develop between the creation and abolition of wages board apparatus at either
end of the twentieth century.17 This reasoning overlooks important
developments occurring as a result of 'reconstruction' thinking during both
world wars. Parliament in 1918 and 1945 envisaged that trade boards and
wages councils (respectively) would lose their limited, anti-sweating,
character and fulfil a much broader 'substitute collective bargaining' role for
ill-organised sectors. Due attention is devoted to the significance of the
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second Trade Boards Act and the wages council legislation of the 1940s in
Frederick Bayliss' thorough administrative history of the first half-century of
British wages boards in operation.i'' However, his conclusions reflect the
sadly misplaced optimism of trade unionists forty years ago. He expected that
continuing full employment and the growth of collective bargaining would
render obsolete such compulsory minimum wage-fixing machinery.
This study will emphasise the role of representative industrial
organisations in influencing the character of British minimum wage policy
after 1910. Hart attributed its 'feebleness' to the leverage of powerful
sectional interests such as the Labour Party, the trade unions and employers'
organisations.l" In a recent study covering the working of the clothing trade
boards over five decades, James Gillespie has emphasised the extent to which
organised employers and trade unions alike utilised legal minimum wage
hi h . . 20mac mery to serve t err own mterests.
In seeking to account for the endurance of trade boards, to the apparent
detriment of universal minimum wage policies, Gillespie's approach is more
illuminating than Blackburn's. Whilst Blackburn has highlighted the
shortcomings of trade boards in remedying low pay amongst unorganised
workers, Gillespie has demonstrated the more pertinent point that this issue
was not of primary importance in determining the attitudes of employers and
trade unions towards them. Rather, trade boards proved themselves of
strategic value to those industrial organisations which were not representative
in themselves of the majority of unorganised employers and workers but
which nevertheless enjoyed (over-) representation on them. The role of trade
board propagandists such as R.H. Tawney and J.J. Mallon was thus not of
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central significance in seducing the labour movement away from an
endorsement of national minimum wage policies.
David Vincent, in an impressive study of how (little) state welfare
policies affected the lives of the poor, considered that a universal minimum
wage policy would have proved 'by far the most significant long-term
contribution to the alleviation of poverty' .21 Rodney Lowe is one of very few
historians who have scrutinised the minimum wage as a national political
issue.22 He emphasised the Cabinet's endorsement of a universal minimum
wage policy in April 1919. Relying heavily on his extensive research through
Whitehall archives, he attributes the failure to implement this policy chiefly to
the tactics of the Treasury, which was hostile to such a departure from
orthodox economic principles. This study does not dispute Lowe's argument
in this context. Instead, it lays rather more emphasis on the role of the inter-
war labour movement hierarchy for the lack of momentum for universal
minimum wage policies. Ever appreciative of the principle of collective
working class self help, it remained hostile towards the extension of minimum
wage policy beyond a finite application of trade boards.
Thus Adrian Vinson was right to conclude that during the inter-war
period, 'it was falling prices and new technology, rather than state intervention
in the labour market, which contributed most to the diminution of poverty for
those in employment'. 23 Attention was drawn in the same article to the
relevance of the campaign for the 'endowment of motherhood' (family
allowances) in relation to the minimum wage. The Fabians and the
Independent Labour Party (ILP) were rare amongst pre-1939 minimum wage
policy enthusiasts in acknowledging that it could only serve as an effective
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tool against poverty if implemented in conjunction with other measures
guaranteeing households a minimum income. Furthermore, John MacNicol
asking on what grounds were family allowances acceptable to policy makers
inspired the conceptual framework of this study.24 Likewise, this study seeks
to analyse the statutory minimum wage question on the basis of on what
grounds, or to what extent, the principle was acceptable as a practical policy
expedient amongst government, industrial organisations, political parties and
pressure groups.
So much for the historiography of the minimum wage theme. We now
tum to how the debate about the merits of the policy began. The Victorian
media revisited the scandal of sweated labour during the 1880s.25 A
generation earlier, the public outcry following Henry Mayhew's exposure of
sweating in the Morning Chronicle soon subsided as the British economy
embarked on a prolonged period of robust economic growth after 1851.
However, during the so-called 'great depression', a period between 1879-1896
characterised by a downward trend in agricultural prices, land values,
company profits and dividends, the concurrent rapid economic development of
America and Germany was viewed with apprehension by influential opinion
formers. With Britain's world-wide pre-eminence no longer assured, strategic
considerations helped ensure that the blight of poverty did not disappear from
the consciousness of informed public opinion.
Nevertheless, in spite of British political discourse being awash with
concern at the endurance of poverty in the midst of plenty during the mid-
1880s, it was not until the following decade that policies involving state
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regulation of wages were even suggested as a potential remedy. Ricardo's
dictum that wages 'should be left to the fair and free competition of the
market, and should never be controlled by the interference of the legislature="
remained a central tenet of Victorian political economy.
In his Life and labour of the people, published in 1889, Charles Booth
advocated drastic intervention in the labour market. However, this was
intended to remodel its composition and stimulate higher earnings via the
normal forces of supply and demand. He believed that want and distress
amongst poor households relying on 'intermittent' or 'small regular' earnings
(his classes 'C' and 'D' respectively) could be relieved if the competition of
loafers, semi-criminals and indolent casual workers was eliminated. For these
hopeless classes 'A' and 'B', Booth favoured stem state supervision and
correction in isolated labour colonies.f
The conclusions of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Sweating System reflected the limits of contemporary advanced opinion. It
considered the spread of voluntary organisation, together with better
enforcement and extension of Factory and Public Health legislation to be
adequate remedies for sweating. Its one innovative recommendation was that
the Government and other public bodies should take steps to prevent sweating
in connection with contracts given out by them. At the instigation of Sydney
Buxton, the Liberal MP for Poplar, the Commons accordingly passed the Fair
Wages Resolution on 13 February 1891. Henceforth, the payment of wage-
rates 'generally accepted as current', i.e. often trade union standard, was a
stipulation of public sector contracts. The London County Council and the
London School Board led the local authorities in adopting similar measures.
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However, the notion that the government should make the 'quantum
leap' from merely setting an example as a responsible employer to intervening
in the private sector to ensure fair wage standards, a 'Plimsoll line for labour
as well as ships', 28 was still seen as incredible. Only after a radical intellectual
re-appraisal of the meaning of liberty during the 1890s was it considered less
so. Professor T.H. Green was an influential figure for a new generation of
Liberals. He taught that freedom of action in the economic sphere must be
tempered by consideration of the common good. The Rainbow Circle was a
typical outlet for these New Liberals. Founded in 1894, members such as
John A. Hobson, Richard Haldane, Herbert Samuel, John Robertson and Percy
Alden debated with socialists such as Herbert Burrows, of the Social
Democratic Federation, and Ramsay MacDonald. During their early
discussions, the group dismissed the 'Old Manchesterism' school of political
economy as a manufacturers creed, and embraced instead the new radicalism
of collectivism; 'To coerce a minority may be to free a majority. ,29
Of course, even during the heyday of laissez-faire doctrine, the state
had recognised that it had a duty to intervene in the labour market in order to
protect the population from gross exploitation made possible under conditions
of unregulated capitalism. For instance, the 1847 Factory Act limited the
working day of textile workers to a maximum of ten hours. From the late
1860s onwards, a plethora of health and safety regulations embracing an ever-
increasing proportion of British industry were enacted.
J.A. Hobson was the first economist to acquire a heretical reputation
for viewing wage regulation sympathetically. He had become convinced of
the seemingly paradoxical 'economy of high wages' by 1893.30 Hobson was
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impressed by the evidence of Thomas Brassey, a world-renown railway
contractor, who had demonstrated that higher-paid, and therefore better fed,
labour was generally more productive. Moreover, the higher wage bill
spurring technical innovation and the utilisation of labour-saving machinery
further enhanced efficiency gains." By this time, Hobson was developing his
'under-consumption' thesis. This held that the combination of insufficient
working class wages and over-saving by the higher classes constrained levels
of demand, employment and prosperity in the domestic economy. His
solution was to redistribute the 'surplus' from the wealthy to the wage-earning
classes."
In 1896 Hobson took a step further and made a plea for the principle of
a 'living wage' to govern wage-determination for all workers.P This was not
so much a minimum, as an optimum, wage proposition. He urged a steady but
persistent raising of all wages and 'the formal and express abandonment of the
"higgling of the market" as the sole and sufficient determinant of wages, and
the substitution of a principle in which "needs" and decency of life find
expression'. Hobson's living wage goal was necessarily an elastic concept,
'incapable of exact definition' and varying in value according to the level of a
worker's existing earnings.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb issued a more precise demand for a
statutory minimum wage policy in 1897.34 The Webbs devised the concept of
the 'National Minimum', 'the prohibition of all such conditions of
employment as are inconsistent with the maintenance of the workers in a state
of efficiency as producers and citizens'. In order to secure the community
against the evils of sweating,35 they asserted that existing legislation providing
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a rudimentary minimum of sanitation and leisure was not enough. 'To be
completely effectual, the Policy of the National Minimum will, therefore, have
to be applied to wages.' The Webbs favoured a subsistence-level minimum
wage, 'determined by practical inquiry as to the cost of food, clothing, and
shelter physiologically necessary, according to national habit and custom, to
prevent bodily deterioration. '
Seebohm Rowntree devised his own such physiological needs-based
measure of a 'poverty line' to illustrate that fifteen per cent. of York's working
class households, ten per cent. of York's population, lacked sufficient income
to purchase enough for bare physical existence in 1899.36 A state-
underwritten minimum wage policy was a logical response to Rowntree's
demonstration that even with the strictest self-discipline in the manner of
expenditure, one-tenth of the population could not make ends meet. After all,
the true extent of poverty in this relatively prosperous town was shown to be
nearly ten times greater than the level of pauperism.
However, by the tum of the twentieth century, the belief that poverty
was a symptom of character failings still held sway, albeit to varying degrees,
by informed political opinion. A.J. Sherwell's Temperance and the social
problem, which had sold 90,000 copies and gone through ten editions in the
five years after its 1899 publication," had more of an impact than Rowntree's
study during the first few years of the twentieth century. Moreover, the
Fabian argument that there was no intrinsic difference between wage
regulation and other forms of statutory interference in workplace conditions
was not widely accepted. The 'marginal utility' theory of wages, which held
that wages were determined by a worker's individual contribution to output,
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was an effective psychological barrier to the popularity of the minimum wage
principle. In the realm of wage determination at least, laissez-faire principles
remained the conventional orthodoxy even amongst progressives.
The infant Labour Representation Committee did not challenge this
consensus. In lieu of any serious interest displayed towards it by the Fabians,
its wages policy reflected both the TUC and ILP's simple espousal of living
wages, a rallying cry for higher wages to be won through recognition of trade
unions and the promotion of free collective bargaining. Trade unions, much
better representative of skilled workers, found the idea of state assistance to
win them living wages both threatening and demeaning. Only after 1906 was
the TUC coaxed into countenancing a legal minimum wage policy for their
social inferiors, non-skilled, often-female workers unable to organise for
themselves. The labour movement remained more concerned with securing an
eight-hour day and 'Right to Work' guarantees from the government.
Nevertheless, the Australian colony of Victoria's 1896 Factory and
Shops Act inspired the limited constituency of radicals in Britain who
supported the principle of a minimum wage. By establishing wages boards for
the purpose of fixing minima for six sweated trades in Melbourne, this
measure thrust the statutory minimum wage to the status of a practical policy
expedient." The Women's Trade Union League was particularly interested in
this realisable means of enforcing wages minima by a method that minimised
the danger of unemployment and maximised the role of representatives of the
trades subject to state intervention. Sir Charles Dilke, second husband of the
WTUL's leader, Emilia Pattison, consulted with both Alfred Deakin, the
Prime Minister of Victoria, and Beatrice Webb before introducing the first of
18
his annual Wages Boards Bills before parliament in 1900.39 These Bills failed
to win any support in the Commons until after 1906. However, well before
wider opinion was then re-acquainted with the scandal of sweating, concerned
pressure groups were already viewing its remedy in terms of a specific policy
objective, legal minimum wage-fixing boards.
The following chapter will chart the rapid change of fortune enjoyed
by supporters of the minimum wage principle from 1906, and examine the
genesis of the British trade boards and the initial perceptions of their
performance. Chapter Two will consider minimum wage policy initiatives
beyond the confines of trade boards for sweated sectors, and consider whether
a 'minimum wage for all' was in prospect by 1914. The importance of
wartime wage regulation and its relevance to 'reconstruction' plans in 1917-
1918 will form the main focus of Chapter Three. Chapter Four will analyse
the vicissitudes of the expanded trade boards system during the inter-war
period and demonstrate that, ultimately; trade unions, employers'
organisations and government alike all endorsed them as a 'lowest common
denominator' minimum wage policy. With this inference in mind, Chapter
Five will consider the failure of more comprehensive 'national' minimum
wage policies to make headway between 1918 and 1939.
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CHAPTER ONE
'AN EXPERIMENT AND A REVOLUTION';
THE FIRST TRADE BOARDS - AN OVERVIEW
Charles Dilke's Wages Boards Bill failed to secure a second reading in the
Commons for the seventh-consecutive year in February 1906. Yet, just
three years later, in the midst of the furore over Lloyd George's 'People's
Budget', the Trade Boards Act sailed through parliament against minimal
opposition. The remarkable speed by which parliament endorsed the
groundbreaking principle, that the state should intervene in private sector
wage determination, together with early assessments of the initial trade
boards in action, will be charted in this chapter.
Two events occurring during 1906 were crucial to the emergence of
the minimum wage as a practical policy proposition. Firstly, the new
administration of Henry Campbell-Bannerman, containing many ministers
influenced by the development of 'New Liberal' thinking since the 18905,
enjoyed a landslide election victory. Amongst the deluge of new MPs were
notable social policy radicals such as Charles Masterman, Percy Alden and
Leo Chiozza Money. In addition, thirty MPs took the whip of the self-
proclaimed representative voice of the organised working class, the newly
christened Labour Party. Whilst this dramatic change in the composition of
the Commons by no means rendered legislative enactment of a minimum
wage inevitable, the eviction of Balfour's government and the infusion of
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radical Liberals amongst the new intake was an essential pre-requisite to the
realisation of such a policy.
In this favourable political context the mobilisation of public opinion
against the evils of sweated labour commenced. The sensational 'Sweated
Industries Exhibition', held at the Albert Hall during May and June 1906, led
to the formation of the National Anti-Sweating League (NASL) a few months
later. This pressure group succeeded in orchestrating the campaign against
sweating behind a single legislative prescription, minimum wage-fixing
boards. The NASL managed to persuade its broad coalition of supporters,
including the Trades Union Congress, that a minimum wage policy, applied to
a limited number of sweated trades on an experimental basis, represented
merely a small extra step in the development of Factory and Sanitary
legislation, rather than a huge psychological leap of faith contravening
conventional principles of political economy. Such was the clamour for action
against sweating generated by the NASL's campaign that by 1907 MPs were
debating seriously the legitimacy of a minimum wage experiment. In
response, the Home Secretary appointed a Select Committee to investigate the
question. Its favourable report in July 1908 provided the springboard for
legislation in 1909.
By illustrating the poor working conditions and very low pay I of
female home-workers, the Sweated Industries Exhibition had a huge impact on
well-to-do opinion. It even became a 'society event' after the Women's Trade
Union League (WTUL) persuaded the Princess of Wales to attend. The
exhibition was the brainchild of A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News.2 He
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was impressed at the favourable publicity promoted by the homework
exhibition held in Berlin in January 1906. With his proprietor's full support,
he approached the WTUL with a plan to sponsor a bolder exhibition in
London. With characteristic enthusiasm, Mary Macarthur, the WTUL's
Secretary, seized this golden publicity opportunity.
Under the leadership of J.J. Mallon' the NASL sustained the
momentum created by the Albert hall exhibition by staging similar ventures
over the next few years in provincial centres throughout the UK. The NASL's
biggest coup was to secure the support of the trade union movement for its
policy of wages boards for a limited number of sweated industries. Arthur
Henderson was instrumental in this achievement. A firm supporter of the
WTUL, he had been persuaded by Charles Dilke that a legal minimum wage
for unorganised sectors would help counter the degrading effect of sweated
labour on hard-won trade union standards."
On first reflection it was seem odd that trade unions had to be
persuaded of the merits of minimum wage protection for the lowest-paid
workers in society. However, whilst trade unions were increasingly willing
for the state to undertake responsibility for the 'Right to Work' and limitation
of the length of the working day, they remained very wary of state interference
in wage rate determination. This was viewed as an unwelcome encroachment
upon their exclusive sphere of jurisdiction. During the TUC Congress of
1909, David Shackleton claimed union paternity of the Trade Boards Act:
'The subject of the proper treatment of the evils of sweating has often
occupied the consideration of Congress, and it is gratifying to know that the
government Bill contains within it methods which we from time to time
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advocated.,5 However, this was a spurious adoption claim. The TUC made
no plea for minimum wage legislation in 1906. Only from 1907, after
pressure from Arthur Henderson and Mary Macarthur, in her capacity as head
of the National Federation of Women Workers, did Congress nod through
resolutions in support of the Sweated Industries Bill. Jenny Morris is right to
suspect that 'left to themselves the trade union movement would have failed to
mount a major campaign for legislation on low wages. ,6
The simplest explanation for this indifference can be gleaned from the
outburst of a boilermakers' union delegate, D.C. Cummings, at the 1907
Congress. He stated that the TUC's 'business was to carry out the behests of
those who had sent them there." Sweated workers had not the means to
organise, and hence were left largely untouched by trade union coverage.
Many trade unionists felt that they had enough injustices to fight defending
their sectional interests, let alone undertaking campaigns to correct all the
evils in society. After all, during this period, individual trade unionists could
still face victimisation from employers and the Taff Vale and other adverse
legal judgements rankled with organised labour. As workers faced an uphill
struggle to maintain the real value of wage-rates in the Edwardian period,
because of price-inflation, organised labour were hardly in the mood to
endorse the Webbs' view that 'the pressing need ... is not any increase in the
money wages of the better paid and stronger sections of the wage earners, but
a levelling-up of the oppressed classes who fall below the poverty line."
After extensive analysis of the Australian 'Special [wages] Boards',
Ernest Aves endorsed Margaret MacDonald's view that they weakened the
position of trade unions. Although Aves found that the establishment of
25
Special Boards in a trade tended to provide a modest stimulus to organisation,
and that unions had a useful role to fulfil in the effective operation and
monitoring of the system, he feared that the existence of statutory minimum
wage-fixing boards would reduce the incentive for trade union formation and
development." However, although this conviction foretold the arguments of
trade union opponents of trade boards in the 1920s, it was not seized upon by
organised labour in 1908-1909. Two factors probably accounted for this.
Firstly, a majority of trade unionists took little interest in the finer points of
the wages boards debate. Secondly, the minority of trade unionists
wholeheartedly subscribing to the NASL's campaign recognised that the
sectors for which wages boards were earmarked were anyhow characterised
by low, or non-existent, levels of voluntary organisation. In other words, the
NASL's proposal involved merely 'compulsory collective bargaining being
applied to trades in which collective bargaining had not arisen spontaneously
. ff . ,10or was me tective.
The proud masculine mind-set of trade unionists militated against their
viewing with enthusiasm legislative assistance to workers to secure higher
wages. They considered that, if allowed by the state to operate on an even
keel, 'organised labour ... was fairly well able to look after itself. ,11 Such was
the adherence by trade unions to the principle of free collective bargaining that
William Appleton, a lace-making trade unionist, could not bring himself to
countenance wages boards on anything other than a voluntary basis.12 Only
the weaker unions at Congress were attracted to the notion of government-
underwritten minimum wage guarantees. Organised labour felt that male
'breadwinners' should earn a living wage sufficient to support their
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dependants, thus freeing their wives from the necessity of entering the labour
market. Therein lay the skill of the NASL in identifying the sweated worker
for whom protection was needed almost exclusively with the plight of female
home-workers+
Whether the TUC supported the NASL's policy primarily from
enlightened or darker motives is difficult to assess. Certainly, if the opponents
of a statutory minimum wage policy were proved correct and home-workers
were displaced, at least they would no longer threaten male wage-rates and
employment by undercutting! However, it is more likely that a synthesis of
pity for the most downtrodden of workers and a recognition that female home-
workers enjoying the protection of a legal minimum wage were not a threat to
male trade unionists' 'independence' won them over to the cause of the
NASL. Of the woman worker, Nathan Buckner, a tailoring trade unionist,
sympathised patronisingly, 'it is impossible to expect her to organise and stand
up as a man. She may lose work, and she has to remember her children.' 14
Arthur Henderson and George Barnes were adamant that wages boards for
sweated industries would not be the 'thin end of the wedge' for general wage
I· 15regu ation.
The sensitivities of organised labour influenced the decision of the
form of legislative action against sweating to be adopted. For instance, the
trade unions' strong prejudice against compulsory arbitration precluded the
adoption in Britain of the New Zealand system of state arbitrated wage-rate
determination.i" Anti-sweating campaigners were thus left to weigh up the
relative merits of wages boards compared with various schemes for the
licensing of homework, based on the legislation of several American States.
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Under such schemes, homework was only legal if the worker held a licence
permitting her to work at a specified address.
Of course, a licensing scheme would not have made any direct impact
upon the wages received for homework, but supporters of such a policy argued
that by restricting the supply of labour via a licence, its price to employers
would rise. More generally, Margaret MacDonald argued that, 'if you
introduce improvements in one direction you really improve matters all round.
Get the work done under sanitary conditions, and it is [a] step towards raising
the self-respect of the workers ... with self-respect will come a demand for
better wages.t'" However, a majority of anti-sweating campaigners wanted a
more direct remedy for raising wages: 'I do not see that it [licensing] would do
us any good at all; it is only for the benefit of the people who buy the articles
in the way of preventing infection, but the worker would get no benefit, and it
would not alter our condition at all.'18 For some, support for wages boards
was a recognition that 'some factories do not pay any better inside than OUt.,19
It is interesting that the Trade Boards Act applied to both indoor and outdoor
work, despite neither the NASL nor the Select Committee having
recommended this step.
Ramsay and Margaret MacDonald were thus isolated In their
opposition to wages boards, both within the Labour Party and even within the
Women's Industrial Council, which originally favoured a licensing scheme.
This did not stop the MacDonalds fighting an increasingly bitter campaign
against wages boards. Only a few individuals, such as Clara Collet, a Board
of Trade official, sympathised with their arguments.i" Collet believed that
large proportions of home-workers were 'fairly comfortably situated married
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women, who add to family income' and the distressing cases were often
elderly people who should not have been still working.r' Margaret
MacDonald believed that removing widows and wives of incapacitated
'breadwinners' from the rigours of labour market competition, and
maintaining them via state benefits, was a more appropriate policy.
The MacDonalds feared that wages boards would fix rates at a level that
would achieve little more than sweating raised to a slightly higher level. Of
the sweated female worker, Ramsay asserted that 'she is not only easily
frightened by threats of loss of work, but has no very high demands at best, so
that the minimum which such boards will fix will not be above the economic
margin of home work, nor allow a satisfactorily high standard of life. ,22 In
view of the lack of organisation amongst sweated workers, the Macdonalds
also doubted whether the determinations of a wages board would ever be
enforced adequately. 'How would the price lists of our existing Conciliation
Boards be enforced if only a factory inspector and not a well-organised union
were behind them?,23
Margaret MacDonald lambasted the campaign for wages boards as a
diversion from the crusade for socialism: 'I regret that ... our socialist friends
should be helping ... to salve the consciences of the unconverted, and to assist
Liberal pseudo-reformers to pose as real reformers, by pointing out this
sidepath, which I hold to be a blind alley. ,24
In fact, the whole argument about the structure of legislation most
appropriate to counter the problem of sweated homework was entwined with
the debate over whether the abolition of homework itself was desirable.
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George Shann, a leading figure within the NASL admitted openly to the Select
Committee his desire to see homework diminished and driven into the
factories.f Most socialists disapproved of the practice. The Webbs
considered the
economic effect of homework is thus to undermine the Standard
Rate, to destroy the Normal Day, and to abstract from the total
remuneration of the operative, all the advantages of room, fire, light,
and sanitary conveniences which would otherwise be provided by
the employer. Nor are these insidious effects confined merely to the
outworkers. The operatives employed on similar tasks on the
employer's premises have to submit to reductions of wages and
extensions of hours, under the threat of the diversion of more and
more of the business of their out-working competitors. Homework,
in fact, makes all Trade Unionism impossible.f
The Social Democratic Federation'" and even some mainstream Labour Party
figures shared this stance. During the debate on the second reading of the
Trade Boards Bill, Tom Richards urged that any trade that could not pay its
workers a decent wage should be killed off and transferred into the factory.f
From an employers' perspective, D.S. Douglas, a cardboard box manufacturer,
complained to the Select Committee that the 'person who simply wants to
work outside the factory to have what they are pleased to call their "freedom",
that is to loaf about half the week and work hard next half, is a person who
ought to be put under proper discipline and to work under decent conditions in
a factory. ,29
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It is thus not surprising that some feminists suspected the motives of
wages board advocates. Helen Fraser asked a conference organised by the
Scottish Council for Women's Trades in 1907 whether it was right that they
approved of 'restrictive legislation with regard to women, while women had
politically no power at all. They were going to decide, in a well-meaning way
no doubt, that these women were to be protected, and yet they know perfectly
-tb
well that no woman was allowed voice her opinion politically. ,30 This was the
"
only substantial point made by feminists during the debate over wages boards.
The concurrent campaign for female suffrage seized their attention, even
though the overwhelming majority of sweated home-workers were female.
Against the blatantly expressed prejudices of some reformers, it is not
surprising that opponents sprang up to argue that however awful conditions of
home work may have been, the state had no right to deprive sweated workers
of their right to earn a meagre pittance. The National Home Workers League
claimed to represent some 3,000 homeworkers nation-wide. Miss Vynne and
Edith Lawson from this rather dubious organisation appeared before the Select
Committee. The latter summed up their philosophy as follows: 'We do not
like legislation. It is not elastic, and often does more harm than good.':" Miss
Vynne complained that, 'any legislation, any agitation, any worrying about
home-work makes the masters stop giving it out. A Sweated Industries
Exhibition in a town instantly means that two or three manufacturers stop
giving out work, and the people suffer,.32
This pressure group evidently exploited the fear of sweated workers
that any change would result in conditions becoming even worse for them. In
an unsuccessful attempt to imitate the effect Mary Macarthur's testimony had
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upon the Select Committee, Vynne and Lawson likewise produced seven
homeworkers. However, their testimonies exposed the League's antics as a
tragic farce. In stark contrast to Macarthur's seven workers, Lawson's were
all inarticulate, and were confused into thinking that a minimum wage would
result in a uniform wage, regardless of skill and efficiency." It would not have
taken much effort on the part of the League to explain dispassionately that the
proposal intended to fix minimum rates of wages. Miss Lawson admitted that
her officials made no attempt to explain the contents of the Sweated Industries
Bill, which they simply read out to a no-doubt bewildered homeworker!" In
the event, the Committee seemed unimpressed by the desire of the National
Home Workers League to keep their 'membership' in ignorance of the essential
facts of the debate.
The argument about whether legislation would diminish homework
took place because of the conventional assumption that if wages rose, less
demand for labour would ensue. In fact, Ernest Aves found that where Special
Boards had raised wages in Victoria, overall costs of production had not
followed suit. 35 Fabians explained that higher wages could often act as a spur
to greater efficiency, both on the part of the worker and with regard to
management practices, i.e. a reorganisation of production processes. Although
both Hobson and the Webbs acknowledged the possibility of some
displacement of workers occurring, they maintained that any shrinkage in
'parasitic trades' would be more than compensated for by a re-distribution of
capital and labour to more productive sectors." Unemployment was frankly
admitted as a risk, but downplayed as representing a short-term risk in the
wider interests of all workers. In this regard, Dilke urged the Select
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Committee not to exaggerate 'little difficulties'. 37 Most reformers accepted
his view that the need to find a remedy for an acknowledged evil was so great
that any individual hardship was a price worth paying to secure an overall
benefit to the community as a whole. Helen Bosanquet's warning that the
introduction of a minimum wage would be to the detriment of slower workers,
because of pressure to 'speed up', 38 was for the present disregarded by
enthusiasts for wages boards.
Momentum behind the campaign for wages boards began to gather
pace in 1907. Although Dilke' s Wages Boards Bill once again failed to secure
a second reading, the Labour Party managed to secure a brief second reading
for an identical Sweated Industries Bill. Apart from MacDonald, Labour MPs
were united behind this proposal; Henderson finally faced him down over this
issue at the 1908 Labour conference.l" However, in an ironic twist of fate that
betrayed the real priorities of the labour movement, the Sweated Industries
Bill died through lack of parliamentary time because the Commons had held a
long debate on the (Coal Mines) Eight Hours Bill.
Nevertheless, impressed by the favourable reaction to the Sweated
Industries Bill, the Home Secretary, Herbert Gladstone, established the Select
Committee on Home Work under Sir Thomas Whittaker40 in June 1907. The
success of the NASL in maximising support for its cause by linking the
perception of sweating exclusively with female homeworkers can be judged
from the title of the Committee. Five months earlier, Gladstone had appointed
Ernest Aves" to investigate the working of the Special Boards in Australia.
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The Labour Party ranked the Sweated Industries Bill as a key priority
in 1908. This year, however, the Bill was a cross-party proposal, enjoying a
wide measure of support, with George Toulmin, Liberal MP for Bury,
introducing the measure to an enthusiastic House of Commons.
The successful Liberal entrepreneur, Alfred Mond, endorsed Hobson's
argument in favour of the 'economy of high wages' and stressed that even
with higher wages and a shorter working day than the rest of Europe, Britain
still enjoyed lower labour costs per ton of production than any other
continental country. He recommended rigorous penalties for employers
infringing the decisions of wages boards and cited the presence of robust
organisation in healthy trades as a reason for his support for state assistance
for workers outside the remit of trade unions.42
On the Unionist benches James Craig and Frederick Banbury opposed
the proposals on individualist grounds. However, Banbury's hysterical
protests about 'socialistic measures' enjoyed surprisingly little support from
his own colleagues. On the contrary, John Hills and Alfred Lyttleton adopted
a very supportive attitude. After all, 'social imperialist' motivations allowed
even Conservative politicians to sponsor collective social welfare policies to
promote the 'physical efficiency' of 'future defenders of the Empire'.
However, this support was tempered by their stressing the importance of
limiting the experiment of any statutory regulation of wages to a restricted
number of trades, at least before any general expansion of the principle could
be considered. Pike Pease and E.A. Goulding, Conservative MPs for
Darlington and Worcester, respectively, both justified their support for the bill
on compassionate grounds. Pease wondered 'Why on earth should they allow
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people to go on working at starvation wages?,43 Goulding placed emphasis on
the number of women who would benefit from the proposed measure.
Utilising social imperialist arguments, he worried that sweated homeworkers
'had to work such long hours that, as a natural consequence, these unfortunate
women had to neglect their natural duties as mothers and housewives' .44
Banbury could not ignore the lack of sympathy on his own side for his
obstructive attitude and withdrew a hostile amendment he had tabled to
impede the Bill. Indeed, it was symptomatic of the mood of the debate that
the only occasion when party-political tension was roused was when Goulding
complained that no Tory MP was to be found amongst the sponsors of the
Bill!
If this reaction in parliament was music to the ears of the NASL, the
publication of Ernest Aves' Report in July 1908 was a setback in the campaign
for a minimum wage in Britain. Aves appreciated the simplicity and low
administrative costs of the Victorian Special Boards, and recognised the
advantages of minimum rates being fixed by representatives of the trade
affected. However, whilst he acknowledged their popularity locally and
credited their role in the establishment of a floor to wages, common standards
and beneficial customs in trades, he was not convinced that wages boards
could be applied in Britain. Generally, he saw wages boards as insufficiently
elastic to adapt to changed market conditions. He also considered that they
brought suffering upon the less efficient workers and encouraged the
substitution of juvenile labour for full-priced adult workers. In spite of the
fact that Special Boards had been a success in Victoria, he considered that this
colony enjoyed especially favourable conditions that would not apply to
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Britain. Victoria benefited both from geographical isolation and import
tariffs. This 'double' protection could thus better insulate their economy from
any ill-effects resulting from the fixing of a 'reckless' minimum wage. By
contrast, Britain was a free trade nation located in close proximity to its
continental economic rivals. Britain's female labour market suffered from a
glut of home-workers that served to lower its value; Victoria had less than
2,000 homeworkers and was desperately short of female labour. Its tiny
population in comparison with Britain's also acted as an insurance against
widespread collusion and evasion of legal minimum rates.
Rather limply, Aves concluded that any wages boards established in
Britain should be voluntary, relying on publicity rather than sanction to
'enforce' their decisions." However, there was much to encourage wages
board enthusiasts amongst the evidence contained in the Aves Report. Aves
found that wages had risen by 16.5per cent. in board trades since 1896, but by
only 11.6 per cent in non-board trades. Popular opinion in Victoria believed
that the boards had been successful in ameliorating sweating and Aves
acknowledged that general conditions of employment had improved under the
influence of the Boards.
Of particular relevance to British reformers was the experience of the
Victorian Special Boards in the clothing sector. As in Britain, this was
predominantly a female trade, and Aves singled-out the Clothing Boards as
being especially successful in securing an improvement in wages and
conditions.46 More generally, Aves had found no proof of pressure to 'speed
up', though less efficient workers did receive fewer offers of work, and higher
wages did indeed prove to be a spur to more efficient reorganisation within
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firms. Rather than costs of production rising with the increased wages bill, in
the clothing sector, there was even evidence of a fall in such costs."
This last point of Aves was very important as it provided an answer to
the argument of some tariff reformers that wages boards would be a useless
expedient in a free trade country. J.G. Newey, a hook and eye manufacturer
from Birmingham, told the Select Committee that wages boards would be of
'no use under our present system; they will become inoperative. ,48
Protectionists raised the spectre of foreign competition in home and overseas
markets if the prices of British manufactures were increased and worried that
foreign sweated labour would replace home sweated labour if wages boards
priced workers out of their jobs." But their arguments rested solely on the
assumption that any rise in wage rates produced a rise in the price of the
finished product. In addition to pointing out that this need not happen,
supporters of wages boards often drew attention to the persistence of sweating
in protectionist Berlin, Paris and Philadelphia, and the emergence of
campaigns there for legislation to correct it.50 At any rate, Whittaker's
Committee suggested that, in view of low-paid labour competition from parts
of Europe and the Far East, Britain would have to compete by the principles of
the economy of high wages; 'competition must be met by increased efficiency,
not by low wages.Y'
The Select Committee on Home Work took evidence from a wide
range of witnesses during its sittings in 1907 and 1908. They included
employers, trade unionists, charity workers, factory inspectors and other
government officials. Even the voices of sweated workers themselves were
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heard, albeit thanks to careful selection by both Mary Macarthur and the
National Home Workers League. Macarthur clearly had a great impact upon
the Committee, as did the failure of existing legislative remedies, such as
Factory Act regulations, to impact upon the sweating problem. However, the
testimony of George Askwith, the Board of Trade's Arbitrator and Conciliator
in industrial disputes, that 'Wages Boards are workable and practicable, and
would be beneficial, and ought to be tried' 52 helped swing the Committee
round to a unanimous recommendation that the wages boards experiment
should be tried.
The Committee was not disheartened by the attitude of employers
appearing before them. Whilst many remained opposed to the establishment
of wages boards, most of them were induced under questioning to admit some
benefits of such a scheme. Thus although their recommendations went much
further than the employer witnesses would have been comfortable with, the
MPs could justifiably claim to have framed their stance as a result of careful
sifting of their evidence.
Of course, the employers willing to be quizzed by the Committee were
the 'better' class who would have less to fear from legislation than 'sweaters'.
Even D.S. Douglas, no enthusiast for wages boards, admitted that, 'if you can
fix a uniform scale of wages, it would be a very good thing for the employers:
it would stop a rare lot of cutting among ourselves. I should like a strong
unio~ in our trade I can assure you. ,53 Although William Bridgett was careful
to stress that he held more advanced views on the matter than his Chamber of
Commerce colleagues, he supported statutory wages boards. The persistent
refusal of a minority of his lace-manufacturing rivals in Nottingham to obey
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the voluntarily agreed minimum tariff of piece-rates induced him to adopt this
stance" Introducing the Trade Boards Bill, Churchill was careful to stress
that a key principle behind it was 'to protect the good employers ... who are
anxious to pay a proper rate of wages from being undercut, and to protect
them by compulsory powers. ,55
Some employers disguised their opposition to the wages boards
principle by stressing practical difficulties likely to arise from their
operation.56 Several employers shared box-makers Charles Watts' and D.J.
Douglas' fear that 'employers on the Boards would have an undue advantage
over their competitors who would have to submit original designs for their
inspection.57 Others stressed the impracticality of fixing separate piece-rates
for the hundreds of subtly different designs, which could make a much greater
difference in the time and effort required producing the product. Dilke
countered that this multitude of designs could be slimmed down to a few basic
categories for the purpose of fixing piece-rates. Using Askwith's arguments,
he argued that the coal trade had managed to fix complicated schedules for
many different grades of work." The stance of Alfred Smith, a clothing
employer, that no employer would pay a worker, however skilled, a rate above
the minimum fixed was disbelieved and openly challenged by Committee
members.Y
The attitude of employers appearing before the committee was aptly
summarised by Dilke who asserted that most employers shared a 'not very
violent, but rather general opposition to all new laws. ,60 And as Aves
observed in Victoria, if a minimum wage must be fixed for their trade,
employers considered it better that it be done by wages boards where they
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would enjoy direct representation, than by an Arbitration Court. Ultimately,
George Askwith, who was well acquainted with the mind-set of employers,
did not believe the employers, as a whole, would stand in the way of
a minimum wage. If they could be brought out of the narrow limits
of their shops they would themselves fight the sweating employer
and prevent the middlemen getting an undue share of the profits.
The establishment of a Wages Board would not in any way injure
trade, nor was the fixing of a minimum wage such a terrible thing as
many appeared to think. He had himself fixed scores and scores of
minimum wages in all parts of the country, he believed with
excellent results."
In the autumn of 1908, Ramsay MacDonald observed waspishly, 'As
was expected, the Committee has reported in favour of Wages Boards. Most
of its active members were committed to that proposal before any evidence
was taken'. 62 Although this statement was broadly correct, this unanimous
recommendation by the cross-party Select Committee gave a huge boost to the
momentum for legislation.
After careful deliberations, these MPs decided that the payment of
wages inadequate for subsistence still existed on too extensive a scale for
parliament to ignore the fact and that existing remedies had failed to solve the
problem. They also recognised the very dim prospects that sweated workers
could ever combine together to demand for themselves better conditions.
They thus decided that legislation directly concerning rates of payment was
necessary. Accepting the argument long-articulated by the Webbs, the
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Committee were 'of opinion that it is quite as legitimate to establish by
legislation a minimum standard of remuneration as it is to establish such a
standard of sanitation, cleanliness, ventilation, air space, and hours of work. ,63
At the very least, argued Whittaker, boards could level-up wages to the
standard paid by the best employers in a trade.
The Chairman of the Home Work Committee viewed his
recommendations as representing a 'third way' between the opposing
extremes of tariff reformers and socialists:
who have convinced themselves that what our country needs is a
revolutionary change in our commercial system on the one hand and
in the economic laws of the social fabric on the other, and who,
consequently... exaggerate anything and everything that will lend
itself to the suggestion that the social and economic condition of the
people is deplorably bad and is steadily getting worse.64
Middle of the road Liberal opinion was happy to support a proposal, which
although marking a new departure in the role of the state, seemed less of a
threat to the existing order than the calls for protection of industry or the
'implementation of socialism'.
In order not to stray too far in advance of mainstream progressive
opinion, and as an insurance against the risks involved with such a new
departure, the Committee proposed wages boards for just three trades on an
experimental basis.65 They did not propose to extend the coverage of boards
into factory trades, and time-rates were to be used as a standard instead of
piece-rates. The Committee also rejected an attempt by Chiozza Money to
link wages boards with a co-ordinated assault on wider causes of poverty by
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means of policies to reform the Poor Law, old age pensions and invalidity
pensions, technical education for children and action to find work for the
unemployed." Wages boards were to be applied on a strictly 'limited
application' basis in order not to alienate both sympathisers with the plight of
the sweated on the Right and trade unions committed to the principle of
extending voluntary collective bargaining across industry.
Of course, a unanimous report from a group of MPs in favour of a
wages board experiment, and the general sympathy it won from their peers,
did not mean that the principle of statutory wage interference was not strongly
opposed in some quarters. Those holding such views would complain that the
'House of Commons is always dangerous when it is unanimous'I'"
There were still plenty of laissez-faire libertarians who believed that
statutory minimum wages offended against 'immutable economic law' .68 The
Vice President of the London Chamber of Commerce, Guy Morrish, defiantly
informed the Select Committee that he was opposed 'to the principle of any
interference between labour and capital. ,69 Unsurprisingly, the Liberty and
Property Defence League, which was similarly averse to state interference,
opposed the idea of a minimum wage both intrinsically and on the grounds
that improved conditions in newly-regulated trades would cause displacement
and an influx of labour into the still unregulated trades, thus intensifying
sweating.Y From the opposite end of the political spectrum, Ramsay
MacDonald also subscribed to this foreboding."
In parliament, doctrinaire believers in laissez-faire had become a rare
breed on the Liberal benches. Only Harold Cox, a bitter critic of the
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Government's social policies, spoke out against wages boards. On the
opposition side, the dwindling band of Unionist Free Traders defended these
views. Lord Hugh Cecil shared with the Liberty and Property Defence League
and The Spectator the misgiving that legal minimum wages represented an
oppressive degree of state control which could 'not logically stop until they
had substituted the State for the individual in all things.' 72 They argued that
'interference between an employer and homeworker ... is not free trade, while
measures for securing reasonable terms for the worker are just as clearly
protective.t " This was a moot point, but the principled opposition of laissez-
faire libertarians to state intervention generally devalued their arguments
against wages boards in the minds of the NASL's supporters.
In order to put pressure on the Government to sponsor a wages boards
bill in the 1909 Session, the National Anti-Sweating League marshalled a
'who's who' of influential public figures to present a deputation to the Prime
Minister on 14 December 1908. Headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the
delegation included several more bishops, the Chief Rabbi, Conservative
Lords Milner and Dunraven, a broad representative section of Parliamentary
opinion, female trade unionists and even the wife of the Home Secretary."
Asquith assured the deputation that he was 'one of those who feel very little
alarm, from a speculative or practical point of view, in the fixing of a
minimum wage.'75 Not to be outdone, Lord Milner announced publicly that
wages boards would form part of the social policy of a future Tory
administration. Whitehall took its cue and prepared its Trade Boards Bill. In
January 1909 responsibility for trade boards was transferred from the Home
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Office to the Board of Trade; the former department regarding their
establishment as akin to a development of Boards of Arbitration rather than an
extension of the Factory Acts. At the same time, H.J. Tennant, was appointed
Minister of State at the Board of Trade under Churchill. 76
Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade,
viewed trade boards as a useful surrogate to collective bargaining in those
trades where organisation of workers and employers had hitherto proved
impossible.f However, he was keen to limit this innovation to a select group of
trades. Churchill's Cabinet Memorandum of 12 March 1909 stressed that,
These methods of regulating wages by law are only defensible as
exceptional measures to deal with diseased and parasitic trades. A
gulf must be fixed between trades subject to such control and
ordinary economic industry. A clear definition of sweated trades
must comprise (a) wages exceptionally low, and (b) conditions
prejudicial to physical and social welfare. Every further extension of
the Act to trades not in the Schedule must obtain Parliamentary
sanction. Thus there is no danger of such principles being
unwittingly accepted as the normal basis of industry. 78
This was sound practical politics, as parliament was ready only for limited
encroachments of the 'free' wages contract.
The government-sponsored Trade Boards Bill was introduced to the
Commons for the first time just two days before the second-reading debate of
the cross-party Sweated Industries Bill in March 1909.79 Like its rival
measure, it proposed to establish wages boards for the tailoring, lace-finishing,
and blouse-making trades, but the (paper and cardboard) box making trade
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was also included in the schedule. Not surprisingly, the Commons' debate
mirrored that of the previous year's Sweated Industries Bill. Churchill
enthused to his wife, 'The Trade Boards Bill has been beautifully received & it
will be passed without a division. A. Balfour & Alfred Lyttleton were most
friendly to it, & all opposition has faded away. ,80
Emphasising the gender question in his support for the Bill, Lyttleton,
from the Conservative front bench, appealed to the 'chivalrous instincts of the
House' to help remedy the condition of 'poor women and girls'." With
Balfour, he ensured the swift withdrawal of a 'blocking' tariff reform
amendment, even though he saw the measure as a second-best option to
Protection.
In fact, trade boards could offer hope to tariff reformers. This was not
simply because, as Unionist Free Traders claimed, minimum wage regulation
contravened the 'free' labour market element of free trade. Trade boards
could conceivably evolve into mechanisms for deciding tariff levels on an
industry-by-industry basis, or at least highlight the need for them."
Additionally, the Free Traders' jibe at the 'dear loaf tariff policy could be
muted if trade boards were raising domestic wage levels. Alternatively,
believing that sweating was part and parcel of a free trade regime and that any
attempt to solve it short of Protection was futile, tariff reformers could
welcome the minimum wage experiment on the grounds that its failure would
strengthen their arguments!
Balfour was not prepared to allow his party to be seen to scupper a bi-
partisan measure designed for the benefit of poor female workers and enjoying
wide-support amongst the chattering classes outside parliament. Frederick
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Banbury was left to fume on the sidelines, 'I believe this is one of the most
dangerous Bills that have ever been introduced into the Commons ... I regret
very much the attitude which my party has taken up upon it. ,83 Viscount
Castlereagh best summed up the mood of those MPs who were not overly
keen on the Bill. Despite disliking the principle that the state should intervene
in wage-rate determination, he declined to oppose the Bill: 'With regard to the
evils of sweating, they are of so terrible a character that it ill becomes anyone
to oppose legislation even though not completely convinced of its success."
Despite the contention of H.J. Tennant that the Trade Boards Bill was
'at once an experiment and a revolution - a new step in the social progress', 85
the fact that it was also a modest measure, rather than a 'complete surrender to
the Socialist Party' ,86 accounted for the general goodwill towards it from all
sides of the House of Commons. Both Conservative and Liberal speakers
emphasised their support for the limited, experimental aspect of the Bill.
Alfred Lyttleton qualified his strong support for the Bill with a request for the
opportunities for the easy expansion of trade boards to industries other than
those scheduled to be tightened up. This point was echoed by other MPs,
chiefly Conservatives, unhappy with the initial proposition that trade boards
could be extended to further trades by a 'Ministerial Order' operational after it
had lain unchallenged on the table of the House of Commons for thirty days.
In theory, this could have facilitated a very wide expansion of the principle of
minimum wages, but as mentioned above, the Board of Trade had already
emphatically rejected this strategy.
However, Churchill's desire 'to preserve a general measure of
agreement for a Bill which is more a House of Commons Bill than a Bill of the
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Government' ,87 led him agree with Conservatives an alternative means of
providing for the future extension of trade boards.f The far more restrictive
'Provisional Order' expedient was substituted. This procedure necessitated
most of the stages of a full-scale bill before securing parliamentary approval.
The Liberal and Conservative front benches thus ensured that any extension of
the trade boards experiment would be a difficult and lengthy process, though
by convention, Provisional Orders rarely even encountered a division. In his
willingness to maximise the consensus in favour of the Trade Boards Bill,
Churchill infuriated Labour MPs. However, in view of the labour movement's
wariness of any extension of the principle of state determined wages, it is
possible that this represented mere pique at not being consulted over the
change.t"
Although the extension of trade boards to new sectors was made a
more remote prospect by the above change, the determination of the female
chain-makers from Cradley Heath ensured that chain-making was
incorporated into the schedule of the Act, in place of the blouse-making trade.
In a very rare example of sweated workers evidently acting in a pro-active
manner by combination, Sheila Blackburn has described the lobbying of
Thomas Sitch, Secretary of their union, to convince sympathetic MPs that the
trade was worthy of inclusionr"
At a time of fierce 'Peers verses the People' controversy over the
Budget, the House of Lords raised no objection to the Trade Boards Bill. Lord
Salisbury, the official Conservative spokesman on the Bill in the Upper
House, endorsed it on the grounds that it was experimental and 'because the
ordinary trade remedy for these evils appears to be impracticable - I mean the
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union of the workers. ,91 Hence this minimum wage measure reached the
statute book in October 1909 against remarkably little resistance.
Trade board enthusiasts had thus succeeded in inducing parliament to
sponsor a groundbreaking statutory minimum wage experiment in 1909.
Thereafter, the NASL needed to demonstrate that trade boards raised wages
without endangering the economic viability of industry. As the sole legal
minimum wage model that the state was prepared to countenance at this time,
the credibility of the principle as a practical public policy expedient depended
upon the performance of the trade boards.
Sheila Blackburn has thus observed wryly that, 'in view of the
trepidation with which the Trade Boards Act was finally placed on the statute
book, it was perhaps inevitable that the benefits of the first boards would be
greatly exaggerated by their supporters.t'" Certainly, key figures within the
NASL, such as A.G. Gardiner and 1.J. Mallon, were eager to claim that
'remarkable success has attended the operation of the Act. ,93 Significantly
however, officials at the Board of Trade appeared to concur with this positive
assessment. Although they felt unable to give an ultimate verdict upon the
performance of the boards, given the general prosperity of the 1910-1914
period, civil servants felt that 'so far as we are able to judge at the present time
the result is a success'. Furthermore, 'both employers and employed have
found that the Trade Boards have been extremely useful; and no injury has
been done to the trade. ,94 Accordingly, trade boards were established for four
new trades employing almost 200,000 workers in 1913 (see below).
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R.H. Tawney embarked upon the most thorough assessment of the
performance of trade boards. The chain trade was the first subject of his
analysis," both because of its concentration in a small district and it being the
first board to fix minimum rates. Tawney was anxious to stress that he did not
consider the chain trade as necessarily representative of industry as a whole.
More significant was his subsequent study into the effects of a minimum wage
in the tailoring industry. As a nation-wide trade, operating under a variety of
different conditions, Tawney could claim justifiably that the 'establishment of
minimum rates of payment by the Tailoring Trade Board may be regarded
I . . ,96a most as an experimentum CruCIS. He went on to conclude that 'if
minimum rates can be enforced in this particular industry without mischievous
economic reactions (such as the creation of unemployment) ... they can ... be
enforced in almost any other. ,97 Blackburn treats this favourable assessment
with scepticism." However, though Tawney was an enthusiastic supporter of
the trade boards, his writings on them were not simply works of one-sided
propaganda. He offered criticisms of their administration, and was mindful
that trade boards had yet to be subject to the test of a trade depression. In the
succeeding paragraphs, an analysis will be made of the effects of the trade
boards in action.
The length of time it took for the initial trade boards to fix a minimum
rate caused disquiet amongst commentators. The official history of the
clothing workers' union considered the trade boards a 'cumbersome body' and
was scathing that, 'for fourteen months nothing happened. ,99 Of course, much
time was spent in the preliminary work of establishing the trade boards during
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1910. Officials consulted with representatives of the trade regarding the
precise scope of the boards, and the members to be chosen to sit on them.
However, the pace of progress was scarcely hastened once these
preliminary tasks had been completed. Tawney considered
the suggestion sometimes made that the system is likely to result in
ill-advised interference, in rashly thrusting an iron-rod into the
mechanism of industry ... almost ludicrous. In practice, the Boards
proceedings are characterised by a caution surpassing that of
Government departments.l'"
For example, only after the Tailoring Trade Board's eighth meeting, on 10-12
July 1912, nineteen months after its first, did it agree finally upon its minimum
time-rate for adult women; another month passed before it came into operation
on 19 August. The rate did not have full legal force, 'Obligatory Order', until
20 February 1913, as for the first six months of 'limited operation' rates were a
civil contract rather than a legal one.
Nevertheless, the different cost of living in different parts of the
country and the differentiation in trade product complicated the job of the
Tailoring and Box-making Boards and manufacturing processes, an issue that
raised questions regarding the scope of the determinations. One advantage of
the proceedings having been of a 'protracted character"?' though was that all
sections of the trade were consulted before minimum rates were fixed.
Unsurprisingly, the Chain and Lace-finishing Trade Boards, serving only
Cradley Heath and Nottingham respectively, established their minimum rates
well before the larger boards.
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The structure of trade boards, while conducive to inclusive decision-
making, did not promote brisk rate fixing. The need to refer provisional
decisions of the full board to district trade committees, regional consultative
boards constituted on the same principle as the national board, added several
months to the deliberations of the Box-making and Tailoring Trade Boards.
Time was also wasted by representatives of both sides being reluctant initially
to propose rates which had a realistic prospect of securing consensus, or more
realistically, the support of the 'appointed' (independent) members. In the
words of a northern box manufacturer, 'much argument was wasted by both
sides trying to achieve the impossible' .102
However, once such ritual horse trading over rates had been dispensed
with, trade boards could decide upon minimum rates fairly quickly. For
instance, at only the second meeting of the Shirt-making Trade Board, on 29-
30 April 1914, a compromise proposal by the workers' representatives for a
31h.d. minimum female hourly time-rate won the support of the appointed
members. Alas, this swift decision did not receive the full force of law until the
following year. This case illustrated the importance of the appointed members,
as they had become frustrated during the first meeting of the Shirt-making
Trade Board at the disparity between the proposals of both sides.l'" Whatever
their respective instincts, representatives of workers and employers were thus
forced ultimately to propose rates which were likely to win the support of
dispassionate members representing the wider community. Both sides grasped
quickly that initiating a reasonable compromise paid dividends in terms of
goodwill from the chairman.i'" By such behaviour in 1914, employers'
representatives on the tailoring board insured themselves against a substantial
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increase In female rmmmum rates when they readily consented to a ~d.
hourly-increase, albeit on condition its delayed implementation, after workers'
. d .. l~representatives propose a nse In rates.
The task of arriving at a consensus on trade boards was sometimes
hampered by tensions within the respective representative sides. Despite long-
standing gender antagonism in many sectors of trade, prompted by male
workers fearing that female presence in a trade depressed their wages, both
male and female employees were represented on most boards; apart from one
or two women, however, most worker representatives were male.
Nevertheless, only when downward pressure was applied to minimum rates
after 1920 did women clothing workers complain that trade boards were
neglecting their interests in favour of the skilled male minority in the trade (see
below, Chapter Four).
Conversely, the composition of employer representation on boards
caused much early controversy. After losing their battle with the Board of
Trade to have sub-contractors included as workers' representatives on the
tailoring board, clothing employers insisted that they be protected from the
threat that master tailors would combine with workers' representatives to
outvote them by a system of 'side' voting. Hence, whenever a controversial
issue arose on the board, employers claimed 'voting by sides', i.e. a majority
vote amongst employers was counted as a unanimous 'block' vote. Tawney
complained about the 'suppression of minorities' on this trade board.l'"
Nonetheless, the suspicion of manufacturers that 'sub contracting employers
were practically not employers seeing that many of them work at the same
work as those whom they employ't'" was borne out by their consistent
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willingness to sponsor a higher minimum rate than factory employers could
tolerate.l08
However, manufacturers from relatively highly paid northern districts
also disappointed their southern and eastern brethren by their unwillingness to
oppose minimum rates deemed too high by employers from these low-paying
districts. The Leeds district of the clothing employers' organisation belatedly
and only reluctantly agreed to fall in with other districts in opposing the 3Y2d.
rate initially proposed by the Tailoring Trade Board. R. Bourke, a Leeds
clothing manufacturer, professed himself bewildered at the clamour to oppose
hi d ' . 109t IS mo est rmmmum rate. Similarly, Co-operative Wholesale Society
employer representatives sometimes sympathised with the appeals of the
k ' . 110wor ers representatives. Box-making employers, on the other hand,
seemed more concerned that workers' representatives should only be drawn
from amongst those actively engaged in the trade, II I a ruse no doubt designed
to exclude articulate trade unionists or NASL officials from facing them during
trade board deliberations!
We tum now to the question of the minimum rates actually fixed by the
trade boards. Whilst the 1909 Act permitted trade boards to fix minimum
piece-rates, it obliged them to fix minimum time-rates. Most workers during
this period were, however, paid by piece-rate. Payment by time-rate was
generally reserved for a small proportion of workers where piece-rate payment
was found to be impractical, for example, where a worker was engaged in
work which was constantly varied in character, or was primarily of a
supervisory nature. Nevertheless, it was recognised that fixing piece-rates for
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the vast array of different processes within a trade was too complicated a task
for trade boards. A committee of the Tailoring Trade Board considered fixing
general minimum piece-rates in 1913, but decided to 'postpone' the
question! 112 Instead, an obligation was placed on an employer to demonstrate
that the piece-rate he paid his employees would yield 'to the ordinary worker at
least the same amount of money as the minimum time-rate.' 113 Only in the
district-level chain board did the fixing of an extensive range of minimum
piece-rates eclipse the significance of the minimum time rate fixed.
Nonetheless, even supporters of trade boards were embarrassed at the
low level of the minimum time rates for Chain-making. The minimum hourly
time rate of 2'h.d. won a female chain-maker, working a full 54-hour week,
only lIs. 3d. Tawney admitted that this rate was 'extremely low', but he
asserted that as the chain trade had experienced a sharp downturn in 1908-
1909, because of the state of the shipbuilding sector, its representatives were
erring on the side of caution in plumping for such modest rates. Nevertheless,
he regretted the repercussions this decision had for subsequent trade board
determinations.114 Clearly, trade board minima did not represent a 'living
wage', which Hobson had defined as representing a level sufficient for at least
'the maintenance of all wholesome and pleasant elements of customary
consumption' .II 5 The rates fixed were perhaps more akin to the subsistence
wage advocated by the Webbs. However, as the trade boards had to pay
attention to 'what the trade could bear', even this supposition is of uncertain
accuracy. 1.J. Mallon conceded a 'weakness of the Trade Board method,
which results in the fixing of a wage based neither upon the cost of living nor
upon consideration of what the trade can bear, but upon a blend of both.' 116
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Unsurprisingly, there was frustration amongst trade uruons at the
modest rates fixed by the trade boards. Thomas Sitch, of the chain-makers'
union, feared that employers were succeeding in using the boards 'as an
instrument of legalising sweating instead of using it as a means to stamp out an
evil that has blighted the district'.'!" Disgusted that adult women clothing
workers with four years experience had waited almost three years for a
minimum hourly-rate of only 3Y4d., W.E. Jansen, a member of the Tailoring
Trade Board and an Amalgamated Union of Clothing Operatives (AUCO)
delegate at the 1912 TUC, complained that trade boards were a handicap to the
workers.i" Furthermore, as R. Bourke, the Leeds clothing manufacturer,
reminded the Tailoring Trade Board, 'while a 3Y4d rate would yield 13/6Y2for
a full week of 50 hours, it would only yield a rate averaging 11/11 per week for
twelve months owing to the seasonal character of the trade.' 119
Supporters of trade boards were thus faced with a difficult task in
convincing organised labour of their beneficial effects. Nonetheless, Tawney
pointed out that, though the rates of wages sanctioned by the boards were
hardly generous, they did represent an advance on wage-rates paid prior to the
establishment of trade boards. Moreover, in chain making, he could
demonstrate that piece-rates had not merely remained stagnant in 1909
compared with two decades earlier, but they had actually fallen. He could
therefore argue that, had 'the trade boards not intervened, the condition of the
outworkers in 1914 would probably have been much what it was in 1876, 1888
and 1910.'120 Likewise, the modest minimum hourly-rate for lace finishers of
2%d. contrasted favourably with the evidence that such workers at the Sweated
Industries Exhibition earned barely two-pence an hour.121
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A chief factor in the consensus behind the Trade Boards Act was the
conviction that the legislation was as much about improving the social
condition of sweated women workers as for the statutory determination of
wages. However, the trade boards felt little inclination to challenge the
convention that female rates should remain at approximately half the level of
male rates. Nevertheless, whilst the earnings of full-time female workers in
the four scheduled trades were modest, at between lis. 3d. and 13s. 6Yzd., it
should be borne in mind that the 1906 census of wages revealed that one-third
of women employed in factories and workshops earned less than ten shillings
per week.122 Against this fact, the achievement of the trade boards appeared
impressive. After all, it was entirely within the remit of the boards, with their
concern for 'exceptionally low' rates of payment, merely to lift women's wage
levels to the nation-wide average often to twelve shillings per week. Although
this aim was less noble than attempting to raise wages to the level of a living
wage, it must be remembered that this aspiration, when it was supported at all,
was almost universally reserved for male 'breadwinners'.
Naturally, the lowest paid workers benefited most from the trade
boards. The conditions of learners improved significantly in all four scheduled
trades. Tawney demonstrated that piece-rates for the lowest two grades of
chain making increased by 67 per cent. and 49 per cent. respectively.V'
Increases of a similar scale were reported amongst the lace-finishers.
Although there was no general increase in earnings as a result of the
determinations of the box-making and tailoring boards, workers in poorly-paid
districts did enjoy such rises. Largely concentrated in southern England, 38 per
cent. of female tailoring workers in Britain enjoyed a rise in their weekly
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earnings.v" Similarly, whilst most men engaged in tailoring already earned the
six-pence hourly minimum rate, as evidenced by the low number of employer-
objections to the rate, those in isolated districts such as Hebden Bridge and
Swindon won advances in their eamings.l'"
Trade unionists welcomed this evidence of wages being levelled-up to
the better standard of trade. Nevertheless, they were more concerned that trade
board minimum rates did not become a 'maximum' and massage down the
wage-rates earned by organised, predominantly male, workers in the higher
sections of the trades covered by the boards. At the foot of each official
notification of a trade board minimum was the following clause: 'The above
Minimum Time Rates are without prejudice to the workers who are earning
higher rates of wages. ' Although Tawney found that a minuscule proportion of
tailoring firms had reduced piece-rates for higher grades of work, he concluded
that there had 'been no general tendency for the minimum to become the
maximum.Y''' However, one box-manufacturer did rejoice in his board's
determination, calling it the
'Box Trade Arbitration Treaty', for it not only protects the worker
against bad conditions and sweated wages, but it also SECURES
THE EMPLOYER FROM TRADE DISPUTES AND STRIKES,
and relieves him the responsibility of having to meet demands for
increased wages single-handed. In future, all such difficulties will
be referred to the Trade Board, and its award will have the force of
law, and what is perhaps better, it will carry with it the united
influence of the representatives of both sides.127
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Fortunately for trade unionists, trade board members had no desire to assume
the role of an arbitrator of higher earnings in the trade, as envisaged for them
by this employer. In fact, as organisation amongst workers became stronger in
the scheduled trades, unions in some districts secured wage-agreements well in
excess of statutory minimum levels (see below).
Another benefit of trade board determinations recognised by
contemporaries was that 'no deductions from such rates are permissible' .128
This principle was of no small importance to workers, for as late as 1912,
complaints were still aired at the TUC regarding 'robbery' of employee
earnings by means of unjust deductions from official wage-rates, by means of
charges for such provisions as hot water, stools and thread.!"
Minimum wage rates fixed by the trade boards were deemed not to
have been responsible for price rises. The years prior to 1914 were in any case
characterised by sharp price inflation. Although Tawney acknowledged that
the price of chain had risen substantially between 1909 and 1912, he pointed
out that the quality of the product had also increased significantly since then,
remembering also that prices would have been lower in 1909 because of the
depression in trade. Conversely, Tawney concluded that there was 'no
evidence that any appreciable rise in prices has been caused by the
establishment of minimum rates of payment in the tailoring industry, though
there has probably been some decline in the quality of clothing.' 130
Notwithstanding this last point, Tawney was convinced that the boards had, by
setting 'general rules', raised the standard of the trades. He even predicted that
the wild fluctuations in wage-rates and prices, which had proved so
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destabilising to trade, would henceforth be checked by the existence of
minimum rates, thus lessening the severity of any future depression.i"
Many commentators feared that a minimum wage would lead to the
displacement of slow and inefficient workers, which, by increasing
unemployment, would accentuate the miserable plight of sweated workers.
The fixing of a minimum wage, ostensibly to help the worst-paid, would be of
little use if that rate was considered by employers to be too high to render the
employment of slow, elderly and otherwise inefficient workers feasible. One
trade publication jeered that the 'ship in danger of sinking is to be saved by
throwing the women and children overboard!' 132 Using a less delicate turn of
phrase, a spokesman for laundry employers asserted that, 'No commercial man
will pay a duffer more than she is worth, and if the Trade Board raise the wage
all the duffers will have to go I do not know where.' 133 However, the Trade
Boards Act provided for permits to be issued to employers authorising them to
pay lower rates to such workers, usually elderly and disabled employees.
Surprisingly, just 121 such certificates had been issued for all scheduled trades
by May 1913.134
Instead, the tailoring board decided to insure against the possibility of
its inefficient workers losing work by devising the rule that piece-rates were
considered to conform with its determinations as long as they provided just
eighty per cent. of workers with the means to earn the minimum time rate. In
other words, twenty per cent. of workers, if they were deemed less capable
than 'ordinary' workers, could legally be paid below the statutory minimum
rates! Trade unionists were naturally concerned at 'a practice which allows the
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employer to get out of his liabilities after a rate has been fixed by the board.' 135
Workers' representatives on the Tailoring Trade Board registered their
conviction that all workers, except those certified as unfit to earn the minimum
rate, should receive the minimum rates.136 Tawney, acknowledged that in view
of the 'large number of elderly persons who are employed in some branches of
the tailoring industry, the retention of the percentage rule as a safety-valve may
be judicious.' However, he hoped that in time 'the percentage who at present
may earn less than the minimum should be reduced.' 137 Not surprisingly in
view of this rule and the general prosperity of trade in 1913-14, Tawney found
hardly any evidence of displacement in the tailoring trade as a result of the
minimum wage. Although he did find some evidence of dismissals in some
East-Anglian firms, he claimed that after re-training, most of the workers soon
regained work. Any displacement that did occur, Tawney argued, was very
gradual, and took the form of employers taking a keener interest in which
younger workers entered the trade.138
In fact, trade boards were generally credited with fostering increased
efficiency, thus confirming Hobson's belief in the 'economy of higher wages.'
Tawney, ever-mindful that 'bad wages produce bad work is an experience as
common as it is habitually disregarded' noted that an increase in worker output
. id d . h .. 139coiner e WIt a nse m wages. However, Tawney admitted that
productivity amongst workers did not increase solely due to the benevolent
effects of higher earnings on their nutritional intake. He found evidence of
'speeding-up' in ill-managed tailoring firms, whereby undue pressure was
placed on employees 'to earn the minimum time-rate on piece-rates which will
not produce it except at the cost of nervous overstrain.' 140
60
Efficiency improvements were also stimulated on the side of the firm.
David Little, a prominent clothing manufacturer, believed that the
establishment of legal minima in his industry had fostered a minimum standard
of management.'?' Firms were spurred on to find savings in their operating
costs by investing in better machinery, re-organising their manufacturing
processes on more efficient lines, and regularising output. This latter
efficiency improvement resulted in a shorter working week, in some cases, as
employers reduced the amount of time workers were kept waiting for work, to
a minimum.V Felix Maginn was confident that most firms could afford to pay
any increased wage costs from efficiency-savings:
I greatly doubt if any employer has reached such perfection of
arrangements in his factory that nothing remains to be saved. In any
ordinary business keen organisation seems to be almost the last thing
thought about. ... If the State interference in the matter of wages
compels manufacturers to organise their businesses more perfectly,
and to pay in wages what is now wasted in antiquated processes and
in unscientific use of material and other ways, it may eventually
prove a boon to them and the nation at large.l'"
Only firms operating at the margin of trade found such a solution to a higher
wage burden impossible. Very few members of the Edwardian polity mourned
the demise of such concerns, given its tacit acceptance of the Webbs' view that
'parasitic' trades should be left to wither and die. Workers thereby losing their
jobs would soon find new ones in more efficient and productive sectors, so the
hypothesis went.
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It was very important for enthusiasts of trade boards to convince trade
unions that they had fostered organisation amongst the workers covered by
their remit. This was especially pressing given that Ernest Aves had concluded
in 1908 that special boards in Australia had weakened the motives for trade
union formation and development. Fortunately for reformers, there was ample
evidence of the spur given to employee organisation by the trade boards prior
to 1914. No doubt aided by the prevalence of general prosperity and rising
trade union membership, the mere passage of the Act seems to have produced a
positive effect on recruitment: female membership of the Amalgamated
Society of Tailors and Tailoresses doubled during the second half of 1909.144
More spectacularly, the Amalgamated Union of Clothing Operatives, which
enjoyed a more consistent reputation for welcoming female and semi-skilled
recruits, increased its membership total from 2,500 in 1907, to 4,000 in 1911,
and 12,000 in 1915.145 The bulk of this increase occurred in the year after
minimum rates became obligatory, before the outbreak of war. Mary
Macarthur's National Federation of Women Workers (NFWW) was also able
to recruit chain-makers on an impressive scale in Cradley Heath, though the
bulk of this work was completed before the establishment of the board.
However, during the war, the flight of such workers into better paid munitions
work impacted upon the NFWW's membership totals for this sector.
At the very least, trade boards were shown not to have an adverse effect
on trade union membership. Indeed, by enabling workers to afford
subscriptions and raising their aspirations, trade boards were credited with
aiding the unionisation of low-paid workers. In many districts, the AUCO was
able to negotiate agreements with employers that established minimum wage-
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rates for men and women at significantly higher levels than the statutory
figures.i'" Thus, trade boards, though conceived as a substitute for collective
bargaining, were succeeding in promoting the real thing, albeit on a localised
scale. Consequently, NASL members were able to bury their disappointment
that trade boards had failed to establish 'living' wage-rates. By providing an
impetus to voluntary organisation, they reasoned that trade boards provided
workers with an indirect means of securing a living wage: 'the Trade Boards
method, while not ensuring at the outset a satisfactory wage, evokes the forces
that eventually cannot fail to secure it.' 147 Likewise, Tawney insisted that
trade unionism was an essential tool to workers covered by trade boards,
securing for them higher rates than bare minima and helping to police the
ACt.148
Nevertheless, although Tawney claimed that the effects of trade boards
upon organisation offered hope and encouragement to workers in other trades,
Mary Macarthur faced a fairly lonely task in accentuating the positive impact
of the trade boards to a lukewarm audience at the TUC in 1912 and 1913. This
may have been accounted for by organised labour's confidence that the
government had no desire to encroach upon its collective bargaining role by
establishing trade boards in unionised sectors. It was illustrative that the
higher grades of work performed by heavily unionised men in the chain-
making, tailoring and lace trades were deliberately excluded from the coverage
of the initial trade boards. Similarly, when the Board of Trade proposed to
extend trade boards to new trades in 19l3, an official was anxious to stress that
'we only wish to include tin boxes and canisters which are made by women ...
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For instance, we do not wish to include the heavy tin boxes which are made by
members, say of the Tinsmith's Union.,149
Trade boards provided a greater spur to employer mobilisation. For
instance, prior to 1909, no organisation of clothing factory occupiers existed.
However, a London clothing manufacturer considered that the Act provided
the practical necessity for such an association. He also revealed a conviction
that other employers in other sectors were only too willing to support the
establishment of a tailoring trade board, as long as they remained
unencumbered by such 'interference':
There were certain trades which had hoodwinked the Government
over this very matter by saying that Trade Boards would be
impossible in their trade, but that in the clothing trade Trade Boards
would work. He thought it was time that they amalgamated to look
ft hei . 150a er t err own mterests.
Larger employers wasted no time in preparing for state intervention in their
trade. A powerful nation-wide Clothing Manufacturers Federation, though
representing only a minority of the number of firms in the tailoring trade
accounted for the bulk of its production, was functioning by the spring of 1910.
An Employers (Trade Board) Joint Advisory Committee, encompassing
representatives from all scheduled trades, was also established in October
1910. These employer organisations quickly established their effectiveness.
Minutes of the clothing manufacturing organisations reveal very thorough
preparation for trade board meetings.!" whilst their successful co-ordination of
the lobbying campaign against the proposed female tailoring rate of 3Yld. in
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1911-12 was masterly. Thus in April 1913, when the Board of Trade indicated
its intention of establishing a shirt-making trade board, the first response of the
employers in the trade was not to oppose the proposal, on the contrary, they
adopted a very sanguine attitude, but to organise themselves into a
federation.P' In a relatively short time, most employers covered by trade
boards acknowledged the benefits their operation brought to the trade. The
fear of the Nottingham Chamber of Commerce in 1909 that the lace-finishing
trade board would bring 'ruinous consequences to local industry,153 was soon
proved to have been unjustified; trade boards served employers well in
practice.
Indeed, employers even found common ground with workers'
representatives in pressing for uniform national minimum rates, to include
Ireland,154 and an extension of the scope of existing trade boards.l" Of course,
fear of other employers gaining an undue advantage by undercutting the rates
of those who were forced to abide by trade board rates prompted this
standpoint. Employers bound by trade board regulations considered that, if
they were to be subject to such 'burdens', why should not other employers?
Clothing manufacturers thus had little sympathy for their East Anglian rivals,
and Tailoring Trade Board colleague, who lobbied for a reduced minimum rate
to apply to their district.l" Stronger employers, able to afford higher wages,
had scant concern for their inefficient competitors struggling to operate on the
margins of the trade.
Although employers in the scheduled trades were largely reconciled to
their boards, certain deficiencies in the definition and administration of the Act
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infuriated workers and employers alike. G.W. Brown, president of the Leeds
clothing employers' organisation and member of the tailoring board, was
scathing that his 'association has had to advise the Board of Trade to whom
their Act applies'. Furthermore, he was frustrated that he had 'totally failed to
get a definition from the Board of Trade of what is an "ordinary" worker.' 157
As mentioned above, trade unionists were frustrated by the 'absolute
farce' of the working of the eighty per cent. piece-rate rule.158 They were also
aggravated by the six months of 'limited operation' which served as an
interlude between minimum rates being fixed by a trade board and the Board
of Trade intervening to give them full legal sanction. With so much
deliberation before a trade board even fixed a rate, the justification for such a
procedure was questionable. When the limited operation period of the chain
board commenced in August 1910, the employers began a lockout of the
women who refused to accept lower rates; the workers feared that employers
were intending to stockpile chain as an insurance against the full operation of
the minimum rate. However, their strike proved so successful that after two
months, the employers were forced to concede the new rates as obligatory, four
months before they legally-were. Blackburn has credited the chain-makers
with ensuring 'by their struggle that the Trade Boards Act would be applied,
not only to their trade, but to other industries, rather than remaining a dead
letter.' 159
The trade boards experiment was indeed undermined by the
opportunities for evasion of minimum rates, as the MacDonalds had predicted.
Although it was assumed that as both employers and employees had a common
interest in ensuring the observance of trade board determinations, instances of
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evasion would be infrequent, this proved to be a forlorn hope. Miss Sydney
Phelps, of the Home-workers Aid Association, provided anecdotal evidence of
employers attempting to undercut minimum rates in the box-making trade.160
With greater certainty, Tawney, using Trade Board Inspectorate figures, found
that of 339 visits paid to employers in the six months to 31 March 1914, in
only 128 cases was there no irregularity found.l'" He feared that there was a
'real risk of the Trade Board's determination being evaded in certain localities
and in certain sections of the trade.' A similarly high proportion of
'irregularities' was uncovered during the following year.162 Against this clear
threat to the credibility of trade boards, the low number of inspectors employed
to enforce their decisions was recognised as woefully inadequate by employers
and workers.163 By the summer of 1913 the enforcement of minimum rates for
over 250,000 workers working in thousands of firms was the responsibility of
an inspectorate numbering only seven persons. However, as prosecutions of
persistently offending employers were undertaken by the Board of Trade,
supporters of trade boards could claim legitimately that a strengthened
inspectorate would reduce the general threat of evasion in factory trades.
Nevertheless, the problem of how to ensure that home-workers received
the minimum rates due to them was an intractable one, as the Board of Trade
recognised.l'" The failure of the larger boards to fix piece-rates was the crux
of the problem. As they could not monitor the working pace of employees
outside the factory employers considered time-rates an unacceptable
benchmark for assessing whether home-workers were receiving adequate
wages. Even so, Tawney's discovery that two-thirds of tailoring home-
workers in Colchester and three-quarters of home-workers in London had not
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received any advance in their piece-rates roughly one-year after minimum time
rates became obligatory was of cause for concem.i'" Tawney found that some
home-workers in the tailoring trade were unaware of the existence of the trade
board in the autumn of 19l3! 166 A demonstration, perhaps, both of how
ignorant the poorest were of state efforts to raise their condition, and how little
these efforts impinged upon their lives.167
In spite of the prominence accorded to the plight of the sweated home-
worker during the campaign for legislative intervention between 1906 and
1909, the proven success of trade boards was demonstrated in factory, rather
than outdoor sectors of the nation-wide scheduled trades. Ernest Aves found
this to be the experience in Australia too. Devotees of trade boards comforted
themselves in the knowledge that outwork was continuing to diminish in
scope. Margaret MacDonald's prediction that trade boards would place a
premium on homework and thus revive the sector was inaccurate. Instead of
succumbing to the temptation to give more work out so as to evade minimum
rates, most employers, motivated to improve productivity, found that it was
more advantageous to bring more work 'indoors'. This facilitated easier
monitoring of the quality and standardisation of product as well as providing
employers with greater assurance that work would be completed on time. The
Board of Trade was probably embarrassed and exasperated at their failure to
solve the homework problem. They would have concurred with Tawney's
hypothesis that as long as the reduction in homework was gradual, and not
causing unemployment, it was a trend to be welcomed.168 In fact, during the
three decades following the passage of the Trade Boards Act, homework
continued its steady but inexorable decline.i'"
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It is significant that when the Board of Trade decided upon a modest
expansion of the trade boards system in 1913 it proposed to apply them largely
to 'indoor' trades. These were sugar confectionery and food preserving; shirt
making; hollowware making; linen and cotton embroidery; and calendering
and machine ironing in steam laundries. Although shirt-making retained a
declining home-work sector, only the small Irish linen and cotton embroidery
trade was an outdoor one, and this was included in the Provisional Order on the
recommendation of a 1912 Home Office Report.170 Both sugar confectionery
and food preserving, and shirt-making were large national women's trades
employing at least 80,000 and 50,000 females respectively. In the former
sector, wages remained at the dire level revealed in the 1906 census, whereby
over forty per cent. of full-time female workers earned less than ten shillings
per week, whilst the Board of Trade had long-earmarked the shirt-making trade
for wages board regulation.V' In the hollowware trade women employees in
the Black Country, marshalled by the National Federation of Women Workers
in 1912, successfully went on strike in support of piece-lists which enabled
them to earn ten shillings for a 54 hour week, compared with the six-to-seven
shillings they earned hitherto.l72 Thereafter, both sides were keen on the
establishment of a trade board, for the employers 'wished to secure against
other employers undercutting them, and the workers ... wished to retain the
frui f hei ike.' 173n ts 0 t ir stn .
Neither employers nor workers in the four aforementioned trades raised
any objection to their impending coverage by trade boards. In sharp contrast,
laundry employers petitioned against the Provisional Order. An MP
sympathetic to their cause explained:
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the industry repudiates the suggestion that an appreciable portion of
its employees receive a sweated wage, resents the establishment of
an invidious and unjustifiable distinction between steam and hand
laundries, affirms that its operations carried on under thoroughly
hygienic conditions ... and maintains that no interference is
necessary.i"
Laundry employers even claimed that as the NFWW had begun recruiting in
the industry, there was no justification for state intervention in wage
determination in the trade.175 However, the NFWW had only recruited about
one thousand laundry workers across Britain; conditions were evidently not
ripe for collective bargaining. Whilst the Board of Trade was satisfied that
wages were exceptionally low in the laundry trade176 it is reasonable to blame
bureaucratic ineptitude as much as the canny resistance of employers for the
failure to establish a trade board in this sector. The definition of the section of
the laundry industry to be subject to a trade board was imprecise and allowed
employers to convince the Select Committee members that such intervention
would be detrimental to the trade. During one sitting of the 1913 Select
Committee both a Board of Trade official and a spokesman for the laundry
employers appeared confused as to which sections of the trade the Provisional
Order was intended to apply to!177
At least the supporters of an extension of trade boards exhibited better
organisational skills. Macarthur's NFWW frequently lobbied the Board of
Trade discreetly for such a course of action. More surprisingly, in 1913 the
Daily Telegraph claimed that for 'the last few months, the Conservative and
Unionist Women's Franchise Association have been working very quietly to
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extend the provisions of the Trade Boards Act to a larger number of ill-paid
industries' .178 As early as May 1911, Sydney Buxton revealed to the
Commons that applications had been received at his department, from either
workmen or employers, for trade boards to be extended to the brass, linen and
cognate, calico printing, shirt-making, baking, joinery and (Irish) railways.i'"
The TUC as a whole may have adopted a lukewarm attitude towards the trade
boards, but several weaker unions, such as those representing agricultural
labourers, carmen and other vehicle workers, were keen for them to be
established in their trades.180 Remarkably, Mary Macarthur even secured the
support of the 1911 Congress for a resolution calling for the extension of 'the
Trade Boards Act to all trades in which the rate of pay is so low as not to
afford a living wage.,181
By 1913 parliament evidently considered the trade boards a modest
success worthy of modest extension. The 'leap in the dark' of 1909 had been
justified. The 'special case' argument relating to sweated labour proved the
crucial factor in seducing 'middle ground' opinion in support of a minimum
wage policy. As Philip Snowden commented, 'It was such a departure from
the old idea of non-interference with economic laws that nothing but the
absolute necessity of doing something to deal with the universally admitted
evil of sweating secured agreement that the experiment should be tried.' 182 A
desperate, intractable problem warranted a dramatic, innovative response.
Apart from weaknesses regarding enforcement of determinations, trade
boards were perceived to have succeeded in meeting their terms of reference.
Minimum rates fixed by trade boards were not generous, but their remit was to
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raise the wage-rates of 'exceptionally low' paid sectors to the levels paid by
the better-organised firms. From the government's perspective, at least the
modest level of minimum rates fixed diminished the prospect both of their
causing unemployment and prompting an outcry from employers. Such a
negative reaction from employers would surely have cooled the enthusiasm of
the Liberal Party for this experimental statutory intervention in the wages
contract. For employers, the trade boards proved a valuable insurance against
undercutting, when determinations were properly administered, whilst unions
could acknowledge the impressive spur they had given to the organisation of
workers in the scheduled trades. Trade boards fitted in neatly with the New
Liberal welfare agenda whereby state assistance was to be concentrated on the
poorest members of society, without pauperising them, and enabling them to
increase their capacity for self-help. More importantly from ministers'
perspective, perhaps, trade boards appeared to aid the operation of the free-
market economy generally.
As will be demonstrated In the following chapter, the widespread
perception of trade boards' successful operation served as a springboard for
more ambitious statutory minimum wage policy propositions. By the autumn
of 1913, the government had decided to apply this model of minimum wage-
fixing machinery to the agricultural industry, the greatest sector of the
economy after coal mining, whose heavily unionised workers were awarded
wages board model minimum wage protection in 1912.
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CHAPTER TWO
A MINIMUM WAGE FOR ALL IN PROSPECT?
1910-1914
This chapter will chart the developments in trade union and party political
thinking after 1909 that was to herald the tantalising prospect of a de-facto
'minimum wage for all' by the eve of the First World War. By 1914, statutory
minimum wage policy extended far beyond the limited application of trade
boards to sweated sectors. Almost 900,000 underground mineworkers were
guaranteed daily wage minima in response to the national strike called by the
Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) in 1912. The following year, the
Liberal Cabinet committed itself to establishing wages boards for agricultural
workers, the second largest occupational grouping, after the miners.
Furthermore, just before the crises in Ulster and continental Europe claimed
the exclusive attention of Asquith's ministers in the summer of 1914, the
government was, arguably, poised to endorse the principle of a minimum
wage for unskilled, non-unionised, town labourers.
But what prompted this movement of opinion? Of undoubted
importance was the decline in real wages during the Edwardian period. Board
of Trade statistics revealed that between 1900 and 1912 food prices had risen
by 14 per cent., whilst the cost of clothing had risen by 16 per cent.' By
contrast, wage levels had stagnated. Rowntree's 21s. 8d. 'poverty line', the
household income required in 1899 by an 'average' family in York to
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maintain 'mere physical efficiency', had by 1913 risen with inflation to 25
shillings.
All but the highest wage-earning classes were affected by this rise in
the cost of living. For millions of households headed by unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, together with a considerable minority of skilled workers,
fighting a constant battle to avoid a descent into acute poverty, the reduced
spending power of often-irregular earnings had potentially serious
consequences. The 'wages question', the insufficiency of wages to meet the
subsistence needs of wage-earning households, thus became a major political
issue from 1910. For, despite the healthy performance of the economy as a
whole, wages failed to advance sufficiently to keep pace with price rises, if,
indeed, they rose at all. As Philip Snowden argued, 'so long as the workman
is left to provide most of the necessities of life by individual expenditure, the
question of wages will be of paramount importance to him." Unsurprisingly,
industrial unrest increased sharply after the economy emerged from its last
pre-war recession in 1909. Rather than attribute this upsurge in industrial
militancy to socialism in general, or syndicalism in particular, more perceptive
observers judged correctly that, 'it is about wages that nine-tenths of the
strikes and lock-outs arise, and wages, wages, wages, and little else than
wages are at the bottom of the "labour unrest".,3
It was not merely the continued growth of inequalities of wealth that
aroused the ire of workers, but the greater visibility of these disparities. This
was not only due to the plethora of writings on the subject of poverty in this
period: the late-Victorian expansion of the cheap popular press continued into
the next decade. 'Ostentatious' displays of wealth, such as motorcar usage,
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amongst the privileged classes grew concurrently with this phenomenon. A
1911 Cabinet Paper concerned with industrial unrest identified the impatience
of wage earners concerned with the 'bare struggle for a livelihood' and mused;
'in affording a basis for discontent with his lot in life to the wage-earner, this
publicity of private luxury may not be without importance."
Furthermore, a study by Professor A.L. Bowley, the statistician who
had helped the Board of Trade compile its cost of living index, into the
conditions of working class households in four towns in 1912-13, concluded
that poverty was as all-pervasive as Rowntree had found in York over a
decade earlier. Bowley found that a comparable proportion of adult male
householders was failing to earn sufficient wages to provide for the physical
efficiency needs of their dependants. Whereas in 1899, 36 per cent. of such
workers in York earned less than 24 shillings per week, in Northampton and
Warrington in 1913 the figures were 27 per cent. and 33 per cent.,
respectively, whilst in Reading over fifty per cent. of workers failed to earn
this amount in 1912.5 Even more alarmingly, Bowley found that insufficient
wages constituted the principal cause of poverty in two-thirds of cases in
Northampton and Reading, and a mighty 87 per cent. in Warrington
(Rowntree's figure for York was 57 per cent.)." Even Bowley, an academic of
no obvious radical disposition, was moved by empirical evidence to conclude
that
It can hardly be too emphatically stated that of all the causes of
primary poverty which have been brought to our notice, low wages
are by far the most important. We could go further and say that to
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raise the wages of the worst-paid workers is the most pressing social
task with which the country is confronted to-day.i
Against this background, the term 'sweating' was increasingly deemed to
define not merely 'exceptionally' -exploited labour, such as female home
workers, for instance, but all wage earners that failed to earn sufficient to
maintain physical efficiency. In view of the importance of the 'sweating'
concept to the decision of the state to grant minimum wage protection to
limited groups of workers in 1909, such a modification in the understanding of
the term foreshadowed a major shift in attitudes towards the applicability of
legal minimum wages to industry in general.
Buoyed by rising trade union membership, against a background of
falling unemployment from 1910, trade unions redoubled their efforts to
secure 'living' wages for their members. However, it is doubtful whether
trade unionists were uniformly sympathetic to the notion that all workers
deserved a living wage. Some 'pioneer' trade unionists, who had sometimes
experienced intimidation and victimisation from employers' resenting
combination amongst their employees, felt that if unorganised workers wanted
a living wage, they should form or join a trade union and fight for one!
Minimum wages demanded by trade unions were thus to be won by collective
bargaining rather than statutory intervention."
Many unions representing skilled workers remained wary of
advocating flat-rate minima, for fear that such a wage could be 'juggled' by
employers 'into a fixed rate which every worker in the trade must accept. ,9
Nonetheless, smaller unions representing the lower grades of labour
recognised the service a fixed minimum rate could render in raising the
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standard of living of their members (and also in acting as a recruiting agent
amongst the unskilled workers for the union which cared to sponsor such an
advance on their behalf). Labourers, failing often to earn even a pound a
week, did not hold the fear that a subsistence-level minimum wage could
become a maximum rate.
However, those unions able to exercise industrial muscle were keener
advocates of the 'general advance of wages' movement than statutory
minimum wages in 1913-1914. In response to the prolonged fall in real wages
during the Edwardian period, this movement called for all trade unions to take
'early and simultaneous action to obtain an increase of Ss. a week for all
grades of time and piece workers in both public and private employ' .10 To
many trade unionists, this joint collective demand for a flat-rate increase in
wages was a preferable policy to a minimum wage, which was perceived all-
too-often as aflat-rate wage policy.
Nonetheless, the peculiar difficulties of the coal industry led the
miners to seek a guaranteed minimum daily wage guarantee in 1911-1912.11
The industry suffered from declining productivity during the Edwardian
period 'because the physical conditions of individual mines and the efficiency
of management were often inferior.' 12 Colliers working in poor seams,
'abnormal places', struggled to maintain their piece-rate earnings, especially
with the onset of shorter shifts resulting from the 1908 Eight Hours Act. The
problem was accentuated in South Wales by the tradition whereby coal-
getters, besides the work of getting coal, performed various other preparatory
and subsidiary tasks, whereas in the north-east, for example, these tasks were
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performed by a lower grade of miner. South Wales colliery owners, burdened
by the Eight Hours Act coming into force at a time when coal exports had
slumped, cut back discretionary allowances (,consideration') traditionally paid
to miners working in difficult seams."
The demand for a minimum wage for all underground workers rapidly
superseded the abnormal places issue: 'if a man is justified in claiming that his
earnings should be made up, if they are below normal owing to faulty
conditions, he may be equally justified if his earnings are restricted through
faulty management; both are equally out of his control.' 14 In October 1911,
the annual conference of the MFGB decided to 'take immediate steps to
secure an individual District Minimum Wage for all men and boys ... without
any reference to the working places being abnormal.' 15 However, the sheer
complexity of fixing a schedule of minimum rates for different grades of
underground worker defeated the MFGB. Hence, district associations were
left to calculate these, on the understanding that no underground worker
should earn less than five shillings per day and boys should earn a minimum
of two shillings per day."
In a ballot of the membership on 18 January 1912, mmers
overwhelmingly endorsed their union's 'five and two' daily minimum wage
demand and the associated schedules. Almost eighty per cent of those voting
(445,801 votes against 115,300) endorsed strike action in support of the claim.
The resultant first national miners stoppage was due to commence on 1 March
1912.
The government faced an awkward dilemma over whether to intervene to
settle the dispute. It recognised the primary importance of coal to Britain's
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economy and defence. Liberal ministers had also to reflect that, historically, a
clear majority of both colliery owners and coal-miners had supported their
party. A delicate balancing act was thus required by Asquith to preserve the
electoral support of the bulk of the one million strong workforce, and secure
the continued financial and political support of the owners. This task had
already proved testing, for the combination of a decisive break with laissez-
faire economic doctrine and the adoption of New Liberal social policies by
Asquith's government had already alienated the older traditional school of
Gladstonian Liberal capitalists. Any capitulation to the demands of the
electorally powerful miners risked provoking a further influx of businessmen
into the Conservative camp. On the other side of the negotiating table, the
MFGB had voted to affiliate to the fledgling Labour Party in 1908. Although
the results of the 1910 elections bear testament to the enduring 'Lib-Lab'
loyalty amongst enfranchised miners, ministers were conscious that this
support was weakening amidst the younger generation of more radically-
inclined miners.
Nevertheless, Asquith did express his sympathy with what he viewed as
'an unselfish demand on the part of the great bulk of the miners'; 17 unselfish
because their aim was to secure a minimum wage for the minority of
underground workers unable to earn a decent wage, rather than a general
increase for the majority. It should also be remembered that, although the
miners wanted a minimum wage safety net, they preferred for it to be
guaranteed by the employers, rather than the government. Anti-statism
remained a powerful component of the political mindset of the miners.
'Mabon' and Enoch Edwards, MFGB President, were not isolated in their
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conviction that state interference to determine the wage rates of miners was an
affront to the notion of the proud and independent collier."
The national stoppage began on I March, after the breakdown of a
government-sponsored conference of the Mining Association (the employers)
and the MFGB at the Foreign Office on 27 February. Within weeks, over a
million men were thrown out of work, especially in the transport industries,
whilst many more were put on short-time working.
Nevertheless, colliery owners were determined not to give ground.
They believed that a
guaranteed minimum would be a premium upon idleness and an
encouragement to the shirker to win as little coal as possible in
exchange for the minimum wage ... the incentive which at present
exists for the miner to turn out the maximum amount of coal, to
enable him to earn the highest possible wage, would be destroyed.l"
C.B. Crawshaw, the Dewsbury-based Yorkshire mine-owners leader, was
anxious that that, 'I do hope Mr. Asquith fully realises the true position and
will not "truck" for the miners votes! or be led astray by Lloyd George' .20
During the first fortnight in March, the government grappled for a
solution to the crisis. In the trouble-shooting 'Joint Committee' machinery
existent in the Northeast coalfield, whereby local disputes were referred to a
committee comprising six representatives each of employers and the union,
together with an impartial chairman, it appeared to have found a means for a
legislative settlement of the miners' minimum wage controversy.i' This
machinery was conveniently similar in structure to the trade boards. By
devolving responsibility for fixing daily minima to semi-autonomous
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representative boards, the government could preserve its carefully engineered
even-handedness. Miners would be granted the principle of a minimum wage,
via legislation, but employers would not be bound by the MFGB's schedule of
minimum day rates.
The government introduced its bill on 19 March, providing for the
establishment of county-level wages boards ('Joint District Boards') with a
reference to fix minimum piece-rates for all grades of underground miner
within three months of their establishment. In the Commons, two Liberal
colliery owners, Joseph Walton and Arthur Markham, both stressed their
support for what they viewed as a sensible, moderate compromise solution to
the crisis. Walton mocked the outrage of some MPs by comparing the miners'
demands with the 'minimum wage' they had granted themselves in 1911.22
Markham endorsed statutory intervention in the wages contract in this special
case, citing as his justification the appalling casualty rates prevalent amongst
underground miners. The endorsement of these two Liberals was especially
significant, as both owned collieries in districts where the MFGB scheduled
minimum rates were highest (South Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire
respectively), at 7s. 6d. a day. It is notable that other Liberal businessmen,
such as Albert Spicer and Alfred Mond, justified their support for the Bill on
the grounds that the Trade Boards Act precedent had worked so successfully.
Mond reminded the Commons that the principle of state intervention to fix
minimum wages
is not exactly novel. When the House, in 1909, passed with very
little discussion the Trade Boards Act it laid down this principle by
giving the right to outside Boards to tell employers what rate of
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wages they must pay. I may be told that those are the sweated
industries, but that does not affect the principle in the slightest
degree. Either this House is in a position to legislate on fixed wages
or it is not. 23
However, most Conservatives were not prepared to accept the argument
that measures merely tolerated for the benefit of helpless (female) workers
should also be conceded to the most powerful and organised sector of trade
unionists. They were clearly unhappy at 'giving-in' to the demands of
organised labour. Balfour asked, 'has any feudal baron ever exercised his
powers in the manner which the leaders of this great union are now using
theirs?,24 Clearly, Conservative acquiescence to trade boards for a limited
number of sweated trades did not weaken their conviction that the state should
not intervene to determine wage rates in private industry generally. Bonar Law
inferred that the government had broken the cross-party consensus in favour of
drawing upon the resources of the state only to aid the condition of the poor,
and set a dangerous precedent.f As the Liverpool Weekly Courier lamented,
the 'historic policy of Liberalism has been to let work and wages alone,
leaving employers and men and economic laws to settle prices and wages. ,26
Ultimately, however, the Conservatives offered little constructive
criticism to the Government's handling of the crisis. In any case, Robert
Sanders, a Conservative whip, acknowledged that,
Our people are very divided as to what we ought to do ... On the
whole the majority is against a minimum wage ... A few of our men
don't like opposing [the] second reading and the Morning Post
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correspondent told me it was very dangerous for the mmmg
. d 27representatives to 0 so.
Unimpressed with Bonar Law's 'crabbing' on this issue, Sanders lamented
that, 'all through the debate the trouble was that our people were afraid to
announce an alternative policy. ,28 However, Conservatives quietly assisting
ministers in preventing the bill from being radicalised more to the MFGB's
satisfaction, especially with regard to the lobbying of Labour MPs for the Bill
to incorporate an endorsement of the 'five and two' principle.
Nevertheless, the miners were far from satisfied with the Coal Mines
(Minimum Wage) Act. The result of the ballot of miners on 6 April was
testament to this fact. Nationally, the MFGB membership actually voted to
continue the strike (by 244,011 votes to 201,013), but as the requisite two-
thirds majority was not met, the Union's Executive recommended a return to
work. Alan Griffin noted that when an official of the Nottinghamshire Miners
Association advised the men to vote for a resumption of work, 'there was so
much heckling as to be unable to finish his speech. ,29 Amongst the larger
districts, only South Wales and the Midland Federation voted for a resumption
of'work."
The miners were still not won round to the legislative settlement of the
minimum wage dispute once the Joint District Boards had fixed minimum
rates. Whereas Will Thome enthused to the TUC later that year that 'in many
districts a substantial increase of wages has been brought about' ,31 most miners
disputed this. Although the boards were intended to foster consensus between
employers and workers; in only three districts (Lancashire, South Derbyshire,
and Warwickshire) were they able to fix rates without recourse to the reserve
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arbitration powers of the chairmen, provided for in the legislation to ensure
that minimum rates were fixed by June.32 Not surprisingly after such a bitterly
fought dispute, common ground between the two sides was difficult to achieve.
The rates fixed by the chairmen-cum-arbitrators were significantly below the
MFGB's demands. For instance, in South Wales, the minimum day rate for
colliers was fixed at 417, approximately 2/6 below the rate in the miners'
schedule, whilst instead of the 'five and two', South Wales underground
workers were guaranteed a minimum of 3/4 and 1/4 rcspcctively"
Furthermore, the miners themselves were responsible for action to recoup any
underpayment of these meagre minima, via the civil, rather than criminal,
courts. There were many complaints that employers were refusing to co-
operate with the requirements of the Act. Justice reported that 'a number of
people had been dismissed by the masters so as to avoid payment of the extra
wages due between the resumption of work after the strike and the decision of
the Joint District Board' .34
Nevertheless, despite Asquith's insistence that the Minimum Wage Act
'does not purport to lay down any general principles. It is quite possible for
anybody to support this Bill, who holds, as I hold, that it is very undesirable
for Parliament to fix wages',35 Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary,
recognised that 'a door has been opened with regard to the minimum wage
which cannot be closed again. ,36 In April 1912, The Nation argued that
it is idle to pretend that early claims will not be pressed for the
extension of the principle now legally conceded in the mining
industry to other occupations, in some of which the gap between
current wages and decent subsistence is considerably greater."
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After all, if the state could legislate for minimum wages in the least and most
organised sectors of the economy, it could apply them anywhere. Revealingly,
after the end of the national coal strike, the government considered the
feasibility of extending the principle of 'state interference in the economic
conditions of the trade, on the lines of Trade Boards or a statutory minimum'r",
as a compensatory gesture in return for a statutory limitation of the rights of
miners, railway, dockyard (and other inland transport workers) to strike.
However, the government had no intention of granting a thirty shillings
weekly national minimum wage for all adult workers, a policy championed
within the labour movement. This figure appears to have been adopted
because it represented a 'good average' of adult male urban workers' weekly
earnings during this period." Will Crooks, an ILP and Labour MP, became
synonymous with the thirty shillings campaign after he first introduced such a
motion before a sceptical House of Commons on 26 April 1911.40 The ILP
executive decided one week later to launch a national campaign for the thirty
shilling weekly minimum and an eight-hour day. During July 1911, over 700
meetings were organised nation-wide, and a conference was held in Bradford,
attended by nearly 500 delegates from trades councils and unions endorsing the
. 41campaign,
Although non-socialist commentators, including those sympathetic to
the concept of statutory minimum wages, considered the thirty shillings
proposal an impossible pipe dream," in 1912, even the TUC endorsed it.43
Fearing that a minimum wage could all too easily become a maximum wage,
the TUC had been wary of Will Thome's argument that wages should be raised
91
by a combination of trade union and legislative effort.44 It is thus unlikely that
the TUC were committed, wholeheartedly, to a universal minimum weekly
wage of thirty shillings. Although this resolution was once-again nodded
through without debate in 1913, this Congress also passed a minimum wage
resolution specifying no monetary figure, and launched the' general advance of
wages' campaign." TUC business managers may well have opted to appease
the minority of delegates interested in the minimum wage issue by quietly
allowing their resolutions to pass. This freed conference time for Congress to
debate the issues that it held close to its heart, such as the legal status of trade
unions, unemployment and hours of labour issues. In the final analysis,
organised labour viewed the thirty shillings minimum wage policy as 'a
declaration of socialist intent rather than a practical measure. ,46
Even Philip Snowden, a senior figure within the ILP and Parliamentary
Labour Party, was publicly scathing of the thirty shillings policy:
As a practical question, anything in the way of fixing by Act of
Parliament a rigid and universal minimum wage is out of the
question. Agitations for a universal minimum wage of 30s. a week
are excellent propaganda, but as practical proposals such demands
only lay themselves open to destructive criticism."
The principle of a uniform national minimum wage was scarcely more
popular than the specific thirty shillings figure. R.H. Tawney, a keen advocate
of trade boards, disliked the idea of a national minimum wage. 'It means that
people are not paid what they are worth, but what is necessary to keep them
working. That is how a horse or a slave is paid. ,48 J.1. Mallon, a fellow
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propagandist for the trade boards, also argued that a flat-rate minimum wage
would conflict with the trade union practice of district wage-rate agreements."
Acknowledging regional variations in the cost of living, even the
Fabians, who favoured universal minimum wage coverage based on the cost of
providing the basic physical requirements of workers, insisted that district
level trade boards should be the means of implementing it.5o Sidney Webb was
emphatic in his rejection of a uniform national minimum wage:
This sounds simple, but it is undesirable and impracticable. Any
universal minimum of that sort, applying to all districts and to all
sorts of occupations, would certainly be fixed at a very low level, so
as not to throw out of employment the millions of men and women
workers in different parts of the country who are at present getting
much less than a pound a week. But what use would be a National
Minimum Wage of say, 3d. per hour? This would only encourage
low wages. We don't want the sweated trades to drag down the
. . f h 51rmrumum or t e rest.
Clementina Black was thus rebuffed when she proposed to a Fabian conference
on 12 December 1912 that a national three-pence an hour minimum wage
should be established, in order to, at the very least, aid the unionisation of
sweated labour.52
Rather than endorse a uniform national rmmmum wage, the TUC
surpassed itself in 1911 by nodding through a resolution calling for the
extension of trade boards to 'all trades in which the rate of pay is so low as not
to afford a living wage. ,53 Similarly, the Labour Party sponsored the Labour
(Minimum Conditions) Bill, presented to parliament on 31 July 1913 and 18
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March 1914. Tt proposed to repeal the Trade Boards Act and substitute the
principle that trade boards should be established for every trade where average
weekly earnings were below 25 shillings. These boards would fix minimum
wage rates, a maximum 48-hour week, overtime conditions and terms of
apprenticeship. The Bill was prepared by the War Against Poverty campaign,
organised by the Fabian Society and ILP jointly, and launched at the TUC
Congress in 1912. In addition to the legal minimum wage, the War Against
Poverty crusade encompassed demands for an eight-hour day, increased state
assistance for the maintenance of children, abolition of the Poor Law, housing
and health reforms, and an acceptance by the state of responsibility for the
unemployed. 54
Radical Liberal MPs were keen advocates of an expansion of trade
board coverage. Percy Alden, Robert Harcourt and R.D. Denman were
amongst those who held such views.55 However, many government-supporting
MPs, whilst content to support trade boards for 'diseased' sectors of the
economy, remained wary of any widespread extension of the minimum wage
policy.
Most Conservatives were not keen on any extension of the narrow
guidelines for statutory wage intervention set out in the clauses of the Trade
Boards Act, which they had supported in 1909 largely on account of its
'limited' and 'experimental' character. Therefore, they tolerated merely a
modest extension of the system to further exceptionally low-paying trades. 56
But whilst there were die-hard opponents of the minimum wage principle
within the Tory Party, some Conservatives favoured a more advanced wages
boards policy. 57
94
Richard Cooner. Torv MP for Walsnll even introduced fl Rill calling
for local authorities to fix hourly minimum wage rates. Cooper thought that
urban levels should be at least 4Y2d. for men and 3d. for women, whilst rural
rates should be 4d. and 2Y2d., respectively. 58 Moral force and persuasion,
rather than legal sanction, were to be the enforcement officers of these district
minimum rates. Cooper acknowledged that his proposal was 'very moderate -
too moderate'. However, his objective was to coax MPs within his own party,
who were worried by the potential 'dangers and disadvantages' of
governmental interference in wages questions, into supporting a lowest
common denominator minimum wage policy as a 'first and very moderate step
towards securing a living wage for every able-bodied adult worker in England
and Wales.' He also looked forward to the day when, 'a large mass of public
opinion on the problem of what is a fair living wage to pay any able-bodied
adult will be so developed that this House will be ready to bring forward a very
drastic and compulsory Bill. ,59 However, it is fair to assert that a majority of
Cooper's party dreaded such a day, and would have breathed a sigh of relief
that the Bill failed to progress beyond a first reading.
By 1914, the TUC, the Labour Party, and its affiliated socialist
societies, together with minimum wage enthusiasts amongst the Liberal and
Conservative Parties, all embraced policies envisaging the nation-wide
application of wages boards. These policies were often couched in terms of a
demand for a 'living wage'. For politicians, the term 'living wage' served the
dual advantage of being both an eye-catching popular slogan amongst working
class electors and 'as elastic as life itself60 in terms of practical policy making!
Given that the flat-rate minimum wage policy was not taken seriously even by
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constructed a false dichotomy between the uniform national rate and the 'rival'
trade boards minimum wage policy option."
Nevertheless, there was a 'credibility-gap' between the trumpeting of
the need for living wages by politicians before the First World War, and the
wages boards policy prescriptions produced to provide them. As mentioned in
the Chapter One, even J.1. Mallon admitted that trade boards did not
necessarily establish 'living' minimum wage rates.62 Philip Snowden was
thoroughly representative of his peers in insisting that representative wages
boards, by their 'non-political' nature, were the only practical method of
establishing a legal minimum wage.63
Faced with a multitude of demands and policy-proposals intended to
solve the wages question, what was the response of the Liberal government?
Aside from strengthening the Fair Wages Resolution in 1909,64 increasing the
wages of state employees periodically, and expanding the trade boards system
modestly in 1913, the government considered proposals giving legal force to
voluntary agreements." Against the background of the Port of London
transport workers' strike, hot on the heels of the 1912 miners' strike, ministers
were motivated by the desire to prevent strikes. However, the idea proved a
non-starter. The TUC considered the strike weapon sacrosanct, and remained
hostile to any impingement upon the principle of free collective bargaining."
Lloyd George was attracted by an alternative proposal to secure
industrial peace and solve the wages question, presented to him by a group of
radical Liberals in May 1912. They urged that the 'general principle of a
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living wage for every worker', together with an extension of wages board
machinery to agriculture, should be implemented.f" Recognising that the
former policy was too radical for his Cabinet colleagues, Lloyd George turned
his attention to the land, the traditional rallying-cry of radicals.
The plight of the agricultural worker was to form the centrepiece of the
'land campaign'. 68 Lloyd George recognised the opportunity to seize the
political initiative from both the Conservatives and the labour movement, and
resuscitate Liberal fortunes. Asquith's government had become unpopular by
1912. A multitude of factors contributed to this impasse. Firstly, the extent of
industrial unrest appeared unprecedented to contemporaries, and influential
middle-class electors felt a periodical sense of national crisis. In addition,
'old' Liberal policy throwbacks to the 1891 'Newcastle Programme', such as
Irish Home Rule and Welsh Church Disestablishment, which forced
themselves upon ministers after 1910, on account of their new-found
dependence on the votes of MPs from the 'Celtic fringe', offered little prospect
of winning Asquith's government popularity amongst English voters.
Governmental indecision over the women's suffrage question hardly-aided the
Liberal party's image, whilst the emerging Marconi scandal aroused suspicions
of 'slease' within the highest echelons of the Cabinet.
The weakening of Lloyd George's political stature, as a result of the
Marconi affair, was accentuated by the initial unpopularity of his great
National Insurance Act of 1911. In order to build up the Insurance Fund,
contributions were extracted from wages in July 1912, six months before the
first sickness and unemployment benefits could be claimed by workers. The
Conservatives made much political capital out of this, reminding low-paid
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agricultural workers, in narticular, of the burden of conttibutions.V Lloyd
George's followers hoped that a campaign intended to raise the condition of
rural labourers would win the support of both working class electors, who
recognised the depressive effect of low agricultural earnings on their own
wages, and middle class Liberals, whose interests would not be harmed by a
radical programme striking at the heart of the landed interest.
It was long acknowledged that agricultural workers were, in effect,
sweated. The Board of Trade Earnings and Hours Enquiry into Agriculture
found that, for all classes of farm worker, including the higher grades, in 1907,
weekly earnings (including payments in kind) averaged only 18s. 4d. in
England and exactly 18 shillings in Wales.7o Even after making allowance for
payments in kind," the low rents of rural dwellings and the opportunities
available to country-folk to grow their own vegetables; contemporaries
recognised that these earnings were pitifully low. In order to arrest the 'flight
from the land' of young labourers, politicians were relatively sympathetic to
the notion that the state should intervene in the rural wage market by 1912.
Indeed, whilst the Coal Mines (Minimum Wages) Bill was being discussed in
parliament, F.E. Smith, the future Lord Birkenhead, asked pointedly, 'is the
agricultural labourer with his I5s. a week not quite as much as entitled to the
privilege of a minimum wage as the miner who earns pounds a week?,72
Although the agricultural minimum wage was the principal policy-
initiative of the land campaign, it was intended merely as a remedy for the
rural housing question, the main concern of Liberals. Radicals were keen to
liberate rural workers from the tied cottage system; not only because of the
squalid condition of many of the properties, but because the custom was
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perceived as a social evil which perpetuated the subservience of the farm
worker to the farmer and the landlord. However, if house-construction in the
countryside was to be stimulated, radicals believed that market-levels of rent
would need to be levied on the new properties. Only if rural workers were
guaranteed a minimum wage could they afford this rent increase."
Reg Groves charged that Liberals, by their invective against reactionary
landlords, were seeking to divert the attention of industrial workers away from
their struggle with employers, themselves often Libera1.74 Although this
assertion was essentially correct, Edwardians recognised that the plight of rural
workers affected the welfare of wage earners in every sector of the economy.
Trade unionists shared Lloyd George's conviction that 'the wages in a good
many trades and industries are lowered and pulled down by he fact that
agricultural labour was underpaid. .. . You cannot deal with agricultural labour
as ifit were merely a problem that affected the labourer alone.,75 For example,
the National Union of Dock Labourers complained that the influx of
agricultural workers into the docks was intensifying the competition for labour
and dragging wages downwards." Likewise, Ben Tillett complained that
during industrial disputes, blackleg labour was often recruited from amongst
farm workers." The Workers' Union justified its energetic recruitment drive
amongst agricultural workers from 1913 on the following lines:
These men, crushed by low wages and other evil conditions are often
compelled to go into industrial centres to find employment, and
having no tradition of trades unionism to guide them, are too ready
to undersell the town workers, who are constantly menaced by the
low wage workers of the country."
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T ::1n~refnrmf'r<: honed that if W(lqe" cmllrl he r::li"eo in the countrvside, rural
depopulation could be halted. This would deplete the influx of cheap unskilled
labour in urban labour markets, which should raise wage levels, via the forces
of supply and demand.
After securing the permission of Asquith," Lloyd George established
his own Land Enquiry Committee in July 1912, under the command of
Seebohm Rowntree and c.R. Buxton.t'' Employing paid commissioners, the
Land Enquiry Committee mounted a thorough investigation into rural
labourers' wages and housing conditions, together with an analysis of the
opportunities for agricultural development and tenancy, rating and taxation
questions affecting farmers. This monumental study followed in the footsteps
of previous sociological case studies into rural standards of living."
Thus, the Land Enquiry Committee's findings tended to confirm what
was already known about the condition of agricultural labourers, rather than
shock the public with any new startling revelations. Nevertheless, the Enquiry
illustrated the grim reality of 'sweated' wages earned by the majority of farm
workers in England and Wales. Whilst average weekly earnings of agricultural
labourers in the northern counties of Northumberland, Durham and Lancashire
generally exceeded a pound a week, most farm workers in southern and eastern
counties were not so lucky. The sixty-per cent. of ordinary rural workers who
failed even to earn an average of eighteen shillings each week were
overwhelmingly-concentrated in these districts. In Norfolk and Oxfordshire,
average earnings for farm labourers lingered at around the fifteen shillings
mark!82
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F'::trrnW0rKerll. lacked barcainino strenoth Local onnortunities for
alternative employment were frequently scarce, and trade union organisation
proved difficult to nurture. Under these circumstances, Seebohm Rowntree
concluded that 'a material improvement in the condition of the underpaid
labourer can only be brought about by the intervention of the State. ,83 The
Land Enquiry Committee recommended that,
Supply and demand are to be scrapped as a basis for wages. The
standard wage is to be such a sum as will enable the labourer to keep
himself and an average family in a state of physical efficiency and
, I J:'. hi 84pay a commercia rent lor IS cottage.
lA. Hobson's 'economy of high wages' dictum was used to support these
arguments.
Do not let us ... be over-fearful of higher wages. It is a
commonplace of economic science that low-paid labour is not in the
long-run cheap labour. Even though a great addition may be
demanded in the wages of the lower-paid men, it will not be a
permanent net addition to the cost of production. The men will very
soon begin to produce more - enormously more in some cases; and
on many farms no doubt it will be found that labour can be better
organised, so that each unit represents a greater value than before.85
Land campaigners refuted the notion that unemployment would result from a
raising of agricultural wages. In spite of inferior soil quality, in comparison
with the south, farming remained prosperous in northern England, even though
the greater opportunities for alternative employment meant that agricultural
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workers were naid relativelv high wages. 'If agriculture in the North can vield
[a] living wage with reasonable profit, why not elsewherev'"
During a series of Cabinet meetings in October 1913, Lloyd George,
after first winning over Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and Richard Haldane,
convinced his colleagues of the merits of the Land Enquiry Committee's
proposals. Even sceptical ministers, such as Walter Runciman, the Minister
for Agriculture, were brought round in support of agricultural minimum
wages.87 Although Charles Hobhouse feared that the granting of a minimum
wage to agriculture would 'unquestionably compel a similar or even immediate
determination of minimum wages in all other trades in the United Kingdom', 88
there
were no other effective plans to revive the Liberals' popularity and
his colleagues had little option but to trust Lloyd George to repeat
his feat of 1909. But the Cabinet's acquiescence was also a tribute
to the diligence of the Enquiry's research and convincing nature of
the programme they had produced/"
However, the Cabinet had not yet committed itself to a precise outline
of agricultural minimum wage legislation by the summer of 1914. The Ulster
crisis and mounting international tension served to shunt Cabinet consideration
of land campaign issues into a comer after the autumn of 1913.90 The Land
Enquiry Committee intended their proposals to provide the blueprint for the
government's next term in office, and the basis of its appeal to the country in
an election due before December 1915.
102
Ministers were nevertheless wary of the Land Enquiry Committee's
recommendation that agricultural minimum wages should be fixed according
to a physical efficiency standard. Even C.R. Buxton recognised that 'a certain
amount of latitude as to the basis of a minimum wage will be inevitable at first,
and the wages boards cannot, in practice, be prevented from taking into
account "what the industry will 'bear"', even though the result, for a time,
should be less than a 'Living' wage. ,91 As a first step, the Government
intended 'to fix the minimum at at least the highest rate prevailing in the
area. ,92 Thus, as with the trade boards precedent, the state was not to ascribe
specific minima, in spite of Lloyd George's desire that a national weekly wage
figure be set as a guideline for local wage-fixing bodies.f Furthermore,
ministers considered the ordinary laws of supply and demand sufficient to
provide adequate wages in the majority rural districts in northern England.
Wages boards were earmarked principally for Welsh and southern and eastern
English counties, where wage-rates were lowest. For Scotland, where
agricultural workers' earnings were generally higher, and where socio-
economic relations between farmers and labourers tended to be closer, the
separate Land Enquiry Committee had made no mention of a minimum wage."
Labour Party strategists, whilst recognising the underlying relevance of
the issues Lloyd George was raising to the welfare of urban workers, did not
consider it prudent to do the Chancellor's bidding. After all, most historians
agree on the failure of the Land Enquiry Committee's Urban Report (see
below) to match the impact its rural counterpart achieved. The Labour Party
lacked a base upon which to mount an effective appeal to rural labourers. Prior
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to 1914 secure-rooted trade union organisation and ILP branches were almost
non-existent amongst agricultural constituencies. The stance of the Daily
Herald epitomised the ambivalent attitude of the labour movement towards
Lloyd George's land campaign:
Let Labour see to land reform by all means, but we hope it will not
forget that the majority of British workers are industrial workers and
that the Liberal manufacturer has as bad a record for sweating and
. h h T . 95oppression as as t e ory squire.
Nevertheless, from the moment the Trade Boards Act reached the
statute book, the ILP, the Labour Party and the TUC were all persistent in their
appeals to the government to incorporate agricultural workers within its remit.
Moreover, the ILP, motivated both by a long-held interest in land issues and a
perennial concern for labour movement independence from the Liberals,
pressurised the Labour Party into establishing its own committee of enquiry
into rural problems in August 1912.96 The committee was chaired by George
Roberts, the Norwich MP who had long-championed the cause of the
agricultural worker within the Labour Party.
Labour's Land Committee issued an interim memorandum in May
1913. It advocated a minimum wage for agricultural labourers, fair
rent courts, the extension of the Smallholdings and Allotments Act
1907, the establishment of rural credit banks under state authority,
and the fostering of co-operative agricultural methods.97
After completing a fact-finding tour to Denmark during the autumn of 1913,
the committee published its final report in January 1914.
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Tnthe event anart from a commitment to eventual land nationalisation,
Labour's proposals were very similar to those advocated by the Liberals!
However, the Labour Party did at least place some of its proposals before the
Commons. George Roberts secured a first reading for his Agricultural
Labourers (Wages and Hours) Bill on 27 May 1913. It proposed that county
boards be established nation-wide for the purpose of fixing minimum wages
and regulating hours. Central government was to refrain from setting a wage
figure, but county boards were to fix wages 'of such a standard as to ensure to
the agricultural labourer the possibility of maintaining himself and his family
in a state of decency and comfort. ,98
By August 1914, organised labour had enjoyed localised successes in
winning minimum weekly wage guarantees from farmers, via collective
agreements in some agricultural districts." However, despite sporadic local
victories won before the First World War, contemporaries recognised that
agricultural trade unionism was too limited in its coverage amongst the huge,
but sparsely-distributed, workforce to win higher wages for the majority of
rural labourers. Statutory intervention appeared to provide the only means for
securing a general rise in the rural labourer's condition.
The Conservative Party held no such certainties. Although their
Campaign Guide of 1914 rejected further minimum wage legislation as
destructive of freedom of contract.i'" the Party's National Union Executive
Committee minutes betray that leadership thinking on the agricultural
minimum wages question was still in a state of flux by July 1914. Nine
months after Lloyd George had launched his land campaign, Arthur Steel-
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Maitland. the Torv Chief Whip. renlied to a request for a clarification of the
official Conservative response: there was 'no Unionist policy yet laid down on
these matters but he was ready to pass on any suggestions made'! 101It appears
that the Tory leadership was waiting upon the reaction of farmers to Lord
Salisbury's Conservative agricultural committee proposals before adopting a
fixed policy on the question.102 Salisbury's committee bowed to the instincts
of the National Farmers Union and avoided any commitment to an agricultural
minimum wage. Instead, it favoured a voluntary uprating of wages by farmers
. h id di . 103In t e poorer-pal istncts.
The Duke of Marlborough declared against any legislative interference
in wage-determination and argued that, 'as a general rule, rural labour receives
about as much as it is worth,.104 Walter Long, representative of the traditional
Tory squire, was bitterly opposed to Lloyd George's agricultural minimum
wage policy. lOS Of course, landowners, like farmers and agricultural labourers,
could not be stereotyped into a homogenous mould of interests or political
opinions. For instance, F.C. Arkwright, a Derbyshire landowner, endorsed the
principle of a minimum wage for farm workers.l'" However, it seems that
farmers and landowners alike remained wary of Lloyd George's proposals, in
spite of the fact that the Liberals proposed reforms intended for the benefit of
tenant farmers, at the expense of the landowner; such as fixed tenure
d ib I 107guarantees an rent tn una s.
Andrew Bonar Law, the Tory leader, preferred to pay the land
campaign as little attention as possible, and exploit both his party's 'Unionist'
credentials and the government's discomfort with regard to the mounting crisis
in Ulster, caused by the imminent enactment of the Irish Home Rule Bill.
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Indeed on ~O Octoher 1913. Steel-Maitland instructed Conservative
candidates in the constituencies to concentrate on Ulster in their speeches, and
. hid . ,108Ignore t e an campaign:
Bonar Law's inert reaction to Lloyd George's populist crusade
prompted a section of his party to write a letter of protest on 8 November 1913.
They asserted that an 'attempt simply to ignore the land problem cannot in the
nature of things meet with success ... The agricultural voter might be inclined
to think that he had to choose between sacrificing Ulster and sacrificing his
own private interests.109 The fifteen signatories to the letter comprised the
membership of the Agricultural sub-committee of the Unionist Social Reform
Committee (USRC). This unofficial ginger group was established under the
chairmanship of F.E. Smith in the spring of 1911. Its membership included
relatively youthful MPs who believed that the Conservatives must embrace a
coherent social programme, in order to re-capture the Tory working-class voter
lost in the 1906 and 1910 elections. Jane Ridley has described their ideology
as an intriguing 'synthesis of traditional toryism, Fabian socialism and
id b 1 . ,110 F 1912 b .contemporary I eas a out rura regeneration". rom , su -comrmttees
of the USRC produced reports recommending an advanced health policy,
educational reform and a major overhaul of the Poor Law.
Christopher Tumor, an enlightened and somewhat eccentric
Lincolnshire landowner, chaired the agricultural sub-committee. Tumor's sub-
committee upstaged the official launch of Lloyd George's land campaign by
publishing A Unionist Agricultural Policy, a six-penny pamphlet selling over
3,000 copies during its first week of publication in September 1913. The
report echoed the arguments of Liberals who maintained that low wages in
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agriculture suppressed all wages: agricultural wages boards were advocated to
raise the wages of unorganised farm labourers to subsistence level. 111 Most
strikingly, A Unionist Agricultural Policy proposed that the state should bear
the burden of the higher wage bill imposed on farmers, via higher personal
income tax rates, The Liberals proposed that the landowner should shoulder
the burden, via rent rebates to farmers, Although no group of Conservatives
would dare to propose that landowners pay for the cost of granting farm
workers a living wage, it is surprising that progressive taxation, rather than
tariff revenues, was chosen as the alternative means of financing the policy,l12
Nevertheless, by placing the burden of the agricultural minimum wage on
upper middle class income tax payers, the USRC could ensure that
'plutocratic' supporters of Lloyd George, such as the Rowntree, Cadbury,
Lever and Montague families, would not be spared the cost of financing their
own policies! The USRC's proposals provide clear evidence of a certain
parallel between the extent to which advanced Tories and socialists were
prepared to utilise the resources of the state, when events were considered to
necessitate such bold action, to an extent to which Liberals balked at.
However, only after 1914 would this phenomenon be put to the test.
Above all, the purpose of A Unionist Agricultural Policy was to
educate and influence a sceptical Conservative party rather than to highlight
h I, h id 1 113 H ' , ,t e po ICY amongst t e WI er e ectorate. owever, mamstream opiruon
within the Conservative Party disagreed with the USRC's contention that an
agricultural minimum wage was in no way in 'conflict with historic Tory
doctrines', In vain did Tumor's committee assert that the
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principle of Toryism is not that freedom of contract cannot he
interfered with under any circumstances, but that it should not be
interfered with unless the policy of allowing such freedom has failed
to produce desirable results from the point of view of the State. In
case of agricultural wages ... the policy of laissez-faire has produced
I .. . I h [ ] 114resu ts imrmca to t e race .
Tories from the shires resented these younger urban Conservative social
reformers interfering in rural matters. Despite the gradual weakening of the
influence of the 'squirearchy' within the Tory Party during the late Victorian
and Edwardian period, it was roused when reforms threatening its interest
appeared on the political agenda. Not surprisingly, both attempts by John Hills
to present the USRC's minimum wage proposals to the Commons, via the
Agricultural Employment Boards Bill, in May 1913 and April 1914, failed to
progress beyond the first reading stage. After all, none of the three main
political parties had an interest in securing its success. Either they wanted to
publicise their own proposals, as in the case of the Liberal and Labour Parties,
or they disliked the principle of an agricultural minimum wage, as with the
bulk of Hills' own party.
In the constituencies, Conservatives concentrated upon the prospect of
higher prices, the threat of unemployment, and an end to valuable payments in
kind they considered likely if farmers were to be subject to minimum wage
legislation. lIS In fact, the contention that benevolent social reforms sometimes
rendered worse the position of those for whom the legislation was intended to
benefit was perhaps the Conservatives' strongest argument in answer to the
land campaign. After all, National Insurance contributions bore heavily on
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azricultural workers. The Conservatives exnloited statements made bv T .iheral
land reformers effectively, and argued that, as the 'increased wage to the
labourer will really be paid over to the landlord', agricultural labourers 'are not
to have any more money to spend on themselves'. 116 This was a salient
rebuttal to Lloyd George's propagandising, given that Liberals proposed to
raise farm workers' wages primarily in order that they would be able to afford
an 'economic', i.e. higher, rent for their cottage. However, the Conservative
Party failed to exploit this argument to any degree.
The Land Enquiry Committee published its Urban Report on 2 April
1914. Although the housing question was again the foremost concern for
Liberals, the Report proposed a minimum wage
for all low-paid wage-earners, and that the minimum wage fixed
under such a statute shall ... not be less than the sum required to keep
a family of normal size in a state of physical efficiency, and to
enable them to pay an economic or commercial rent for a sanitary
dwelling.F"
Thus, under the Land Enquiry Committee proposals, wages boards were to be
~
established for the lowest-paid workers in the towns, as well in rural districts
"
of England and Wales. The Industrial Unrest Sub-Committee of the Unionist
Social Reform Committee, chaired by John Hills, also produced a similarly
radical report in the summer of 1914. The Industrial Unrest: a Practical
Solution report proposed
the substitution of a genuine system of arbitration for the solution of
labour disputes, and the recognition of a standard minimum wage in
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snccified industries as a first instalment of the general extension of
such a principle to all classes of labour alike.1I8
Alas, not only did the proposal stand no chance of being accepted as
Conservative Party policy; the report was also published too late to have any
impact upon public debate. The government had yet to pronounce in favour of
urban wages boards before international and Irish crises dominated Cabinet
meetings from the end of June 1914.119 Therefore, by the outbreak of
hostilities on 4 August, the urban land campaign had not enjoyed a chance to
win popularity amongst electors.
The logical consequence of the urban and rural land campaigns was for
the Liberal government to institute district wages boards throughout England
and Wales. The Labour Party, with the TUC's blessing, was already
committed to such a policy. Granted that counter-factual speculation is a futile
exercise, it is worth bearing in mind that had war not broken out in 1914, it is
likely that the Liberals, for so long identified as the guardian and champion of
laissez-faire ideology, would have committed themselves to an urban and rural
minimum wage. As the Daily Citizen noted in 1914, the 'principle of the legal
minimum wage has made astonishing progress since the passing of the Trade
Boards Act in 1909.' 120 Thus Frederick Banbury's fear that, 'if the amount of
wages paid to the agricultural labourer is to be fixed by the State it follows that
the amount of wages paid in every industry in the country must be so fixed', 12l
appeared close to realisation by the summer of 1914.
Had the Liberals won the election due in 1915, a de-facto minimum
wage for all could well have been established in 1916, just twenty years after
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lA. Hobson first called for one. As one historian has noted. this would have
provided 'a degree of retrospective unity to their social policy through an
assault on low wage poverty.' 122 The Liberals' electoral prospects depended
more upon the health of the 'progressive alliance' with the Labour at
constituency level than the resurgence of Conservative Party morale as a result
of the Ulster crisis. Thus, a commitment by the government to establishing a
minimum wage for all unorganised workers would have chimed in well with
the priorities of the Labour Party, which was then not strong enough to make a
lone bid for power.
However, this de-facto minimum wage for all would not have been a
uniform national minimum wage, such as the thirty shillings policy
championed by Will Crooks. Nor would 'living' minimum wages for all be
established, along the lines advocated by Hobson. Instead, district wages
boards, composed of local representatives from both sides of industry, would
have been established nation-wide, to fix a minimum wage rate based on those
paid by reputable employers. These minima would provide a 'floor' to wages
for those workers too weak to organise themselves into trade unions and
thereby win for themselves a living wage. The two main parties, and certainly
the labour movement, wished to avoid any interference with the structure of
collective-bargaining wage determination that delivered relatively high wage
rates in the organised sectors of the economy.
By 1914, there was an emerging consensus in favour of legal minimum
wage machinery, amongst radicals within all three mainstream British political
parties, to encompass workers left unprotected by trade union coverage. Of
course, this collectivist-minded consensus in favour of a general minimum
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wage policy did not embrace all members of the parties. Liberals of a more
traditional economic outlook, and 'collective self-help' trade unionists, shared,
with the clear majority of Conservatives, a discomfort with the notion of any
further legislative forays in the direction of a minimum wage, save for a
modest expansion in the number of trade boards.
Thus, there was a gulf separating the rhetoric of politicians advocating
a living wage for all workers and the wages boards policies they proposed to
achieve this objective. Once it is understood that politicians favouring a
national application of minimum wage machinery advocated only a watered
down 'what the trade can bear' minimum wage policy, it is possible to
understand why so many moderate, mainstream Edwardians, especially
amongst the Liberal Party, could endorse the policy by 1914. To their mind,
all that was being supported was a major extension of the trade board
machinery, which was widely perceived as a success. Armed with this
understanding of what contemporary politicians understood by the term
'national minimum wage', i.e. a national application of local minimum wage
machinery, it is possible to dispute J.R.Hay's assertion that a 'substantial body
of opinion' within the Liberal Party was opposed to such a policy in 1914.123
The trade boards precedent enabled ministers to grasp at similar
machinery as a means of resolving the miners' strike in 1912. Once the largest
and most powerfully organised group of workers had been granted statutory
minimum wage protection, there were few ideological barriers in the way of
granting wages boards to all occupational groups. Although the outbreak of
the First World War killed off the land campaign, the following chapter will
discuss the similar ad hoc development of minimum wage regulation after
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1914, and the emergence of 'reconstruction' polices, which were to herald the
similar prospect of a minimum wage for all in 1918.
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rll A,VTF"Q Tll~FF
FROM 'TOTAL WAR' TO TOTAL MINIMUM
WAGE COVERAGE, 1914-1918
During the First World War, the incremental, almost accidental, advance of
the minimum wage principle that occurred prior to 1914 was accelerated
further. By 1915, it was apparent that the war was to place 'unprecedented
demands upon the resources of conflicting nations, largely because of the size
of the armed forces involved, the weapons they employed, the duration of the
conflict and to a lesser degree its geographical spread'.' The demands of
'total war' could not be met by 'business as usual'; the conventional working
of the economy along free market principles, tempered by minimal
government intervention. The national emergency forced administrators to
ignore and subvert classical economic 'laws' and lift 'the rigid fiscal
constraints which, whatever the rhetoric, had held back the expansion of the
Edwardian state." In order to reconcile the conflicting demands for
manpower for the army and labour to produce the means to wage war, the
state needed to control the production and distribution of the nation's
resources. It was thus imperative that the state take the politically sensitive
step of controlling the labour market. Extensive forays into wage regulation
were a consequence of this undertaking.
This chapter will consider how the twin consequences of the need for
'dilution', the substitution of lesser-skilled male and female workers for
skilled craftsmen in the munitions sector, together with the effects of inflation
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on earnings, dragged government into an ever more extensive regulation of
wages. Secondly, the granting of agricultural minimum wage machinery in
1917, in acknowledgement of the strategic importance of British food
production to the war effort, will be reviewed. Thirdly, 'reconstruction'
thinking evolving during the latter half of the war will be analysed.
Reconstruction plans for permanent minimum wage for all policies
compensated for the shelving, by the Liberal government, of similar proposals
at the start of the conflict. The 1918 Trade Boards Act was intended to
transform their status from sweating remedies applied on an exceptional basis,
to substitute collective bargaining agencies applied across lesser-organised
sectors of industry. Finally, the November 1918 Wages (Temporary
Regulation) Act was to ensure universal minimum wage protection for almost
two years after the armistice.
In August 1914, contemporaries believed that the war would be a short
conflict, 'over by Christmas', and that unemployment would be its major
consequence, as a result of the dislocation of trade markets in Britain and
overseas. They were soon proved mistaken on both counts. Within two
months, the mass enlistment of volunteers into the colours and the demands of
the emergent war economy had combined to eliminate male unemployment.
Although joblessness remained a problem, albeit a diminishing one, for
women workers for a few months longer;' the spring of 1915 witnessed the
emergence of acute labour shortages for war work.
By 1917, the state had assumed full control of all key economic
sectors, including the railway, coal mining, agriculture and cotton industries.
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However it was the shortaze of skilled munitions workers that provided the
spur to state intervention in the labour market in 1915. Nearly one-fifth of
skilled engineering manpower had enlisted during the first year of the war.
Nevertheless, in view of the pressing need for a massive expansion of
munitions production, these workers were of much greater use to the war
effort remaining in their jobs. Early in the war, both the Admiralty and the
War Office issued badges to men engaged on vital production processes to
exempt them from military recruitment, 'starred' workers."
Even had skilled engineering workers remained at work, large-scale
dilution would still have been required, in order to increase armaments
production. However, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), and
other unions representing skilled craftsmen, feared that the influx on non-
apprenticed male, and more especially, female, 'dilutees' would undermine
forever their strategic bargaining position.' The unions were convinced, with
some justification, that employers saw the war as a golden opportunity to rid
themselves of union-enforced workplace restrictions. Control over the pace of
production was a central tenet of skilled union strategy," and the victories that
organised labour had won in this field in the six decades prior to 1914 had
been hard fought. Consequently, the two sides of industry were unable to
agree on terms for female dilution.
It was clear to the government that for dilution to occur, it must
intervene to cajole and reassure the trade unions that their interests would be
safeguarded. However, trade unionists were as suspicious of state intervention
in the labour market as much as they were wary of employers. 7 This suspicion
was magnified during wartime by their fear of industrial conscription, which
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was as unnonular with orvanised labour as the nrincinle of militarv
conscription. Nevertheless, the government established the Committee on
Production on 4 February 1915, as a means of resolving a pay dispute amongst
engineering workers on the Clyde."
Chaired by George Askwith, the highly respected Board of Trade
conciliator, the Committee on Production had a reference
to inquire into and report forthwith, after consultation with the
representatives of employers and working men upon the best steps to
be taken to ensure that the productive powers of the employees in the
engmeenng and shipbuilding establishments working for
Government purposes shall be made fully available so as to meet the
needs of the nation in the present emergency. 9
Following its recommendation that restrictive practices should be relaxed and
collective bargaining suspended on all government contracts for the duration of
the war; Lloyd George was able to persuade engineering and shipbuilding
unions to agree to these conditions at a series of conferences at the Treasury on
17-19 March 1915. In return, the 'Treasury Agreement' provided for the
guaranteed restoration of trade union practices upon the cessation of the war
and the substitution of a new system for the settlement of disputes. The role of
the Committee on Production was enhanced to provide voluntary arbitration
for the munitions industry.
However, the trade unions were dilatory in implementing the agreement
at shop-floor level, partly because the government was dragging its feet with
regard to its promise to control the soaring profits of munitions firms.
Consequently, in July 1915, the government substituted legal enactment for
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voluntarv azreement bv enshrining: the Treasurv Aoreement into the terms of
the Munitions of War Act. All workers in 'controlled establishments', private
factories subject to state control for the duration of the war, numbering 20,000
by March 1918, were now subject to binding arbitration by the Committee on
Production. As strikes were forbidden, local munitions tribunals were
established to deal with matters of workshop discipline.l" 'Leaving
certificates' had to be obtained by workers from their employers if they wished
to change jobs. Naturally, this policy acted as a brake on wages as workers
were trapped into working for their current employer for as long as his or her
services were required. Understandably, the leaving certificate was extremely
unpopular amongst wage earners, and the government eventually withdrew the
scheme in October 1917.
The Treasury Agreement stipulated that dilutees should receive the
'customary rate' for the job. The ASE believed that it would be easier to flush
women out of the engineering industry at the end of the war in favour of their
members if women dilutees received skilled male wage rates, thus pricing
themselves out of competition with men. I I In June 1915, the ASE concluded a
wartime alliance with Mary Macarthur's National Federation of Women
Workers (NFWW) in June 1915. 'In return for assistance with recruitment, the
NFWW was pledged to protect men's wage standards and to support the
restoration of trade union practices and in particular the reinstatement of ASE
members.t''' In addition, the ASE held out for a guaranteed minimum wage for
all women dilutees.
Female dilutees often failed to win the customary male rates for the job.
Their entry into the engineering trades was accompanied by changes in
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working practices. In Wightman's opmion, this phenomenon provided
employers with the perfect excuse to deny female (and male) dilutees the
'customary rates' for the job. They argued that women dilutees were not
directly substituting skilled male labour, and therefore had no entitlement to
the skilled male rates. In 1915, the Engineering Employers Federation advised
its members to pay women the district rates for male youths, rather than
adults! 13 Gail Braybon considered that employers had some justification for
denying women customary rates, given the 'considerable changes in working
practice, with the installation of new machines, the use of cranes, lifts and
hoists, and the utilisation of male labourers, supervisors and tool setters.'
Furthermore, she implied that male workers privately agreed with the
employers' point, but fearing for their future wage levels, continued to protest
their adherence to the principle of equal pay for equal work."
Not for the first time during the war, the government found itself
intervening in the labour market to settle anomalies caused by such previous
intervention. Following the September 1915 TUC conference, where its
President, J.A. Seddon, asserted that the 'only course to minimise any possible
danger is to insist upon equal pay for equal work', IS the government
established the Central Munitions Labour Supply Committee." Within a
month, this committee had produced a series of schedules decreeing working
conditions for dilutees. During October, the government issued Ministry of
Munitions Circulars L2 and L3, which governed the wages of female and male
dilutees, respectively, in 'National Factories', the state-owned munitions firms.
However, whereas the Central Munitions Labour Supply Committee
had recommended a minimum time rate of £ 1 a week, Circular L2 fixed this
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f zure as a sneciiic time rate.17 Moreover. the circulars failed to guarantee a
minimum wage to all munitions workers, because, outside the National
Factories, they were merely recommendations to controlled establishments.
Only after the January 1916 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act did the
government grant itself power to regulate rates of wages, and other industrial
conditions, for all munitions workers. Tribunals were established for both
male and female dilutees; the Special Arbitration Tribunal on Women's Wages
was set up in March 1916.
However, the Ministry of Munitions issued no statutory rates until
'Order 447' of July 1916. This prescribed an hourly time rate of 4Y2d. for
women on munitions work not recognised as men's, with an extra half-penny
an hour for work of a dangerous character. Trade unionists protested that the
four-penny hourly piecework rate, also guaranteed to women under the Order,
was worth less than 2%d. at pre-war prices. Thus, Mary Macarthur had little
trouble persuading the 1916 TUC Congress to endorse 'a national minimum
wage for all women wage earners, which shall be at least sufficient to keep
them in physical efficiency and in reasonable comfort.' 18 Nevertheless,
Christopher Addison, the deputy Minister of Munitions, insisted that Order 447
'would improve the wages of tens of thousands of women in this country' and
mentioned that employers had lobbied him, complaining that the rates fixed
hi h 19were too rgn, Indeed, employers were unhappy with the 'rigidity' of this
and subsequent Orders, claiming that rivals from both non-controlled
establishments at home and American and Japanese competition abroad would
undercut their competitiveness. Employers also 'urged that female labour was
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of very little service for some months and nleaded for a lower nrobationarv
rate, or a scale rising with experience and merit. ,20
Complaints soon reached the government that the statutory rates often
failed to guarantee women earnings of twenty shillings a week. Because the
£ 1 a week was calculated on the basis of the normal working week of men in
the engineering trade, i.e. 53 or 54 hours, and women munitions workers
tended to work a standard 48-hour week, employers could legally deny women
the full twenty shillings 'minimum' wage. However, following 'strident
nagging' ,21 the government proved responsive to the criticism and issued Order
888 in December 1916, which stated that '20s. should be the minimum for a 48
hour week and not, as heretofore, the standard rate for the working hours of the
district' .22
Even critics acknowledged the 'real and substantial improvement' In
the wages of women made by the Ministry of Munitions.23 Given the
persistence of prejudices amongst male employers and workers, regarding the
value of women's contribution to the labour market, it is likely that state wage
regulation had beneficial effects upon the female workers concerned.
Conversely, for skilled male workers engaged on work vital to the war effort,
government regulation of wages actually depressed them below the level
which could have been won under conditions of unregulated supply and
demand. A Labour MP declared in 1919: 'our experience of compulsory
arbitration has taught us that the Court is held in hell, and the devil is the
presiding officer. ,24 William Beveridge articulated the view of government,
when he wrote on 1 February 1917:
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T stood for the imnartial state. In neacetirne the emnlovers were
generally top dog and so my business was chiefly to prevent the
employer from exploiting his advantage unduly. In wartime the
workman is top dog, and therefore my business (for the State) is to
prevent the workman from exploiting his advantage unduly."
Wage regulation was undertaken primarily in the interests of the state, rather
than the worker.
However, the effects of wartime inflation on the value of earnings
eventually forced the state to intervene to secure wage standards for an ever-
larger proportion of the workforce. Retail prices doubled during the First
World War. Wage rate increases lagged behind this trend by a significant,
albeit diminishing, margin throughout. Therefore, average real wage levels
remained lower than the July 1914 standard until 1919 when wage-rate
increases finally caught up with the proportionate increase in prices. However,
from 1915, full employment, and the abundant opportunities for working
overtime in many industries, conspired to keep average household earnings
(just about) on a par with the increased cost of living." Nevertheless, fatigue
and overwork were consequences of this trend. As factory regulations were
eased early during the war, many workers in key industries often worked over
seventy hours during a seven-day working week. The government was
concerned, by 1916, that by working excessive hours, many workers were
endangering their health, and diminishing their productivity.f
Naturally, the sharp increase in the cost of living, especially food
prices, which tended to rise even faster than the general level of inflation, was
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a nrincinal concern of the lahour movement's War Emerzencv Workers'
National Committee. Labour MPs warned the government that the erosion of
real wage levels was endangering the industrial truce.i" Initially, the labour
movement favoured government controls over the supply of food, fuel and
other necessities, in order to stabilise prices, rather than wage increases
matching the inflation rate.29 As Will Anderson reminded the Commons;
whilst powerful trade unions could flex industrial muscle in order to secure
compensatory wage increases, lesser-organised workers, and working class
households reliant on wartime separation allowances and Old Age Pension
payments could not insure themselves against inflation.l'' Only after the
government had persisted in following the 'stupid policy ... of expecting the
working classes to assimilate the steeply rising cost of living' /1 did the TUC,
in 1917, call for a co-ordinated attempt to secure 'an increase in wages
proportionate to the progressive increase in prices. ,32
Cost of living pressures had led to rent strikes on the Clyde. Rents
formed the second largest outlay, after food, from working class household
budgets. In response, government was again forced to intervene in the free
market. On 25 November 1915, the 'rather apologetic'F President of the
Local Government Board, the Tory squire, Walter Long, introduced the
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Bill to freeze
increases of such. Frederick Banbury mocked the Bill as being conceived on
the principle that 'Political Economy must be related to Saturn because we are
at war' .34 In a sense he had a point; if the state could determine rent levels, no
ideological barriers stood in the way of it regulating wage or price levels in a
similar manner.
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By 1916, the Committee on Production was awarding systematic
uniform, national flat-rate wage increases, 'to be regarded as war wages and
recognised as due to and dependent on the existence of the abnormal
conditions then prevailing in consequence of the war', i.e. higher prices" The
term 'war wages' was a compromise between the unions' demand for a 'rate
advance' and the employers' desire to concede only a war 'bonus' on top of
the normal wage, that would not have to be included in overtime calculationa."
As Alan Fisher noted, the flat-rate 'war wage' advances 'made the transition to
national negotiation easier, for in many cases there was no interference with
old local variations in basic rates, on which were imposed the uniform national
increases. ,37 They also provided a proportionately greater boost to the wages
of the lower-paid grades of labour. Thus, for the first time, wages were
determined with 'the human factor [taken] into consideration.v"
We shall now move away from considering issues relating to wage
regulation during the first half of the war, and discuss the fate of minimum
wage policies between 1916 and 1918. The poor harvest of 1916, together
with the impact of the German submarine offensive, forced the government to
intervene to stimulate British food production. The 1917 Com Production Act
offered price subsidies to arable farmers and guaranteed all farm workers a
minimum weekly wage of 25 shillings. A Central Agricultural Wages Board
was established, with powers to determine pay and working hours.
This bold step was a far cry from the government's policy towards
agricultural wages earlier in the war. By May 1916, farm workers' wages had
risen, on average, by only half the rate of inflation.39 Nevertheless, the fact
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that farmers had conceded some advances in wage rates nrovided the
justification for ministers to adhere to laissez-faire principles:
But on the whole the laws of supply and demand are acting much
more freely than in ordinary times; and it is probably better to rely
upon the continued upward movement in wages that may be
expected to result from them, than to embark upon any immediate
S . 40tate action.
Sure enough, the laws of supply and demand helped induce about 150,000
male farm workers, fifteen per cent. of the agricultural labour force, to enlist in
the armed services by July 1915,41 and thousands more to take up better-paid
munitions work.
Agricultural trade unions did attempt to negotiate wage increases. In
February 1916, farmers in Norfolk granted official recognition to the
Agricultural Labourers and Rural Workers' Union (NALRWU), and agreed to
a twenty shillings weekly minimum wage.42 However, outside Norfolk and
Lancashire, agricultural trade unionism coverage was extremely patchy. The
initial rush of volunteers for military service had drained the life-blood from
the new union branches of 1913-1914. 'It has been estimated that NALRWU
lost a quarter of its members by 1916, while the number of Workers' Union
branches fell from 250 (1914) to 40 within two years'." Nevertheless, outside
Essex, Cambridgeshire and the Wessex counties, weekly agricultural wages in
Britain had generally reached 25 shillings by 1917. In Scotland, where the
Farm Servants Union enjoyed wider coverage than its English counterparts,
weekly wages were generally in excess of thirty shillings.i"
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Thus. hv 1917. the 25 shillings minimum was of nractical benefit on lv
in isolated rural backwaters. Labour, and some Liberal, MPs argued in favour
of a thirty shillings minimum, especially as the 25 shillings guarantee was
inclusive of the value of allowances paid in kind." Arnold Rowntree
emphasised that inflation had reduced the value of 25 shillings to just 14s. 6d.
at July 1914 prices." Only after the Minister for Agriculture, R.E. Prothero,
assured MPs that the 25 shillings figure represented 'a minimum wage, the
irreducible minimum, the datum line from which Wages Boards may work ...
independent of the fall in prices',47 did he persuade the Commons to reject
Labour's thirty shillings amendment.
In view of the previous contentiousness of the policy within the Tory
Party, it is interesting that the principle of an agricultural minimum wage
proved to be less controversial than the figure proposed. The exceptional
circumstances of wartime subdued opposition to the Bill. Admittedly,
Frederick Banbury preferred wages to be settled by the law of supply and
demand alone." However, most potential opponents of the principle of
agricultural minimum wages, on the Conservative side, were probably
assuaged both by the urgent need to increase food production and the Bill's
scheme of price subsidies. Indeed, given that the minimum wage was fixed
below prevailing wage levels, farmers gained more from the Act. In fact, the
'bounties' to be paid to farmers were unpopular amongst opposition Liberal
and Labour MPs.49
Robert Walker, leader of the NALRWU, was reluctant to place too
much faith in the work of agricultural wages boards. He preferred to rely on
organisation to secure for the farm worker better wages and conditions. 50 In
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nractice. however. Walker's own union. and the Workers' I Inion. seized unon
the agricultural minimum wage machinery as their best hope of winning higher
wages for farm workers. Indeed, the revival of agricultural trade unionism's
fortunes coincided with the appearance of the Com Production Bill. Aided by
a further grant from the TUC towards organisation costs in 1917,51NALRWU
membership increased to 41,000 in 1918, 73,000 in 1919, and 93,000 in 1920.
Even more dramatically, the agricultural membership of the Workers' Union
nudged the 100,000 mark by 1920.52 Not surprisingly, this latter union seemed
happy with the impact of state intervention into agricultural wage
determination. 53
Undoubtedly, the Com Production Act did much to raise the earnings
of agricultural labourers, especially in those counties renow~ for low pay.
"
Comparing estimated earnings in 1914 with minimum wage levels in 1920-21,
Alan Armstrong found that the three counties that enjoyed the highest advance
were Oxfordshire, Suffolk and Norfolk. Furthermore, by 1921, minimum
weekly wage rates in these three counties, at around 42 shillings, were less
than four shillings a week lower than the three highest-paying counties,
Lancashire, Durham and Northumberland.i" However, as F.E. Green pointed
out, winning the legal right to a certain minimum wage did not always
guarantee that the worker received the specified sum. From a glance at
inspection statistics, a relatively high number of farmers appeared to have
disregarded the law. 55
Outside the munitions and cotton sectors, where female trade union
coverage was relatively robust, women workers 'shared but to a small extent in
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the unward movement of wages due to the war' ,56 The condition of women
performing 'women's jobs' was largely overlooked during the First World
War. Female clothing workers and shop assistants remained extremely poorly
paid. Accordingly, the TUC demanded trade boards for the entire retail and
I h· 57C ot mg sectors.
However, trade board rates were an inadequate insurance against
wartime inflation. Apparently, workers' representatives experienced difficulty
in securing trade board meetings during the first two years of the war.58 Only
during August and September 1916, did the Tailoring and Shirt-making Trade
Boards, respectively, increase their minimum hourly time rates for women, by
a mere half-penny, to four-pence; a full two years into the war!59 Not
surprisingly, many women working for employers paying little or no more than
the trade board minima voted with their feet and left their trade for better-paid
munitions work.60 Employers feared a permanent increase in minimum rates
resulting from what could have been transient movements in price levels.61
According to the 1919 War Cabinet Committee Report on Women in Industry,
this was because trade boards 'were unable to grant war bonuses as such, and
therefore felt that they ought to base the minimum rates on normal and not the
prevailing abnormal conditions. ,62 Indeed, during the first decade of the trade
boards' existence, neither workers' nor employers' representatives interpreted
their power to fix minimum rates as anything other than sanction to raise them,
given that their purpose was to combat sweating.
In March 1917, the Minister of Labour, John Hodge, after receiving a
deputation from workers' representatives from the five trade boards of nation-
wide coverage" instructed the boards concerned to raise their female
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minimum rates immediately. bv at least a half-nennv an honr64 However.
Hodge confirmed, to a deputation of employers on 3 May, that he was not
demanding that trade boards should 'level up the present minimum rates to the
full extent of the increased cost of living, i.e. to the effect of 65%.'
Accordingly, employers' representatives from the five trade boards met on 15
May to co-ordinate strategies for conceding only token advances/" Noting,
with concern, that employers on the Tin Box trade board had been forced into
granting a V..d. increase in the minimum hourly rate, raising the new minimum
for women to 4Y2d., the employers agreed to limit the hourly increases to a
half-penny. 'It was also agreed that in the event of a rate higher than Y2d. per
hour being passed by the remaining Trade Boards the Employers'
Representatives should not agree to the higher rate taking effect before the date
from which the limited operation of the increased rate comes into force.' Sure
enough, thereafter, trade board minima crept upwards, in halfpenny
instalments. Even so, these advances failed to compensate the women fully for
the increased cost of living since the outbreak of war. Trade unionists
continued to press for a minimum rate that ensured to the worker the same
purchasing power as the wage in 1914.66
Of course, some organised women in trade board sectors benefited
from collective agreements guaranteeing a level of earnings significantly above
the statutory minima. By the end of the war, female chain-workers covered by
an agreement reached between their union and the Chain Manufacturers'
Association, enjoyed weekly earnings of between 25 and 35 shillings,
compared with the trade board minimum rate of just four pence an hour., 16
shillings for a 48-hour week. Similarly, adult women hollow-ware workers
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emnloved hv members of the Licht Castinzs Association enioved zuaranteed
minimum weekly earnings of30s. 9d.67
Women engaged on war work that fell under the jurisdiction of trade
boards were short-changed. As many processes in the hollow-ware and tin-
box trades were classified as munitions work, initially, women workers
benefited from the Special Arbitration Tribunal on Women's Wages cost of
living weekly bonus awards of 2s. 6d. and 3s. 6d., in August and December
1917, respectively. However, in April 1918, the Minister of Labour decided
that such bonuses, in future, would not apply to work under the jurisdiction of
the trade boards." Likewise, in spite of the fact that the men's clothing sector
was geared towards the supply of military uniforms, clothing workers were not
protected by wartime wage regulatory machinery.F' The female chain-making
sector lacked a strong claim for war-work status; the lighter grades of chain
produced were intended for agricultural use, rather than shipping. Thus, the
twin pressures of inflation and labour scarcity combined only slowly to nudge
female trade board minima upwards."
Having looked at both wartime regulation issues and the fate of
minimum wage machinery outside the munitions sector, we now tum to a
discussion of 'reconstruction' thinking, and associated plans for an important
role for minimum wage machinery in the post-war labour market.
The labour movement hierarchy, enjoying unprecedented influence in
Whitehall as a consequence of its total commitment to the war effort, was
inspired by the demonstration, in wartime, that state action could do much to
improve working class standards of living and working conditions. Jimmy
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Sexton. leader of the Liverpool dock workers' and a vociferous sunnorter of
the war effort, epitomised the optimism of labour leaders:
The war, devastating though it has undoubtedly been, has also
demonstrated possibilities from which I trust we shall profit when
peace is declared and we get back to production instead of
destruction, amongst which may be mentioned the unlimited
financial resources of the country for its defence, the organisation of
certain industries almost to Nationalisation, and the control of the
profit-monger. It can never be said, after our experience of the war,
that the nation whose financial resources are so marvellous now can,
even through the mouths of its custodians, use the argument of what
it will cost to secure industrial and other social reforms which must
come as a consequence of the war. For let it not be forgotten the
trenches out in Flanders has been a liberal educator of the British
citizen, who will refuse to be bound when he comes back by the old
moth-eaten shibboleths of the past."
Furthermore, the influence over policy making enjoyed by the TUC leadership,
together with the new force of shop-steward power at workplace level, whetted
the appetite of organised labour for a permanent share in the formulation of
industrial policy, at both the level of the firm and central government.P
In response, many employers were willing to make concessions. They
were motivated by a desire for a permanent abandonment of pre-war restrictive
practices, and a settlement of the causes of labour unrest. The Federation of
British Industries (FBI), anxious to wean trade unionists away from their
wartime habit of turning to the state as a guarantor of industrial standards,
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nronosed a generous svstem of welfare benefits, to he administered hv
d k .. I 73employers an wor ers joint y. Championing the mutual interests of
employers and workers, the FBI's leading figures, notably Hugh Jackson and
Dudley Docker, co-opted influential labour movement 'moderates', such as
Arthur Henderson and J.R. Clynes, into the National Alliance of Employers
and Employed. This organisation championed the FBI's conception of
reconstruction, in general, and the recommendations of the Whitley Committee
(see below), in particular.
These factors, together with a sense of national unity fostered by the
sharing of hardships and horrors associated with war, strengthened the notion
that a better society must be built after the cessation of such a destructive war.
This reconstruction thinking was embraced, or at least paid lip service to, by
opinion across the political spectrum.
This impulse towards social reconstruction was embodied in a series
of innovations of central government. A cabinet committee on
Reconstruction Problems was first appointed by Asquith in the
spring of 1916. It was superseded a year later by a committee of
experts under Lloyd George and Edwin Montagu; and finally a full-
scale Ministry of Reconstruction was set up in July 1917. The
movement covered a wide spectrum of economic and political
issues, ranging from administrative reform and improvement of
industrial relations to enhancement of the status of women and
prevention of unemployment after the war.74
Towards the end of 1916, the Board of Trade began to consider the
merits of a minimum wage strategy as a means of countering the effects on
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women's wages of the dislocation of trade, which was expected to follow the
end of the war." A few months later, the new Ministry of Labour, which
assumed responsibility for the trade boards in January 1917, drafted a Bill
providing for the widespread application of trade boards across industry."
This bill was based on the recommendations of the Industrial Sub-Committee
of the Ministry of Reconstruction's Women's Employment Committee. It
favoured trade boards for all trades employing a significant female workforce,
in order 'to safeguard the position of women in trades where a reasonable level
of remuneration has already been reached in order that they will not sink back
to a condition which is socially undesirable', and to help women whose wages
were still unregulated and 'unduly low'. The Committee also favoured an
extension of the function of trade boards, to regulate pay and hours for all
grades of labour, not just the lowest skilled.77 However, this Bill was not
proceeded with, on account of the appearance of the second Whitley Report on
18 October 1917.
The Ministry of Reconstruction established the Committee on Relations
between Employers and Employed, under the chairmanship of John Whitley,
the deputy Speaker of the House of Commons. Its remit was to 'make and
consider suggestions for securing a permanent improvement in the relations
between employers and workmen.' 78 The Whitley Committee steered a middle
course between the pre-war exclusion of trade unions from industrial decision
making and the unions' demand for some form of workers' control. Via bi-
partite representative Joint Industrial Council (HC) machinery, unions were to
be given full recognition and formal collective bargaining apparatus, but no
formal role in the direction of industry. The Committee's first report, which
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dealt with well-organised industries. was presented to ministers In March
1917.79
The second Whitley Report dealt with the less organised sectors of
industry. For those trades where the establishment of lICs was not practicable,
the Committee recommended that 'Trade Boards should be regarded also as a
means of supplying a regular machinery for negotiation and decision on certain
groups of questions dealt with in other circumstances by collective bargaining
between the employers' organisations and trade unions. ,80 Instead of being
concerned merely with the prevention of sweating, trade boards were now to
serve as a stepping stone to full lIC, i.e. collective bargaining, machinery.
Whitehall clearly favoured a trade-by-trade minimum wage policy.
During the war, Seebohm Rowntree, who had responsibility for overseeing the
welfare of government employed munitions workers, devised a minimum wage
standard capable of maintaining a five-member family in modest comfort."
However, government officials recognised that no agreed basis for the
determination of a uniform minimum wage rate then existed. Furthermore,
there was little uniformity of industrial conditions, on account of variations in:
the cost of living between districts, wage rates between workers of different
grades of skill, the level of trade union organisation, the prosperity of
industries, the proportion of wages to the overall costs of production, and the
,.,.dtr
gnilahw profile of an industry's workforce. Thus, officials feared that the
determination of a uniform minimum wage rate would be influenced more by
political, rather than industrial conditions. The Ministry of Labour favoured
representative trade board machinery, which, it considered, would endow the
minima with greater authority amongst both sides of industry, and ease the
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adjustment of a trade to new minimum standards In addition, the Ministrv
believed that the boards would foster a greater sense of trade unity amongst an
industry.82
The Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry
endorsed the bold principle that 'in order to secure and maintain physical
health and efficiency no normal woman should be employed for less than a
bl b . ,83reasona e su sistence wage. However, closer inspection of the
recommendations indicates that this principle was to take second place behind
existing machinery for minimum wage determination" Beatrice Webb's
Minority Report went further, advocating a genuine national minimum wage,
applicable to men and women equally.f However, this proposal was beyond
the pale for all but Fabian socialists and the most radical feminists. More
palatable to mainstream OpInIOn, and the government, were the
recommendations of Sir William Mackenzie.f Insisting that the British wage
system was too complex to have a uniform minimum wage rate transposed
upon it, Mackenzie favoured, instead, an extension of existing wage regulatory
machinery, in order to effect wages minima on a universal, but trade-by-trade
basis."
The 1918 Trade Boards Act enjoyed broad support in parliament. 88 By
this legislation, trade boards were no longer an 'exceptional' policy expedient
reserved only for the most wretched sectors of the economy. Henceforth,
insufficient industrial organisation in a trade, rather than low wages, was to be
the principal justification for their establishment. However, in some respects,
the 1918 Act represented not so much a full realisation of the Whitley
Committee's desire for trade boards to become full substitute collective
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h::l.rgaining ~qencies. hut more of q comnmmise between this and the 1C)OC)
Act's strictly limited conception of their role. For instance, whilst the Whitley
Report envisaged that trade boards would regulate general conditions of pay
and hours, the 1918 Act empowered them to fix only a handful of specific
minimum rates of wages, and regulate hours only inasmuch for the purpose of
devising overtime provisions.
In order to facilitate an accelerated expansion of the trade boards
system, the 'Special Order' procedure, borrowed from the 1901 Factory Act,
was substituted for the 'Provisional Order' mechanism.F' In essence, a Special
Order placed the onus on parliament to reject the minister's proposal before it
assumed the force of law; MPs having forty days in which to do so. By
contrast, the Provisional Order necessitated the minister justifying his
proposals via the full legislative procedure.
This substitution worried those MPs who were concerned about losing
parliamentary sovereignty to Whitehall. James Mason, a Tory MP with several
business interests, charged the Minister of Labour with 'doing away with the
only safe method by which Parliament can proceed in these matters. ,90 Indeed,
the concerns expressed over this issue betrayed the fact that the principle of
minimum wage regulation still caused unease amongst a surprisingly high
minority ofMPs otherwise sympathetic to the Bill.91 Evidently, some of them
considered wage regulation as a potential 'Frankenstein's Monster', which
must be kept under tight supervision, in case it was 'let loose' to wreak
destruction amongst the free-market economy. Furthermore, the Ministry of
Labour, itself, was distrusted by some employers; regarding it as 'almost
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ostentatiouslv organised for the purpose of being biased in the interests of the
wage-earners as against the persons who pay their wages.,92
Nevertheless, although some MPs feared 'that we shall never escape
this bureaucratic octopus which is likely to cling to us after the War' ,93 there
was broad agreement with the glowing assessment of the nine-year old trade
boards experiment, offered by George Roberts, the Minister of Labour:
Our experience shows a wide improvement in the wage standards,
while no legitimate interests have been prejudiced. Organisation has
been improved, efficiency has stimulated and, above all, industrial
relationships have been bettered."
Rowland Barron, a Leeds clothing merchant and Liberal MP, claimed that the
boards 'have been a very great advantage to the work people without being a
corresponding disadvantage to the employers.' On the contrary, he believed
that trade boards had, by levelling up wage rates, assisted 'the better class of
employers against the less generous class of employers.' For these reasons, he
feIt confident that employers generally would have no objection to the
extension of the trade board system." Even the official speaker opposing the
Trade Boards Bill, James Mason, was careful to stress that: 'I have absolutely
no quarrel whatsoever with the general principle of wages boards, nor do 1
object at all to legitimate attempts to raise the standard of women in trades' .96
Although some MPs were upset that the exceptionally low wages criterion for
trade board establishment, underpinning the 1909 Act, had been usurped in
favour of low organisation." many more MPs stressed the reconstruction
aspect of the Bill. They highlighted the need for trade board machinery to be
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in situ as soon as possible, so as to protect working women from the
consequences of the predicted post-war dislocation of industry.i"
However, the armistice took the government by surprise. Although the
Allies were confident, by the late summer of 1918, that victory over the
Central Powers was imminent, most observers did not expect this to happen
until 1919. Consequently, many reconstruction plans were incomplete by
November 1918. In particular, no new trade boards had been established
following the new Act, which had become law only one month earlier. In view
of the abrupt curtailment of the war economy, the Wages (Temporary
Regulation) Act was passed, in order to forestall a fall in (women's) wages.
This hasty enactment was the product of a conference of employers and
trade union representatives at Caxton Hall, summoned by the government on
13 November 1918. Its purpose was to discuss the promised restoration of pre-
war 'restrictive' practices and wage stabilisation. Royal Assent was given to
the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act just eight days later. The government
undertook a universal minimum wage guarantee, albeit on a temporary basis.
Employers were bound to maintain wage rates at least at the levels prevailing
on 11 November 1918 (the 'prescribed rate') for six months. The Committee
~
on Production replaced by the Interim Court of Arbitration, which was 'able to
A
deal with all wages questions without regard to whether the work affected is
. . k t ,99munitions wor or no. The Interim Court of Arbitration proved an
important agency for the regulation of women's wages during 1919, especially
for those whose terms of contract were unregulated throughout the war, such as
the women's clothing industry, for example.
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Unsurprisingly, in view of the consent given by both sides of industry
at the Caxton Hall meeting, the Bill did not encounter any opposition in
parliament. The trade unions were pleased that the Act repealed those clauses
of the Munitions of War Acts that outlawed strikes. Employers, and the many
potential opponents of the principle that the state was guaranteeing all workers
their existing wage standards, would have been mollified both by an awareness
of the existing extraordinary economic conditions, and the expressly stated
temporary nature of the measure:
The Government are particularly anxious to encourage each industry
to deal with wages and allied questions for itself as soon as
practicable. For these reasons the Arbitration Tribunals will be
Interim Arbitration Tribunals only, and the whole wage policy ... is
intended to operate only for a period of six months.l'"
Nevertheless, come May 1919, Robert Horne, George Roberts' successor as
Minister of Labour, recognising that 'we find ourselves still without having
attained peace and with our industrial life still far from settled', 101 felt
compelled to extend the measure for a further six months. However, even
allowing for the Court's raising of many 'prescribed rates' during 1919, this
was a largely cost-less gesture on the part of government, given the
contemporary inflation in prices and wage rates. Indeed, the November 1919
Industrial Courts Act prolonged the 'minimum wage for all' terms of the
Wages (Temporary Wages) Act until30 September 1920.
Hopes for permanent universal minimum wage coverage were raised in
April 1919, when the government endorsed the recommendation of the
National Industrial Conference for such. This issue will be discussed below, in
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Chapter Five. Before then, Chapter Four will analyse the fate of the much-
expanded trade boards machinery during the inter-war period.
To conclude, it is clear that wage regulation during the First World War
was merely an expedient intended to achieve both control of the labour market
and buy industrial peace, so as to minimise risks to production arising from
industrial unrest. Only during deliberation over programmes of reconstruction
did the government consider extending permanent statutory minimum wage
machinery, and even here, its preferred model for the achievement of fair
wages for labour was via collective bargaining machinery, rather than state
compulsion. Solely for those industries considered unfit for industrial self-
government were trade boards proposed. Trade boards themselves represented
an 'arms-length' devolved form of machinery from the perspective of a
wartime government settling wages by edict and compulsory arbitration.
Nevertheless, in 1918, the government made provision for the widespread
expansion of trade boards into 'mainstream' sectors of industry.
Although the left of the labour movement grew disillusioned with the
role of the 'mighty state' during the war years, in view of policies of
conscription, censorship, and deportations of 'troublesome' workers.l'" most
working class people could appreciate that the state could play a benevolent
role in ensuring fair conditions, especially for the more underprivileged
households. The 'levelling' effect of the state's huge compass over everyday
economic and social existence was not forgotten by the labour movement after
these controls were lifted, as per their original timetable, once the war had
ended. Railway workers and coal miners emerged from the war convinced that
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state control of their industries should be made permanent, whilst the
Committee on Production achieved widespread respect amongst employers and
workers, especially from 1917. And whilst it is true that women continued to
suffer inferior levels of wage payment and wider status compared with men
under conditions of state regulation, the conclusion of the Women in Industry
Report reproduced below appears fair:
Had the ordinary law of supply and demand been left to work freely,
it is possible that the disparity between the wages of men and women
would have increased rather than diminished with the decreasing
supply of skilled men .... There is little reason to support the belief
that under free competition the relation between men's and women's
wages would have changed during the war period as quickly as it did
under state regulation.l'"
After all, as Clare Wightman has shown with regard to the engineering
industry, women's wages 'fell dramatically after wartime regulation was
withdrawn in 1920,.104 State regulation of wages was generally to the benefit
of female and lesser-skilled male labour.
Nevertheless, it is worth re-stating the point that state regulation of
wages did depress the 'economic wage' of skilled engineering workers, in
particular. This experience confirmed the suspicions of many skilled workers
regarding the danger that statutory 'minima' placed a 'ceiling' upon wages.
The experience of widespread government regulation of wages, during the war,
was a demonstration to employers that minimum wages need not necessarily
force them into granting higher wages. On the contrary, it helped them, on
occasion, to stereotype wages at a fairly low level. Nonetheless, whilst skilled
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workers suffered a significant erosion of pay differentials, vis-a-vis lesser-
skilled workers, during the war, at least some improvement in the relative and
absolute pay standards of the latter group was inevitable, given both the acute
shortages for labour and their very low level of earnings in 1914.
The attainment of universal minimum wage coverage, via the wages
(Temporary Regulation) Act, if only temporary, and merely on account of the
need to ensure adequate safeguards during transition of the wartime economy
back to peacetime production, proved that a 'minimum wage for all' was a
practical policy expedient. Henceforth, only the lack of government
commitment to undertake such a comprehensive intervention in determining
industrial standards, rather than the supposed barrier of orthodox economic
'laws', prevented the policy from being realised on a permanent basis.
Despite failing, formally, to renounce its laissez-faire instincts, the
British polity sponsored an unprecedented encroachment by the state into the
free-market economy during the First World War. R.H. Tawney's explanation
for this paradox rested on the ad hoc and incremental nature of this leap in the
dark:
Like factory and public health legislation in the last century, each
justified every additional advance as an exceptional concession to
some specific emergency, which, because it was exceptional, raised
no question of principle. Thus a collectivism was established which
was entirely doctrineless. The most extensive and intricate system
of state intervention in economic life which the country had seen
was brought into existence, without the merits or demerits of State
intervention being even discussed. lOS
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However, out of this chaos of selective improvisation, reconstruction planning
envisaged a de-facto minimum wage for all. The failure of the realisation of
this policy, during the inter-war years, forms the thematic basis for the
following two chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE 'LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR'
TRADE BOARDS CONSENSUS, 1918-1939
This chapter is chiefly concerned with the vicissitudes of trade boards during
the inter-war period. Perceptions of the performance of trade boards, these
being the most extensive model of wages board machinery, determined not
only the fate of government policy towards this specific brand of statutory
minimum wage apparatus, but the course of a broader legal minimum wage
policy.
This chapter will demonstrate that both sides of industry and
government eventually coalesced around the notion that representative wages
boards were the only acceptable means for implementing legal interference in
wage rate determination. This 'lowest common denominator' justification for
the wages board consensus was a result of the broad acceptance that voluntary
collective agreements were the most desirable means of wage regulation.
The Trade Boards Act of 1918 transformed their status. Instead of
being relegated to a 'less eligibility' anti-sweating role in marginal economic
sectors, trade boards 'were placed in a relation to the normal negotiating
machinery of industry which they had not previously held.' 1 Two elements of
this 'reconstruction' measure accounted for this metamorphosis. Firstly,
boards were established in trades where 'no adequate machinery exists for the
effective regulation of wages throughout the trade'.2 Accordingly, sixty-three
trade boards covering some three million workers were operational by 1921/
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covering trades where prevailing wage rates were low (but not necessarily
exceptionally so), and organisation amongst both workers and employers was
patchy (though not necessarily absent) and insufficient for the purposes of
collective bargaining. Secondly, the functions of these more widely applicable
boards were enhanced. Permissive powers now enabled trade boards to fix
juvenile and learner rates, piece-rates and overtime rates, in addition to their
statutory obligation to fix general minimum time rates. Trade boards were
thus empowered to regulate wages, and have some indirect control over
hours," for all grades of workers, rather than merely those engaged on the
lowest-skilled processes.
Thus by mirroring many aspects of collective bargaining machinery,
trade boards had emerged from the 'shadows' of industry to become an
important concern for both employers organisations and trade unions during
the inter-war period. Moreover, in spite of the official line that trade boards
were intended primarily for safeguarding the wage standards of vulnerable,
predominantly female, workers, the regulation of skilled, invariably male,
wage rates were to prove just as important a concern for trade boards after
1918. Therein lay the danger for the trade boards system. By their extension
towards 'mainstream' sectors of industry the trade boards encroached upon
territory occupied by trade unions and employers organisations.
Consequently, whereas trade boards had basked in mainstream bipartisan
support whilst at the same time languishing in relative obscurity prior to 1918,
during the inter-war years they were, on occasion, at the centre of industrial
and party political conflict.
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This chapter will chart the hostile challenges faced by trade boards
during the inter-war years. The period when the government, trade unions and
employers organisations all accepted the 'Whitleyite'/1918 Trade Boards Act
expansionist vision for trade boards was confined to the brief era of prosperity
and 'reconstruction' between 1919 and 1920. Thereafter, the trade boards'
'honeymoon' ended abruptly with the onset of the severe economic depression
in 1921. Employers unleashed a tide of hostility against the system, and the
government appeared sympathetic to their protests. Having already curtailed
trade board expansion and even abolished agricultural minimum wage
machinery in September 19215 the government appointed a committee under
Lord Cave to investigate the working and effects of the system.
The respective attitudes of employers' organisations, the trade unions,
and government towards wages boards centred on five main issues, each of
which will be discussed below. Firstly, the extent to which trade board
minima were observed and enforced was crucial to their credibility. Secondly,
the appropriate level of the rate fixed, and its perceived effects on employment
and wage levels, both within the trade and beyond to 'outside' sectors, was a
key feature of the minimum wage debate. Thirdly, given that Britain's
minimum wage apparatus was of a deliberately devolved, semi-autonomous,
representative character, strong feelings abounded as to the appropriate
composition of the trade boards. Fourthly, argument raged over the
appropriate jurisdiction and coverage of minimum rate determinations.
Finally, the perceived effects of trade boards on industrial organisations was
perhaps the single most important factor governing their popularity on both
sides of industry, and the TUC, in particular.
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The Cave Report of 1922, whilst endorsing the retention of existing
trade boards, formalised the brake placed upon the further expansion of the
system. However, although this Report was to dictate the spirit of government
policy towards the trade boards for the subsequent decade, its more drastic
recommendations involving a neutering of their rate fixing powers were never
implemented. No sooner had the employers become reconciled to the
continuation of the existing trade boards the TUC began to doubt its
commitment to them. By echoing the tone of the Cave Report in key respects,
the TUC's own Committee of Enquiry Report in 1930 served to cement the
'lowest common denominator' wages board consensus during the 1930s.
Thus this chapter will demonstrate that the TUC's policy ultimately must
share responsibility with the Cave Report for constraining the development of
the trade boards system."
For the first two years after the armistice, the expansion of both the
role and coverage of trade boards aroused very little hostility. The widespread
expectation of fundamental social and economic change in Britain during the
'special mood" which infected even politicians of the right during the early
months of 1919 does not solely account for this. In a potentially volatile
period of adjustment to peacetime production, many employers newly subject
to trade board jurisdiction could appreciate the benefits of an established
mechanism for the orderly settlement of wage rates. Additionally, employers
could welcome the apparent guarantee that their domestic competitors were
bound to pay their workers identical minimum rates.
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Capitalising on this sanguine attitude, Robert Home, Minister of
Labour from January 1919 to March 1920, though having apparently 'little
affection for progressive social policies' ,8 proceeded to earmark scores of
trades for statutory wage regulation. However, Home's enthusiasm for trade
board establishment was arguably motivated by a desire to forestall
momentum for the 'national' minimum wage policy recommended by the
National Industrial Conference." Either way, he presided over the great
expansion of trade boards across many sectors of industry. For example, trade
boards were extended to cover all sections of the clothing industry, some
isolated textile producing trades, such as jute and rope manufacture, and
several minor metal-moulding trades on the fringe of the engineering sector
concentrated in the west midlands.i" Of course, the extension of trade boards
to the periphery of such heavily organised sectors naturally forged them into a
closer relationship with pre-existing voluntary collective bargaining
machinery.
Expediency undoubtedly governed the selection of trades for statutory
wage regulatory board coverage. In response to urgings from the labour
movement, the Ministry of Labour planned to extend trade boards into the
nation-wide retail and distributive sector. I I In the event, only Milk
Distributive and Grocery Trade Boards were established in this sector before
trade board expansion was halted in 1921.
Indeed, trade union representatives at the National Industrial
Conference complained of the 'slow and cumbrous', 'gradual and piecemeal'
tempo of trade board extension.V and the Women's Employment Committee
Report endorsed this complaint. 13 Thus, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the
158
November 1918 Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act had to be renewed twice.
The Trade Boards Act of 1918 had been justified on the grounds of
safeguarding the wartime advances in the working conditions of women,
whose wages had been raised to an unsustainable, transitory 'jerry-built
perch'{", However, even after the final expiry of the Wages (Temporary
Regulation) Act on 30 September 1920, one Labour MP could still complain
that some trade board rates were not yet obligatory."
Unions were particularly anxious that the government safeguard wage
standards during the first few months of 1919, when working class earnings
suffered. The announcement of the armistice caused a widespread fall in
earnings as working hours were cut back and many munitions workers were
simply laid off. Most of British industry moved to reduce the working week
to a new 48-hour standard in 1919. Whilst this was a progressive move, most
working men and women naturally required a rise in wage rates in order to
preserve total earnings during a period of rapid price inflation.
Although hampered by a shortage of personnel, ministers explained the
delay in establishing trade boards in terms of the need to make thorough
enquiries into each trade, not least so as to draft a precise definition of it. 16
Nevertheless, the pace of trade board expansion quickened during 1920. The
'unions quickly recognised some of the possibilities inherent in the new
stronger trade boards', 17 and attempted to make them work in the interests of
organised labour. In order to co-ordinate the voice of organised labour on the
boards the Tue sanctioned the creation in January 1921 of the Trade Boards
Advisory eouncil.I8
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A majority of employers affected by the establishment of trade boards
seem to have reacted in a similar manner to the trade unions during 1919-
1920. Broadly, they remained unabashed at the prospect of statutory
regulation and organised themselves so that they could make the new
machinery work in their favour. Indeed, for many trades subject to wartime
regulation, trade boards offered the prospect of less state interference and a
genuine move towards 'home rule for industry'.
Of course, the underlying economic prosperity of these years when
most of the initial trade board rates were negotiated helped foster this relaxed
attitude amongst employers, as did the removal of the 'sweated' taint from
trade boards via the 1918 Act. Clearly, the jute manufacturers were never
reconciled to the imposition of trade boards on their industry.l" but more
symptomatic was the response of the Corset Manufacturers Association.
Behaving in a characteristically 'businesslike' manner, they raised no
opposition to the proposal and proceeded to negotiate with Ministry of Labour
officials regarding the scope of the board and their representation on it. They
also secured the services of C.J. Healy, a solicitor who was the Secretary of
several other clothing employers' organisations covered by trade boards.
Corset manufacturers had thus already co-ordinated their negotiating stance in
time for the first meeting of the board."
J.J. Stark, Secretary of the National Federation of Laundry
Associations, succeeded in persuading the National Confederation of
Employers Organisations (NCEO) of the desirability of a wider degree of
employer co-ordination on the boards. The Trade Boards (Employers')
Consultative Council (TB(E)CC), closely aligned with, but independent from
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the NCEO, was up and running by November 1919.21 However, given that the
General Secretary of the National Union of Manufacturers complained as late
as February 1921 that he 'had great difficulty in securing the list of
Employers' Representatives in the various industries where Trade Boards have
been set Up',22 doubt must be cast as to how ubiquitous the TB(E)CC was
amongst even the constituency of employer organisations, at least prior to the
onset of the depression. Indeed, for the first year of its existence, it was
concerned with only one really contentious issue: side voting, whereby the
majority vote of one side counted as its total vote. This practice affected a
mere handful of boards in trades where a significant proportion of co-
. b . 1 d 23operative or su -contractmg emp oyers operate .
However, the onset of a slump, by the beginning of 1921, roused many
employers hitherto untroubled at being subject to trade board jurisdiction.
During the period of high and rising wages employers who, whilst paying
rates in excess of the legal minima, would have barely noticed the operation of
trade boards suddenly discovered a major obstacle to downward revisions of
rates beneath the legal 'floor'. Thus in sharp contrast to the inaugural boards
which had found their feet during the pre-war boom, dozens of new trade
boards experienced a baptism of fire during the trade depression.
The sudden rediscovery of orthodox economic principles by the
government exposed the trade boards to the clamour for 'economy', 'de-
control' , and wage reductions, which were deemed necessary to restore British
industry's competitiveness and facilitate a business revival. Pointed questions
were now asked in the Commons about the administrative cost of trade
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boards." Against the harsh economic backdrop of widespread short-time
working, layoffs and bankruptcies, the prospect of trade boards realising the
hopes of their sponsors in fostering a consensual spirit between employers and
workers was slim.
On 14 February 1921 the NCEO endorsed the stance of the TB(E)CC
in calling for a halt to the establishment of any further trade boards." Within
a month the Cabinet abruptly forbade any such expansion." Some employers'
organisations called for a more radical course of action. For example, on 17
February 1921, the National Union of Manufacturers decided to press for the
abolition of the trade boards.27 The Association of British Chambers of
Commerce and the Birmingham Association of the Engineering Employers
Federation (EEF) also called for the abolition of trade boards, albeit in the
latter case only 'so far as they applied to the industries covered by these
Federations. ,28
The patchy trade board coverage across the light engineering sector
served to exacerbate the sense of injustice felt by those employers who,
already exposed to the cut and thrust of the international market, were also
subject to trade board regulations. J.G. Newey, a Birmingham-based Pin,
Hook & Eye and Snap Fastener employer, fumed that 'we have always been
able to negotiate successfully with our employees, and we very much resent
the intolerable interference of this Government Committee [sic]'. 29 Influential
sections of the press and parliament supported the employer backlash against
the trade boards"
Whether a majority of employers aside from the most vocal opponents
of trade boards really were desperate for their complete abolition is a moot
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point. In spite of the pressure faced by employers during the slump, the
abolition campaign may have represented little more than an effective method
of inducing reductions in trade board minimum rates and influencing a climate
of opinion which tolerated evasion of 'unfairly' high legal minimum rates.
Both the NCEO memorandum on trade boards and an EEF-sponsored enquiry
into the workings of the Perambulator and Invalid Carriage Trade Board in
1921, whilst considering the abolition option, were prepared to settle for a
reversion of trade board policy to the anti-sweating principles underlying the
1909 Act." Admittedly, industries such as jute manufacture and retail
bespoke tailoring contained a high proportion of employers fundamentally
opposed to trade boards. However, the real bugbear of moderate-minded
employers was the artificially high real level of trade board minimum rates,
once prices had begun to plummet, rather than the principle of a legal
minimum rate per se.
Either way, it is clear that the Ministry of Labour attempted to placate
employers in 1921. Apart from Macnamara's refusal to abolish those trade
boards already established, most policy decisions favoured the interests of
employers. Long-promised boards were never established and the ministerial
veto on confirming trade board rates was exercised frequently as a means of
forcing reductions upon them.32 The labour movement was naturally furious.
As far as they were concerned, the need for trade boards to safeguard living
standards and prevent exploitation was more urgent in a depression than in
prosperous times." As for the axiom that wage reductions were an economic
necessity, organised labour 'did not accept that they had reached an ideal state
in 1918 and that their standard of living should be pegged at that level for
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evermore. On the contrary, they felt justified in seeking a higher standard. ,34
In response to the assault on trade boards, unions swallowed lingering
reservations concerning their desirability and campaigned vigorously in their
defence. The Labour Party conference in June 1921 condemned 'the
organised opposition of employers to Trade Boards, and the ineptitude of the
Government in the matter. It views with grave concern the reactionary
attitude of the Government, in contrast to the arguments used when the
Amending Act was introduced in 1918. ,35 TUC-organised demonstrations in
support of trade boards were held in several large cities during the autumn of
1921.36
In fact, inadequate enforcement of trade board determinations
weakened their credibility amongst trade unions and employers' organisations
alike." The idiosyncratic and frankly suspicious 'libertarian' attitude of a
Manchester-based Rope, Twine and Net manufacturer who was 'not keen on
the appointment of inspectors, and would rather have too little than too much
of that kind of thing' ,38 was certainly not shared by the NCEO or the TUC.
Even J.J. Mallon, one of the greatest champions of the trade boards, 'had
every reason to believe that there was evasion on a large scale. ,39 Likewise,
an executive member of the Federation of British Industries feared that the
Trade Boards Act was 'likely to become a dead letter, because the smaller
firms ... find that it is comparatively safe to ignore the Trade Board altogether,
as they never see an Investigating Officer and no questions are ever raised. ,40
The temptation for employers to side-step their obligations was naturally
greater during adverse economic conditions. For example, almost half of lace
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finishing firms appeared to have responded to the, admittedly ill-timed,
February 1921 increase in trade board rates by ignoring them altogether." In
some instances, workers fearing destitution and faced with the alternative of
being offered insufficient work at trade board rates, colluded with employers
d I I .. 42to un ercut ega mmima.
Addressing this Achilles' heel of the trade boards system was crucial
to its reputation. However, at no point during the inter-war years was the size
of the Trade Boards Inspectorate commensurate with the task it faced. The
inspectorate numbered just 39 officials early in 1923. The two Labour
Ministers of Labour, Tom Shaw and Margaret Bondfield, both acted to
increase the TBl's resources in 1924 and 1929 respectively, but even at its
peak, only 62 officers were charged with ensuring that 1y.. million workers in
trade board trades received their minimum rates. Furthermore, during the
'Great Depression', when the need for such inspectors was arguably greatest,
the National Government cut their number 'for reasons of economy' .43
The Ministry of Labour liked to claim that inspection figures revealed
an underpayment rate in respect of just three per cent. of workers. However,
this figure was an underestimation of the problem of evasion." Firms were
rarely prosecuted for underpaying their employees, and the Ministry usually
undermined the letter of the law further by quietly compelling defaulting
employers to repay their workers only part of their arrears." Gillespie found
that Ministry of Labour officials failed even to inform some workers that their
employers had been ordered to repay arrears to them, on the grounds that
'publication of the arrears would create "friction between worker and
employer", particularly if the ministry had settled by compromise, without full
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repayment. ,46 The unions were concerned that enforcement of minima to
piece workers was particularly lax.47 However, there is an uncomfortable
grain of truth in Dorothy Sells' assertion that 'relentless' enforcement of
minima during recessions could have aggravated 'unemployment and hardship
that would tend to undermine the acts or bring the minimum wage rates
down.,48
In fact, both the (TUC) Trade Boards Advisory Council and the Trade
Boards (Employers') Consultative Council had been frustrated with certain
aspects of trade board administration even before 1921. In particular, trade
boards resented their lack of autonomy from the Ministry of Labour.
Although the Ministry's powers over individual trade boards clearly worked in
the interests of employers during 1921, Sydney Pascall, a leading figure in the
TB(E)CC worried that, 'If ever a Labour Ministry came into power, this
centralisation of function might be highly dangerous. ,49 Both Dorothy Sells
and Rodney Lowe identified the fusion of these pre-existing 'internal'
administrative tensions with the 'external' economic pressures as the cause of
the trade board crisis in 1921.50 More importantly, Lowe has argued
convincingly that the Treasury deliberately crippled trade board policy in 1921
by denying the Ministry of Labour sufficient funds to administer them
properly.
The fate of the Grocery Trade Board epitomised the trade board crisis
during 1921. Along with the Milk Distributive Trade Board, it was the 'first
incursion into the retail trade (where both the workers' need for and
employers' resistance to minimum wages were at their greatest), .51
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Macnamara refused on three occasions to confirm the rates agreed by the
board, with the appointed members siding with the workers' representatives.
The Minister considered that the rates proposed were too high for smaller rural
shops to bear, but Labour MPs pointed to the statement issued by the
appointed members of the Grocery Board denying this.52 Tory MPs were
active in lobbying Macnamara to reject the proposals, aware of both the
importance of this large nation-wide Trade Board to the prestige of the whole
system and the sharp fall in prices since the rates were first proposed. 53
Clearly, arbitrary over-riding of trade board decisions was not a
satisfactory government policy in response to the increasingly strident anti-
trade board campaign. Accordingly, on 21 September 1921 Macnamara
announced the appointment of the Cave Committee. In view of the
controversy caused in the labour movement by some of the recommendations
contained in the April 1922 report, it is worth noting that the Committee
included three representatives from that quarter, all of whom signed the
report. 54
The appointment of the Cave Committee was to lower the temperature
of debate concerning trade boards and allow the supporters of the trade board
principle, or at least those whose criticism fell short of outright hostility, their
voice over the din of the abolitionist campaign. In fact, the Cave Committee
hearings revealed that a clear majority of employers concerned favoured the
retention of trade boards, albeit with modifications to their procedure to render
their decision-making process speedier. Feedback from a questionnaire
circulated by the TB(E)CC to the employers side of all the trade boards
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revealed that majority 'opinion favours the continuance of some system which
will provide for the regulation of wages enforceable by statute on all
Employers in the Trade. ,55 Furthermore, J.J. Mallon reported to a (TUC)
Trade Boards Advisory Council Meeting on 30 September 1921 that 'various
representatives of employers on Trade Boards which have been established for
some time had agreed to sign a statement for publication, expressing their
satisfaction with the Trade Board in their trade and dissenting entirely from
the attempts being made to abolish or suspend Trade Boards. ,56
An analysis of the main criticisms and issues raised during the Cave
Committee Inquiry will now follow. The perceived effects of trade boards
amongst employers and trade unions are especially important, as these
collective opinions were vital to the evolution of minimum wage policy along
wages board lines for so long.
One of the most important issues before the Cave Committee was the
allegation that the 'high level of the minimum rates fixed by the Boards,
together with the absence (in some instances) of any provision for
differentiation to meet special local conditions, have caused loss and
dislocation of trade' .57 Manufacturers in trades subject to foreign competition
naturally championed this argument. Average trade board minima did not
begin to fall until May 1921, about six months later than rates in unregulated
industries. Furthermore, as trade boards found compromise between the
employers' insistence on a rate corresponding to 'what the trade could bear'
and the workers call for a 'living' wage, minimum rates naturally failed to fall
to the extent demanded by the employers. Doubtless, knowledge of this fact
and as a mirror to the negotiating strategy of the unions, employers were apt to
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exaggerate the level of wage reduction deemed necessary. Graham Williams,
a Pin, Hook & Eye and Snap Fastener employer, protested that export sectors
of trade board trades were 'doomed' because minimum rates were fixed 'quite
regardless of the selling value of the article for which the wage is paid'. 58 The
collapse of many continental currencies exposed the relatively high labour
costs faced by British manufacturers: for instance, German wage levels were
now equivalent to just one-third of home rates.59 The Cave Committee
concluded that 'many of the increases in wages settled by the Boards came
into operation at a moment when trade was falling, and we are satisfied that in
some instances the additional burden so imposed on traders made it difficult
for those traders to adjust themselves to the altered conditions. ,60
As the Report credited trade boards with stimulating efficiency, this
conclusion was a little hasty. Indeed, many of the arguments put forward by
employers attributing unemployment in their trades to the boards were
countered effectively by the other witnesses. Whilst even R.H. Tawney
conceded that by stimulating a more efficient utilisation of labour and capital,
trade boards would render some inefficient workers unemployed." the labour
movement could argue that many factors accounted for the dislocation
suffered in trade board industries. For instance, long term structural shifts
away from retail workshop towards wholesale factory production and changes
in fashion in the clothing industry, together with a mechanisation and
decasualisation of work processes in many trades caused some workers to
suffer displacement. Arguably, however, such trends worked in the interests
of the majority of employees remaining in those industries. Furthermore, so
severe were the problems in some trades, and unrelated to the presence of
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trade board regulation, that Jute and Flax industry trade uruon officials
claimed that employers could not guarantee a revival in business even if wage
rates were halved.62 In other words, for industries suffering from severe
structural afflictions, wage rates were not the chief problem.
The labour movement was forthright in its conviction that 'the general
causes of the depression in non-Trade Board trades are ample to account for
the depression in trades under the Boards.t'" Henry Clay, Professor of
Economics at Manchester University, supported this standpoint with his
assertion that unemployment in trade board industries was generally lower
than the average." Besides, far from minimum rates diminishing 'zeal on the
part of the operatives, who look upon the wage conditions regulated by the
Boards as something totally independent of their own exertions and worth' ,65
even those employers railing most ferociously against the burden of
unsustainably high trade board rates recognised that increases granted in 1920
'on account of the increased cost of living have not equalled that increased
cost as represented by Board of Trade figures'. 66 If trade boards had not
granted extravagant awards to workers, surely it was fair to regard them as
victims of the general depression in trade, rather than as one of its
perpetrators. After all, most trade boards implemented significant reductions
in rates during 1921-1922.
However, by fixing uniform national rates for their trades, some boards
were culpable to the charge of aggravating unemployment levels in districts.
Mr. Unwin, chairman of the Hair Manufacturers Association, charged the
trade boards with 'gradually but surely sapping the life and vitality of the
small urban districts of this country and driving the workers into the large
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towns and cities' .67 Macnamara, alive to such criticism, forced several boards
to fix lower rates applicable to remote localities in areas such as Cornwall and
the far north of Scotland." However, responsibility for ensuring that the
composition of most trade boards was drawn from the large industrial centres
lay firmly with the Ministry of Labour, which determined the membership of
trade boards.
On the other hand, trade boards stood little chance of achieving their
role of improving the real wage rates of unorganised workers if they held back
from ever raising rates above those prevailing in the lowest waged districts of
the country. A TB(E)CC-circulated questionnaire in any case revealed that
district trade committees, which provided an arena for employers to lobby for
varying rates, were undervalued by employers in the few trade board trades
which had established them,69 the retail bespoke tailoring sector aside. Of
course, many manufacturing employers represented on trade boards remained
wary of any regional variation in rates as they appreciated the value of a
minimum rate in checking any legal undercutting by their non-federated rivals.
Nevertheless, where trade board determinations affected the
engineering sector, employers protested that the lack of district variation in
statutory rates was contrary to the traditions of their industry. Agreements
reached between the trade unions and the EEF provided for differential district
rates." The West of England Association of the EEF recommended a
compromise along the lines of engineering industry practice: district minimum
rates, to apply across all those industries covered by trade boards, subject to
periodic uniform national variation."
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Workers' and employers' representatives on both the dressmaking and
millinery trade boards recognised their notorious error in fixing their initial
juvenile rates at too high a level. Nevertheless, in view of the practice
whereby employers had hitherto not paid beginners in the above trades, or had
even received a modest lump-sum payment in return for teaching girls the
trade; a practice forbidden by the 1918 Trade Boards Act,
The imposition of any rate (however low) was likely to cause
dislocation in such cases. The Boards' initial policy in fixing rates
for learners was ascribed partly to a desire to attract learners into
trades which had been starved of recruits during the war, when other
and more remunerative occupations were open to young girls, and
partly to the existence of relatively high statutory rates prescribed
under the \Jages (Temporary Regulation) Act and in operation when
the Boards Started to legislate."
As atonement, in 1921 both the above-mentioned boards cut their starting rates
for 14 year-olds by forty per cent.73 In general, the Cave Committee
commended the craft industry trade boards for 'encouraging the revival of
apprenticeship and in placing the industrial training of juveniles on a sound
d . b . ,74an progressive asis.
Regarding the wider issue of the relationship between juvenile wage
scales and adult rates, unions were sensitive to the danger that employers
would substitute youths for full-aged workers. Thus from their perspective,
rather than minimum rates causing a deficiency in the number of young
workers entering trade board trades, the proportion of such workers threatened
the general wage standards of adult (male) workers. This was a particular risk
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for men employed on lesser-skilled processes." It was widely acknowledged
that in remoter districts, milk distributive employers engaged juvenile rounds-
men in preference to adults entitled to full rates." Accordingly, the Trade
Boards Advisory Council recommended in 1931 that boards should be given
powers to regulate the proportion of juveniles working in their trades."
During the recession of the early 1920s, some employers may have felt
justified in evading the spirit of legislation by substituting lower-rated juvenile
workers; because their trade board was 'cumbersome in its action and cannot
cope with conditions which may undergo drastic change from month to
month. ,78 Certainly, the procedure for varying rates was protracted. Even
under the accelerated provisions of the 1918 Act a three-month objection
period was necessary for any 'notice of proposal' to fix or vary rates, whilst
after a further trade board meeting had affirmed the new rates another month
was allowed for ministerial confirmation. Furthermore, some employers
fretted over the rule preventing trade boards from varying rates within a six-
month period." However, this was a red herring, for the 1918 Act stated
explicitly that the Minister of Labour had a free hand to waive this stipulation
under 'special circumstances'i'" which Macnamara did on every occasion he
was so requested. Responding to employers' criticism that the trade board
machinery was 'not sufficiently speedy to enable trades to readjust their
conditions to falling markets', Macnamara maintained that it ensured that
'adequate time for consideration and objection should be given before the
decisive step of making the rate compulsory is taken. Further, ... the
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procedure laid down by the Acts operated last year to delay some increases,
just as now it is operating correspondingly to delay some reductions. ,81
Nevertheless, in spite of the near-universal admission that trade boards
acted to delay some wage reductions during periods of depression, trade
unions shared with employers a frustration with the length of time taken to
confirm rates agreed by trade boards. Disapproval of ministerial power to
meddle with representative trade board determinations accounted for this
standpoint as much as the realisation that upward movements in minimum
wage rates were similarly retarded. Accordingly, the TUC favoured
enactment of the Cave Committee's recommendation that the period allowed
for ministerial confirmation be halved to fourteen days.82 The Trade Boards
(Employers) Consultative Council suggested that 'where a rate has actually
been agreed by the two Sides of the Board it should take effect immediately
without having to wait for the sanction of the Minister of Labour. ,83
As a solution to the problem of delayed (downward) variations in
minimum rates, doubtless Whitehall preferred the Cave Committee's
recommended policy option of encouraging trade board utilisation of cost of
living sliding scales to any diminution of ministerial discretion. However, by
pegging basis rates to a fixed real wage level, sliding scale agreements
(whether based on cost of living or product selling price indices) had long-
proved controversial within the labour movement. Though protecting workers
from any absolute decline in real wage rates, sliding scales likewise prevented
wage advances above the rates of inflation." From the perspective of the
early 1920s, when prices appeared to be falling inexorably, the labour
movement was also anxious lest wage levels revert to their pre-war level. 85
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Cost of living sliding scales offered no guarantee against this possibility.
Consequently, only a handful of trade boards adopted minimum rate scales on
the basis of cost of living index figures.i" and the majority of these boards
moved away from them once the period of rapid price fluctuations appeared to
have passed by in the mid-to-late 1920s.87
The role of trade boards in placing a brake on (downward) wage-rate
variations had an effect beyond the legal scope of their jurisdiction.
Employers affected by this 'external' pressure felt aggrieved. For instance,
wage rates guaranteed by trade boards connected with the engineering sector
were significantly higher than those imposed by the EEF after their victorious
lockout in 1922. In February 1923 hollow-ware employers protested that:
Although the Hollow-ware Trade was formerly reckoned a badly
paid trade in comparison with the average of others in the district
(this being the ground on which the Trade Board was established in
1913), the employers affected by the Hollow-ware Board now find
themselves compelled to pay rates to their lowest classes of workers
considerably in excess of those arranged between the ... Employers
and the Unions.88
Itwas no wonder that F.D. Lamb, of the EEF, wanted trade boards 'to keep off
the grass as far as light engineering was concerned. ,89
In fact, trade boards enjoyed only a narrow room for manoeuvre in
fixing minimum rates. As prevailing wage levels for lesser-skilled workers
barely reached 'poverty line' standards, trade boards exposed themselves to
potentially dangerous criticism from government and both sides of industry for
being too successful at raising minima to the level of, or above, those sectors
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not subject to statutory regulation." After all, the government opted for the
trade board method of wage regulation precisely because the system did not
imply any general regulation of wages outside these specified trades.
Employers complained that it was unfair on them to be forced, under penalty
of criminal prosecution, to pay minimum rates of wages above those levels
trade unions had agreed to regard as standard for comparable work. Likewise,
trade union pride was likely to be offended at the uncomfortable truth that
agreements won through the collective strength of organised labour were for
lower rates than those fixed by boards established for the purpose of aiding
unorganised 'exceptionally' low-paid workers." In this context, 1.1.Mallon
asserted that on trade boards 'very often difficulty in raising a rate of wages
lies not so much inside as outside a trade.,92
A related problem resulted from the government intervening in the
complex wage structure of British industry via the mechanism of trade-based
wages boards: a consequence of their multiplicity was the impression left
amongst ordinary employers and workers alike of the shortcomings of state
bureaucracy. Because many 'trades' shared identical or very similar labour
processes, it was very difficult for officials to draft watertight and exclusive
definitions of what work came under the jurisdiction of which boards. It was
therefore not surprising that exasperated employers and workers frequently
struggled to relate these seemingly 'other-worldly' Whitehall edicts to the
shop floor reality. 'The line of demarcation between Trades is in many cases
very difficult if not impossible to define, with the result that in many factories
more than one set of Trade Board rates is applicable, and workers may be
employed in the same shop and on the same day on jobs falling under two or
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more different classifications. ,93 The Cave Committee advocated a grouping
of trade boards covering related sectors." However, this idea was to prove a
non-starter: for whenever the Ministry had attempted such a policy of
consolidation in the past, existing or prospective minority interests amongst
employers, fearing subjection of their views, protested that a single trade
board would be unrepresentative."
Some employers blamed the (independent) appointed members for the
discrepancy between legal minima and wage-rates outside the scope of trade
boards:
On every occasion when an application has been made by the
employers for relief corresponding to that already obtained in the
surrounding trades months of delay have occurred before the
appointed Members could see their way to throw the weight of their
votes on the employers' side. ... It appears ... that although, as a
condition to the setting up of a new Board, it must be shown that the
trade in question is a worse paid trade than those which occupy the
same district, no corresponding rule applies to the working of the
Board once it is established and the appointed Members are quite
free to perpetrate a state of affairs in which the position is entirely
reversed.96
J.1. Stark emphasised revealingly that the 'complaint is not that they are
consciously unfair, but that they are too sentimental, probably arising from the
fact that they have no actual commercial or factory experience. ,97 However,
he betrayed the true cause of employer frustration with appointed members;
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resentment at the erosion of managerial prerogatives that being subject to trade
board jurisdiction involved.
In ordinary negotiations with labour when a mutual agreement
cannot be arrived at, the employers have to tell the other side that
unless they can accept their final offer they must take what action
they think fit, and in many cases this has had the desired result of
forcing a settlement on reasonable terms.98
The presence of neutral, adjudicating members on trade boards rendered
(EEF-style) take-it-or-leave-it 'steamrollering' tactics over employees an
impossibility for employers in legal minimum rate determination.
Conversely, trade unionists were not convinced of the neutrality of
trade board chairmen and their lieutenants. Taking the opposite stance of
employers, Joseph Hallsworth, General Secretary of the National Union of
Distributive and Allied Workers, maintained that as these independent
members were drawn from the professional and governing classes, they lacked
empathy with the workers' side of trade boards. Furthermore, he claimed,
their social background made them too susceptible to employer
representations that any minimum rate higher than those paid by the least
efficient firms was likely to aggravate unemployment levels."
However, given the simultaneous protests at the 'high' level of trade
board determinations by employers and trade union frustration with their
modesty, it seems fair to conclude that the appointed members successfully
steered a middle course between the opposing demands of both sides of
industry. This was true regardless of the political convictions of the relevant
personnel. Sheila Blackburn identified the chairman of the Chain-making
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Trade Board between 1919 and 1923, Professor Frank Tillyard, as having
'pronounced Conservative politics' .100 However the chairman of the Hollow-
ware Trade Board at the time when employers were convinced of its
insensitivity to their plight was none other than the same Prof. Tillyard! Of
course, in the frequent cases where the two representative sides of a trade
board could not agree on a rate, independent members were called on to
'arbitrate'. Hence, forced to choose between a rock and a hard place,
appointed members naturally suffered the wrath of the losing side, which felt
that its grievances had been accredited insufficient weight.
A frequent explanation given by employers for the relatively high legal
minima vis-a-vis comparable trades was that trade boards were
'unrepresentative, in that, particularly on the workers' side ... the
representative Members are all or practically all trade union Officials' .101 The
NCEO demanded
Reform in the composition of Trade Boards ... to ensure the
presence thereon of distinctive and practical representatives of the
interests affected, in preference to the same set of officials, many of
whom are professional agitators, only concerned in furthering the
immediate interests of their particular Trade Union irrespective of
I. 102U timate consequences.
At the end of 1937, 87 per cent. of employers' representatives were nominees
of associations, whilst 72 per cent. of workers' representatives were chosen by
d . 103tra e unions. Although employers' organisations thus enjoyed a more
generous representation on trade boards than did trade unions, this was
justified by the much higher levels of organisation amongst employers than
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workers. However, trade unionists were strongly 'against the practice of
appointing non-unionists on the Boards, who represented nobody but
themselves. It was representative men that we wanted, not men appointed
according to geographical exigencies.' 104 Thus whilst employers blamed the
presence of too many articulate trade unionists on trade boards for the 'high'
level of minimum rates, conversely, the unions blamed the same 'low' minima
on the presence of those unorganised workers' representatives dismissed as
employers 'narks'.
Officialdom insisted that non-unionised workers in the trade board
industries must be given a direct voice on the boards, on the grounds that 'a
Trade Board is not in the position occupied by a joint negotiating body in a
well organised industry. A Trade Board is established under statute to
represent a trade which cannot be represented as a whole by a voluntarily
constituted body. It is further empowered ... to reach conclusions which are
enforceable at law throughout the trade.' Therefore the Ministry was anxious
to ensure that trade boards included members representative of: the principal
districts in which the trade was carried on; the principal types or sections of
work in the trade; the principal grades of workers in the trade; and male
k I lOSworkers and female wor ers separate y.
The Cave Committee Report went some way to meeting employer
grievances on this point. Although it acknowledged the need for
representatives 'generally skilled in industrial conditions and well qualified to
understand and put forward the views of the workers employed in the trade', it
nevertheless recommended that 'not less than three-quarters of the
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Representative Members on each side shall be or have been engaged in the
d . . ,106tra e In question,
Nonetheless, in trade board industries where the unions had managed
to organise a moderate, albeit still a minority, proportion of workers, the
Ministry allowed them to 'punch above their weight' in terms of trade board
representation. For instance, a 1935 (TUC) TBAC survey of the Brush and
Broom trade revealed that though every workers' representative seat on the
board was occupied by a trade unionist, the coverage of the only significant
union in the trade, the National Society of Brushmakers, was modest. It's
membership embraced just 27.3 per cent of male workers, concentrated in the
skilled branches of the trade, and 11.8 per cent. of female workers, a 20.2 per
cent. coverage overal1.107
The debate surrounding the form of minimum rates fixed by trade
boards will now be analysed. As neither the 1909 nor the 1918 Acts laid down
criteria upon which trade boards should base their minima, much variation
naturally ensued. For instance, boards accorded different levels of importance
to factors such as the 'value' of the work done, the cost of living index figure,
wages in comparable trades, the desirability of a 'living wage' (assuming the
possibility of an agreed formula for such a calculation), and the general
economic health of the trade and its capacity to afford higher real wages. J.H.
Richardson's flimsy argument regarding the 'closeness' of trade board
minimum rates108 was based on his calculation that eighty per cent. of men's
hourly rates were fixed between lId. and 14d. However, the reality was that
one-fifth of male minimum rates were outside (below) this wide band of
between 44 and 56 shillings, calculated on the basis of a 48-hour week.
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Richardson found that ninety per cent. of adult women's basic rates were
between 61i4d. and 7'hd. hourly, 25 to 30 shillings per week. However, both
the trade unions and Whitehall viewed the lack of uniformity in rate-fixing
criteria as a strength of the trade board system, for it rendered the machinery
sufficiently flexible to deal with the special circumstances of a particular
trade.I09 By contrast, it was clear that many employers considered that the
trade boards should confine themselves merely to fixing 'a rate which would
be relative to the lowest class of labour in the least well equipped factory.v '"
The simplicity, not to mention the necessarily modest level, of a near-
uniform basic minimum rate clearly appealed to manufacturing employers
exposed to foreign competition. They resented the provisions of the 1918 Act
for boards to fix rates for (skilled) 'special classes' of workers, powers which
were utilised by over half of all trade boards. 'We deprecate the fact that the
Trade Board has gone beyond its legal obligation to fix a general minimum
rate for the industry, and has fixed rates for semi-skilled and skilled classes of
labour. These classes are organised in powerful Trade Unions, who are quite
capable of protecting the interests of their members' .111 In addition, the
National Confederation of Employers Organisations considered the 'general
minimum piece-rate' and the 'piece-work basis time rate' methods of
guaranteeing minima for piece-workers, enshrined in the 1918 Act, as 'wholly
antagonistic to the principle of payment by results, the only method of
obtaining adequate and encouraging increased production. ,112
In some trades, where organisation on both sides was strong enough to
negotiate agreements, but insufficient to render them enforceable, trade boards
182
were utilised to make compulsory these collective agreements across the
whole trade. This process has been aptly described by James Gillespie and
represented the appropriation of representative trade board machinery by
organisations on both sides of industry anxious to promote their sectional
interests.I''' Hence, against the old union fear that minimum rates would
become standard, trade board determinations in this context made the
realisation of 'maximum' rates for many workers more likely. Some of the
clothing and light metal trade boards were amongst those embracing this
habit. 114 The practice of pushing collective agreements through trade boards
was stimulated by wartime arbitration experience. A joint committee
representing employer and worker interests in the wholesale clothing trades
was a product of the first of four Committee on Production awards between
October 1917 and 1919. 115 This evolved into an established forum for
negotiating collective agreements. Following conferences between the
WCMF and the unions, the arbitration awards were merged into the Tailoring
and Shirt-making Trade Board rates in July 1919.116 Concurrently, the Tin
Box Trade Board agreed to enshrine an Interim Court of Arbitration award
covering the representative organisations across the scope of the trade.'!"
Genuine collective bargaining agreements followed the adoption of these
arbitration awards by certain trade boards. On 31 January 1920, the WMCF
came to a comprehensive national agreement with the Garment Workers'
Union and the AST&T, covering overtime and annual holiday arrangements in
addition to wage rates and hours terms. Henceforth, relevant terms of this
agreement governed the legal determinations of several trade boards.118
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Adherents of Whitleyism would have surely been heartened that trade
boards were fulfilling their apportioned role of substitute joint industrial
councils by regulating conditions of work via collective agreements.
However, even allowing for the meagre level of support remaining for the
'reconstruction' ideal within Whitehall by 1921, the Ministry of Labour
disapproved of trade boards being utilised for the purpose of legalising
collective agreements, as this affected interests not party to such negotiations.
Clearly, there was a democratic deficit involved in the compulsory extension
of voluntary agreements.
In 1921 the Minister of Labour frowned upon the proposal by the
Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring and the Wholesale Mantle and Costume Trade
Boards to co-ordinate their minimum rates in accordance with an agreement
negotiated between the Garment Workers' Union, the AST&T and the
WCMF.1l9 He deplored a clause in the national agreement that required all
parties to undertake not to oppose on a trade board the ratification of rates, as
'the Board is unable properly to carry out its statutory duty of considering
fully the objections lodged against the proposals.' Moreover, representative
members not party to the agreement and appointed members were
disenfranchised from the rate-fixing process. This situation was compounded
on those clothing trade boards that employed the 'side-voting' procedure to
drown out the voice of small and self-employed businesses. Faced with the
combined weight of majority opinion on both sides of the trade boards
concerned, the Ministry's protests came to nothing. Despite Macnamara's
thinly-veiled threat 'to consider seriously whether ... the circumstances in this
trade have so changed that the application to it of the Trade Boards acts is no
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longer expedient', he was forced to concede 'with considerable difficulty', a
confirmation of the wishes of the trade boards.120
Not surprisingly, trade board members from the representative
organisations involved in the collective bargaining machinery could not see
what all the fuss was about. Both employers' and trade unionists stressed the
value of legal enforcement of their agreements in terms bolstering the
observance of trade board minima. David Little, a leading member of the
WCMF, maintained that, 'a settled rate, agreed between the two sides, is the
rate that is going to stand' .121 A collective agreement translated into statutory
minimum wage orders thus represented a 'belt and braces' enforcement
safeguard. Naturally, trade unionists were keen to bolster such convictions
amongst employers. During a conference organised between the Garment
Workers' Union and the Shirt & Collar Manufacturers Federation to discuss
the claim by the former for a penny rise in hourly. rates, Andrew Conley was
anxious to stress that his union
have not had any desire to go to the Trade Board to put up the case
because as has been customary in the past we are desirous of putting
a proposal to the employers side of the Trade Board and
endeavouring to arrive at an Agreement outside the Trade Board ...
is it not better to have an understanding with the Organisation and to
know that when that understanding is arrived at you are insured
. taki I 122agamst any stoppages mg pace.
Conley may have regarded the option of using the forum of trade boards for
determining minimum wage levels almost as a breach of faith with collective
bargaining arrangements, but the fact remained that his union 'remained in the
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anomalous position of never organising more than a minority of workers in the
industry, yet being enmeshed in detailed collective agreements with employers
concerning every branch of the industry.' 123
The word 'minuscule' would prove more appropriate than 'minority'
to describe the level of union coverage within some of the clothing sectors, in
spite of the strength of their representation on the various trade boards. S.P.
Dobbs gave a breakdown of the membership of the Garment Workers' Union
across the trade board demarcations for 1922, admittedly, a year after trade
union membership generally had suffered a collapse from the peak of 1920.124
Apart from in the wholesale tailoring sector, where Conley's union enjoyed an
impressively high coverage of about half the workforce, the Garment
Workers' Union really lacked the moral authority to speak for the workers'
interest in clothing trades. Whereas the seven-thousand strong membership in
the Shirt-making trade, about one-sixth of the workforce, was not too bad, the
union's membership amongst the Wholesale Mantle and Costume trade, also
covered by the national agreements, was, at a little over two-thousand, about
three per cent.
Trade Board enthusiasts may have indulged in much soul-searching
regarding the apparent 'hi-jacking' of representative trade board machinery by
organisations whose majority composition on the board camouflaged a far
more modest level of coverage amongst the trade as a whole. After all, as
trade boards were intended to foster organisation and provide a form of
substitute collective bargaining machinery, it could have appeared churlish to
complain that the collective agreements were insufficiently representative
when great strides in organisation had been made. It is doubtful whether these
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consensual agreements could have stood for long without the force of legal
compulsion ensuring observance in the weaker-organised trades. Even the
sidelining of the appointed members could be considered the lesser of two
evils when compared with the alternative method of minimum rate
determination common on the majority of trade boards: de-facto arbitration by
the appointed members in lieu of any meeting of minds between the two
representative sides. This was clearly an inferior method of encouraging
employer and employee organisation and promoting better industrial relations
compared with using compulsory powers to bolster voluntary collective
agreements.
The concentration by trade unionists on using trade boards for securing
their standard rates as statutory minima relegated the specific interests of
women workers to a secondary consideration. Given that their role in
safeguarding the welfare of working women provided trade boards with their
primary legitimacy in the eyes of most, this was a regrettable development.
However, it was also inevitable to some extent; for organised labour, whose
officials were needed to provide workers' representatives of a meaningful
quality on the trade boards, remained an overwhelmingly male preserve. This
was in spite of the pioneering efforts to recruit working women by such unions
as the National Federation of Women Workers (NFWW)12s and Andrew
Conley's Garment Workers' Union.
When determining the composition of trade boards, the Ministry of
Labour made gestures to the fact that over seventy per cent. of workers under
their jurisdiction were women. Every trade board except for Boot and Shoe
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Repairing, where the proportion of women engaged in the trade was
negligible, had one female independent member.V'' Nevertheless, female
representation on trade boards remained slim. Of course, the absence of any
women representing employers on trade boards was accounted for by the
virtual non-existence of female business managers at this time. In those trades
such as lace finishing where 'sub-contracting' middle-women were an
important feature of the labour market, trade boards lacked jurisdiction over
them and thus any right to include them amongst their membership.l'" Why
were there so few women on the workers' side of trade boards? Three main
factors are to blame. Firstly, as men formed a disproportionately high
proportion of organised workers in trades with low trade union coverage, their
representation was naturally exaggerated on trade boards by the Ministry of
Labour, anxious to ensure that some representatives of unions could serve on
trade boards in order to put the workers' case adequately. Secondly, even
where a meaningful level of female organisation in a trade did exist, only a
low proportion of trade union officials, those most likely to be asked to serve
on a trade board, were women. Thirdly, the dearth of suitably confident and
articulate women from amongst the downtrodden pool of un organised workers
willing to face (possibly their own) employers across the negotiating table was
unsurprising. Thus, apart from a handful of trade union heroines of the calibre
of Susan Lawrence, Margaret Bondfield, Madeleine Symons (all of the
NUGW), Anne Loughlin (of the Garment Workers') and Julia Varley
(Workers' Union), a majority of the workers' representatives even on trade
boards covering a preponderantly female workforce were men.
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This is not to suggest that male trade union officials necessarily were
prejudiced against the interests of female workers. However, it was natural for
them to serve their own constituency first; and women proved far more
difficult to recruit and retain as trade union members. Not only had the labour
movement long-harboured an ambivalent attitude towards the presence of
women in the workforce; women's employment was characterised by
intermittent spells at a single establishment, due both to the effect on their full-
time careers of marriage and their common employment in a seasonal or
casual capacity thereafter, and low rates of pay.
Trade boards tended thus to accept existing workplace conventions that
were prejudicial to the interests of women rather than attempt to reform them.
Therefore the concept of 'equal pay for equal value', which had greater
meaning than equal pay for equal work', given that so few men and women
were ever employed on the same processes, remained a pipe dream as far as
trade board basic minima were concerned. Trade Boards accepted the
contemporary convention that as men were 'breadwinners', a woman's wage
need only cover the cost of her own subsistence. Dorothy Sells calculated that
in 1937, average trade board minimum time rates for women were just 57 per
cent. of adult male rates.128
Furthermore, the influence of trade union officials on trade boards
appeared to offer a greater safeguard to male rather than female minima.
Employers were able to offer this sop to the unions because of the small
proportion of men employed in such trades. For instance, the Paper Box trade
board reduced both male and female hourly rates by a penny in July 1921.
However, because the male rates fell from a much higher base, the
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proportionate decrease in rates suffered by the women was double that of the
men, at roughly ten per cent. compared with roughly five per cent.129 In 1924
Andrew Conley testified to the anger of his female membership that the last
act of the Shirt-making Trade Board had been to reduce female rates whilst
leaving male rates untouched: 'the Union has suffered because we were
deemed to be one of the parties responsible for the decrease taking place. We
have this sort of thing thrown at us ... that the representatives of the Union
sold the trade interests of the women for the purpose of safeguarding the
men's position. ,130 Wage movements in the opposite direction were not
necessarily good news for women either: the Cave Committee noted that the
Brush and Broom Trade Board had raised the minimum rate for women in
d h . .. h I I b ,131or er to prevent t err competmg wit ma e a our.
Against this dire picture of trade boards either pressurising female rates
downwards or pricing women out of jobs regarded as male preserves, a
reminder of the conclusion of the war-time Women's Employment Committee
that 'it is in the regulation of wages by law that the most immediately helpful
means of bettering women's position can be found',132 would have provoked a
melancholic reaction amongst those such as Elizabeth Abbott. Whilst she
acknowledged that 'Trade Boards did not originally create the difference in
the levels of men's and women's wages', she charged that:
by being 'realistic' ... by maintaining and buttressing both the
artificial divisions of work and the unequal wage-rates as a
monopoly of the male worker, they have not only 'approved' those
injustices; they have in fact become a huge machine for awarding
little more than half the male wage-rate to the great majority of
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women workers in the trades covered. ... they act both as a sop to
the public conscience and a sop to the women who get improved
wages.133
There was much to commend Abbott's argument. Nonetheless, it is safe to
conclude, as indeed Abbott did, that most women working in trade board
industries earned higher wage rates than they would have done without trade
board protection, however imperfect that protection may have been. In 1937
the Transport and General Workers Union claimed that women's rates in
unregulated trades were generally around 22 shillings per week, about five
shillings beneath the average trade board basic female time rates on 31
December 1936.134 Furthermore, as the evidence of Clare Wightman testifies,
the arguably flawed trade board forum offered women workers a greater
prospect of a voice in wage rate negotiations than in sectors covered by EEF
agreements.F"
Having discussed the main elements of controversy surrounding the
operation of trade boards above, the main conclusions of the Cave Committee
and the reaction of the British polity to them will now be analysed. Its
unanimous report of April 1922 acknowledged that trade boards had
'substantially improved' 'the conditions of the poorer and less skilled workers
in the unorganised trades, and particularly of women workers' , and
succeeded in abolishing the grosser forms of underpayment and
regularising wages conditions in trades brought under the Acts.
Moreover in establishing statutory minima Trade Boards have
afforded protection to the good employer, able and willing to pay a
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reasonable rate of remuneration to his workers, from unscrupulous
competitors, prepared to take unfair advantage of the economic
. . f h . k 136necessrtres 0 t err wor ers.
Nevertheless, the Report gave precedence to its 'conclusion that, while the
effect of the Trade Board system on trade and industry has occasionally been
stated in terms of exaggeration, there is substance in the allegation that the
operation of some of the Boards have contributed to the volume of trade
depression and unemployment.' 137 Such an alignment with the stance of the
NCEO was further apparent in the Cave Committee's recommendations.
Whilst it rejected abolition of the trade boards as against the public interest.!"
it clearly favoured the limited application anti-sweating 'ambulance' character
of the 1909 Act over the general application substitute collective bargaining
'Whitleyite' principles underlying the 1918 Act.
In attempting to determine the conditions under which Trade Boards
should be set up and their powers and functions when established, the
Committee offered a retrograde conception of the boards' place in industry's
wage bargaining apparatus. As a result of their conviction that trade boards
should merely prevent sweating rather than regulate wages generally, the Cave
Committee recommended that they should be applied to new sectors only
where prevailing wage rates were unduly low and no adequate machinery
existed for the effective regulation of wages.139 Furthermore, even in cases
where the Minister of Labour was satisfied that these criteria were met, he was
advised not to apply the Acts unless a favourable report from a public inquiry
agreed with him! Rhys Davies, trade unionist and Labour MP, protested that
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these three qualifications were 'an impossible trinity' designed to 'make it
absolutely impossible for a trade board to be established in future.' 140
Additionally, the Cave Committee held the view that, whilst the
criminal law was an appropriate tool to protect workers from the evils of
sweated wage-rates, voluntary collective bargaining was a more appropriate
means for determining wages above these bare minima. Accordingly, the
Report drew a
sharp distinction between the fixing of (A) a true minimum wage -
that is to say, the least wage which should be paid to the ordinary
worker of the lowest grade of skill engaged in the trade - and (B)
those other and higher scales of payment which it is desirable to
secure for the part-skilled and skilled workers. The former - the true
minimum - should be fixed by the vote of a majority of the whole
Board, including the Appointed Members, and when confirmed
should be enforced by all the authority of the law; but the latter
(which, by whatever name it may be called, will in fact be a standard
rate) should be determined by agreement between the two sides of
the Board without the vote of the Chairmen or Appointed Members,
and when confirmed should be enforceable by civil proceedings
only.141
The sorry experience of the agricultural workers after the abolition of their
statutory minimum wage guarantees in 1921 was to demonstrate that mere
civil enforcement of wage minima was only effective in trades where powerful
trade unions could use their industrial muscle to deter employers tempted to
undercut collective agreements.if
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By these two main recommendations, the Cave Report, 'in essence,
advocated the burial of the 1918 Act before it had even come to full bloom.' 143
However, the Report further proposed a weakening of minimum rate fixing
powers beyond even a 'return to 1909' basis: it favoured district, as opposed
to national, minimum rate determination by trade boards in 'the distributive
and retail making up trades (such as Millinery and Bespoke Tailoring) and the
Laundry Trade.' 144 However, district level wage fixing was unpopular
amongst representative industrial organisations concerned with trade boards
on both sides of industry. Trade unions feared that this would tend to
undermine wage standards, whereas national organisations of employers
feared that the encouragement offered by district boards to local employers'
organisations would adversely affect their interests.145
Bearing in mind that the main recommendations of the Cave
Committee overturned the Whitley Committee's ambitions for the lesser-
organised trades.!" contemporary commentators remained unperturbed at the
proposed devaluation of the trade boards' position in the industrial system. In
choosing to emphasise that the Cave Report dashed the hopes of those die-
hard opponents of the trade boards who had hoped for their abolition, many of
them overlooked the mutilation of the system proposed by the Cave
Committee.!" R.H. Tawney shared this trait. He stressed that 'the general
endorsement of the system' by the Cave Committee was more significant than
its specific recommendations.!" The point made by Dorothy Sells that as
'most of the seriously underpaid industries had already been brought under the
acts by the end of 1921 ... the pressure for establishment of new Boards was
somewhat relaxed,149 overlooked the fact that the embargo placed on new
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trade board establishment in 1921 precluded their coverage across the
distributive trades, for example. ISOThe retail and distributive sector certainly
met the criteria for trade board coverage; it was characterised by very low
levels of both pay and trade unionism. However, the complexity of this sector
meant that Ministry of Labour officials had yet to finalise questions of
demarcation and scope by the spring of 1921.
Only the TUC appeared fully alive to the reactionary nature of the
Cave Report. Margaret Bondfield spoke for organised labour's 'feeling of
dismay and intense disappointment' that its evidence had not influenced the
recommendations of the Committee.V' The TUC continued to favour the
maintenance of the 'Whitleyite ' basis of the 1918 ACt.152 Indeed, angry trade
unionist defenders of the trade boards demanded an explanation from 'the
three members of the [TUC] General Council as to their reasons for signing
the Cave Committee's Report.'IS3 Poulton, Pugh and Bell all maintained a
humbled silence but Margaret Bondfield chided her General Council
colleagues: 'in matters of such great importance, affecting this large group of
less well-paid workers, it is infinitely better to have a worse majority report
and a strong minority report setting forth the workers' point of view than to
have a compromise report, which is worse than useless.' 154 The ineptitude of
Poulton in endorsing the Report was particularly striking. Unlike the other
two TUC representatives on the Cave Committee, his union had direct and
positive experience of trade boards. Indeed, so content was the Boot and Shoe
Operatives Union with the working of the Shoe Repairing Board that they later
desired its extension to cover the main manufacturing branch of the trade.155
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This was contrary to the Cave Report's rejection of trade board expansion to
any sector enjoying a reasonable level of union isation.
The government accepted the recommendations of the Cave
Committee, but pending the drafting of appropriate legislation it implemented
as many as feasible of the minor ones through administrative action alone.156
Additionally, Macnamara used his ministerial powers to apply the conditions
dubbed the 'impossible trinity' with regard to the future expansion of the
system. However, the National Union of Manufacturers, the NCEO-aligned
Trade Boards (Employers') Consultative Council, and their allies in
parliament were all impatient for the statutory implementation of the Cave
C . 'R 157omrmttee s eport.
The government-sponsored Trade Boards Bill appeared only after the
fall of Lloyd George's discredited Coalition and its replacement by the purely
Conservative Bonar Law Ministry of the 'second eleven'. It was presented to
the Commons for its first reading on 8 May 1923 but never again saw the light
of day. The Bill
had no friends anywhere. It was bitterly opposed by the Labour
Party as an attempt to cripple the Acts. It aroused no great
enthusiasm among employers in the great trades, who, throughout,
have had no particular interest in the Trade Boards system, because
it can never affect them. It was not acceptable to the smaller number
of employers under the acts, who were hostile to Trade Boards,
because it appeared to rivet Trade Boards for ever on the country,
and so far as the larger number of employers were concerned, it was
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considered that some of its conditions appeared to be clumsy and not
d he existi di . 158an a vance on t e e isting con mons.
Nevertheless, the NCEO urged the government to modify the offending
proposals and press ahead with the Bill 'without delay' .159 The government,
however, instead quietly dropped it.160 Crucially, the existing trade boards
were thus to retain their powers to fix legal minimum rates of nation-wide
application and across many classes of work under their jurisdiction.
The advent of the first Labour government in 1924 buried any prospect
of legislative implementation of the Cave Report. Tom Shaw, the new
Minister of Labour, dismissed such a policy as contrary to 'the object which
the framers of the original Acts had in mind.v'"' In fact, its statutory minimum
wages policy was one of the few areas where the minority Labour government
made a real impact during its short existence. For these nine months, Britain
had an unambiguously pro-wages board government for the only time during
the 1921-1939 period. In addition to Noel Buxton's revival of agricultural
minimum wage machinery,162 Tom Shaw, with his deputy, Margaret
Bondfield, strengthened the Trade Boards Inspectorate, re-launched the
disbanded Grocery Trade Board and initiated moves to extend the trade boards
system. Investigations were launched in three trades each with a large nation-
wide but scattered workforce, namely: catering, drapery, and meat
distribution. Not surprisingly, the relevant employers' organisations began to
flex their muscles in response. For instance, the Drapers' Chamber of
Commerce was particularly hostile to the Ministry's inquiry into its trade and
refused to co-operate with it.163 Similarly, the National Chamber of Trade
refused to co-operate with the Ministry's attempts to apply trade boards to the
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retail and distributive sector and 'regretted that the excellent and
representative report of Lord Cave's Committee on trade boards was being
allowed to lie on the table.' 164
This obstructive policy of employers helped delay any definite
application of new trade boards before the Labour government succumbed to
the logic of its precarious parliamentary position and the Conservatives
returned to office in November 1924. Arthur Steel-Maitland, Baldwin's
Minister of Labour between 1924-1929, reversed Shaw's expansionist trade
board policy and decided to disband the Grocery Trade Board.165 This
decision flew in the face of the Ministry of Labour's inquiries, which revealed
an extraordinarily low level of wage rates being paid to the almost totally
unorganised (outside those in Co-operative employment) workers in all four
trades.l'" However, the labour movement, pre-occupied by the General Strike
and mining industry dispute in 1926 and the Trade Disputes Act in 1927,
failed to exploit the Conservative government's duplicity on this Issue.!"
Indeed, the TUC probably felt some degree of relief privately when Steel-
Maitland disbanded the Grocery Trade Board; as trade unionists were very
anxious that their decision to lengthen the 'normal' working week from 48 to
52 hours would set a dangerous precedent for British industry.168
Baldwin's government by no means bent to the employers' desired
trade boards policy in every respect. Within weeks of his appointment, Steel-
Maitland decided against any amendment of the Trade Boards ActS.169 The
TB(E)CC's continued lobbying for such a policy was thus rebuffed.V" He
also rejected emphatically the Cave Committee recommendation that he
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should not approve minimum rates for higher grades of work in cases where
the two representative sides of a trade board had failed to agree.l7l
In fact, during Steel-Maitland's tenure as Minister of Labour, a period
when the international economy was relatively buoyant, trade boards began to
shed their status as a subject of industrial and party political conflict and return
to their pre-1921, relatively non-controversial position. For instance, both the
TB(E)CC and the TUC were broadly satisfied with the government's
proposals regarding minimum wage fixing machinery submitted to the
International Labour Organisation.V' Employers had become generally so
unperturbed by the operation of trade boards that in 1927 the TB(E)CC
Secretary conceded that 'there has not been much for the Council to do during
the past two years,.173 Moreover, the Pin, Hook & Eye and Snap Fasteners
Association even felt confident enough to resign their membership of the
TB(E)CC with the justification, 'As a Trade Board we do not get much
trouble'U" With the trade board system 'bedded in' by the late 1920s and
employers in trades outside their coverage having little reason to fear their
extension, very few of their number were roused against such statutory
'interference' in minimum wage rate determination. During the 'Great
Depression' years of the early 1930s only a 'dribble' of complaints were heard
from employers against the trade boards, a far cry from the flood of hostility
unleashed on them a decade earlier.
Of course, this is not to state that all employers (organisations) were
reconciled to trade boards. As evidence of the dictum that every 'rule' has an
exception to validate it, the early 1920s hostility of the Association of Jute
Spinners & Manufacturers remained undimmed. Their explanation for
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withdrawing from the TB(E)CC was that 'many of the other industries with
Trade Boards were quite satisfied with being under a Trade Board, while we
on the other hand had a different opinion'. 175 During the trough of depression
in 1932, Jute Trade Board minima were blamed for the severe unemployment
in the industry. 176
In resume, three different government policies towards trade boards
can be identified within just two years from 1923. Firstly, the Bonar Law
government favoured firm legislative adherence to the harsh Cave Committee
recommendations. Secondly, the first Labour government renounced such a
Bill and favoured renewed extension of the system. Finally, the November
1924 Baldwin government settled for a 'third way' policy on trade boards that
lasted for the remainder of the inter-war years. Whilst there was to be no
significant expansion of the system, in line with the Cave Report
recommendations, by pledging themselves against legislation the government
ensured that the 'wrecking' ambitions of the Cave Committee in respect of
trade boards' rate fixing powers were sidelined. The 'Whitleyite' substitute
collective bargaining, general wage regulatory role of trade boards as
enshrined in the 1918 Act, was thus maintained for the existing boards
throughout the inter-war period.
Dorothy Sells' assertion that the trade board crisis resulting in the Cave
Committee Report 'thus turned out to be nothing more than growing pains,
years since outlived'{" needs to be qualified. The Cave Committee Report
inflicted far more than merely temporary pain to the youthful trade boards
system: it gave them a serious knock which served to all but curtail any future
growth. Nevertheless, although undersized, the trade boards system proved
200
otherwise to be able to function normally as it reached maturity. Thus, though
the trade board system made a partial recovery from the Cave Report's
'attack', its resultant stunted growth prevented it from reaching out to the extra
two million workers earmarked for trade board coverage in 1919-1920 but
who never received such protection. Even so, Britain's wages board system of
the late 1920s remained the most extensive of its kind in the world, when their
powers and extent of application were taken into account. 178 Furthermore, by
this time, it appeared that the government, employers and the trade unions
alike were broadly content with their work and coverage.
However, the following paragraphs will illustrate how the TUC moved
away from its unambiguous defence of trade boards towards a more qualified
endorsement of their role. It was this movement by the trade unions closer to
the stance of the moderate employer towards trade boards and their reluctance
to countenance their expansion to additional industries which scuppered the
possibility that the 1929 Labour government would facilitate a trade board
'renaissance' .
The easing of the employer attack upon trade boards with the revival of
trade in 1924 allowed those trade union critics of trade boards their voice.
Some trade unionists were 'very upset about the growth of the benevolent
legislation of the Government ... and other bodies to supplant the Trade Union
movement. ' 179 Specifically, contrary to the assumptions of legislators in 1909
and 1918, levels of trade union organisation in trade board industries were
falling from an already meagre figure. This fact alone accounts for the cooling
of enthusiasm for trade boards amongst some sections of the TUC. This is not
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surprising, for in 1909 trade unions shared the belief held by Liberal ministers
that statutory minimum wage fixing boards, by raising the condition of
hitherto 'helpless' workers in sweated trades, would facilitate trade union
organisation. Similarly, the wartime Whitley Committee hoped that the trade
boards would serve as stepping-stones to voluntary regulation of industrial
conditions.
Employers' organisations and the government alike shared with the
trade unions an unwillingness to recognise the trade boards as a permanent
feature of the labour market. However, in the mid-1920s, hopes that trade
board trades could be 'elevated' to a voluntary self-regulated basis appeared
forlorn. Many trade union organisers were to qualify Tawney's pre-war
assertion that trade boards provided an impetus to Trade Unionism a decade
later. Ellen Wilkinson acknowledged the initial spur given to trade unionism
by the establishment of a trade board but maintained that 'as soon as the Trade
Board got into working order the opposite tendency took place.' 180 Julia
Varley, Chief Women's Organiser for the Workers' Union, summed up the
frustrations and tom consciences of many trade unionists towards trade boards
when she wrote, 'although the fixing of a minimum rate might be good for the
worker in the trade, it is absolutely detrimental to Trade Unionism.' 181
Disregarding both the universal nature of the slump in trade union
membership after 1920 and the fact that trade boards had been established in
precisely those trades where organisation had proved so difficult to foster,
trade union officials unleashed bitter sentiments against unorganised workers
in trade board industries. Indeed, such resentment against workers who
'neglected' their trade union 'obligations' were never very well suppressed by
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the organised labour movement. 'Let those who refuse to join a trade union
reap their own harvest. To be helped, the worker must help himself, and to
help himself he must unite his efforts with those of his fellow-workers'c'Y
urged lL. Fine, Secretary of the United Ladies Tailors' Union. John Beard,
President of the Workers' Union, charged trade boards with sapping the
independent spirit of the workers: 'They tended to make the workers rely on
Government patronage rather than on their own strength.,183 C.R. Flynn, a
National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers' Union official, believed
that 'the Trade Board system gives a premium to unorganized workers who
secure the advantages of Trade Union representation and advocacy without
. h f h . ,184meetmg t e costs 0 sue service.
Echoing the demand by employers' organisations in 1921 for trade
boards to revert to their original (1909) modest-coverage anti-sweating status,
Ellen Wilkinson drew a distinction between the useful 'ambulance' work of
the boards in sweated trades and their unwarranted application to trades 'that
could be and ought to be organized.' 185 At heart, organised labour
sympathised with the sentiments of Mrs M. Bamber, a Distributive and Allied
Workers' Union official and long-time opponent of trade boards: '1 deplore
sweating in any industry, but first of all 1 am a Trade Unionist, and 1believe
that the proper way of dealing with sweating is to get inside of Trade Union
organisation. ... we have no right to whine about adult men and women who
have not the common sense to get into the Trade Unions and protect
themselves.'!" The fully justified conviction amongst trade unionists that
employer organisation was benefiting more from trade boards served to
confirm their fears that trade boards were a cuckoo in the TUC's nest. As
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noted in Chapter One, the government's earmarking of a sector for trade board
coverage provided the spur to major employers concerned to establish
effective organisations. So vocal had the trade union critics of the trade boards
become by the later 1920s that Steel-Maitland could hide behind the excuse
that he did not wish to 'kill trade unionism by kindness' for his refusal to
extend the machinery to the low-paying catering and drapery trades.187
In view of the necessity of formulating a definite policy on trade
boards, the 1929 annual meeting of the (TUC) Trade Boards Advisory Council
decided to appoint a sub-committee of enquiry. ISS The two principal concerns
of the enquiry committee were to establish the effects of trade boards on levels
of both wages and trade union membership.P" Trade unions were asked to
contemplate the likely effects of a withdrawal of trade boards on levels of pay
and union membership and to state whether or not they favoured the extension
of trade boards to other trades.
The TBAC Enquiry Committee recognised that trade boards had 'to be
judged on a falling market, in which increases in rates were hardly to be
expected. ,190 It recorded that 'the majority opinion amongst the Unions
concerned is that the Boards have, following the first period of reductions
from the peak of rates of 1921 and 1922, maintained rates or prevented them
from falling when trade was bad.' 191 'As to whether Trade Boards are as
effective in raising rates in times of good trade as they are in maintaining rates
in times of bad trade there is some doubt, but as there has scarcely been an
opportunity of testing this point in the last nine years it is difficult to arrive at
any sound opinion.' 192 Unions were nevertheless conscious that trade boards
would delay increases as they did reductions.
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In addition, the Enquiry Committee found that 'Trade Board rates
compare favourably with rates in like trades to which the Acts have not been
applied, except where such trades are organised.v'" A majority of the unions
concerned credited statutory minima with helping them to establish or
maintain rates via voluntary agreements outside the remit of trade boards.
Within trade board industries themselves, over half of the unions sampled had
secured collective agreements providing for the payment of rates in excess of
statutory minima.V" This justified the Enquiry Committee Report's reminder
in its final concluding sentence that 'the greatest importance is attached to the
fact that Trade Board rates are minimum rates, criminally enforceable and that
the trade unions remain free to secure such higher rates as, through
.. b ibl 195organisation, may e POSSI e.
Of course, as discussed earlier, some trade unions lacked agreements
providing for standard rates above the minima because they utilised trade
boards for the purpose of enforcing agreements arrived at voluntarily with
employers' organisations. In these circumstances, the legal force of trade
boards protected trade unionists and organised employers alike from
d . b . d . f hei d 196un ercuttmg y unorgamse sections 0 t err tra es.
Although the Trade Boards Advisory Council could thus be satisfied
that trade boards had served generally to the material advantage of many
workers, it was anxious to establish primarily whether or not they served trade
union interests in a similarly favourable manner. Regarding the probable
effect of trade boards on trade union organisation, the Enquiry was forced to
reflect the equal strength of opinion on both sides of the argument. True, it
again bore in mind
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the fact that the Boards have to be judged on a falling market. All
Unions have lost substantial numbers and the causes which brought
about these losses in non-Trade Board trades have, of course,
operated in the Trade Board trades. As regards loss of membership
in these latter trades, there can be no exact apportionment of
responsibility as between the Trade Boards themselves and the
general causes which have operated throughout industry.l'"
Nevertheless, the Report followed immediately with the assertion that 'On
general principles it would seem right to assume that workers with a rate of
wages guaranteed to them by a Trade Board should feel less incentive to join a
Trade Union than those whose wages are not so protected.' Thus whilst the
TBAC found no conclusive evidence that trade boards adversely affected trade
union membership, it still harboured the suspicion that they did.
Irrespective of trade boards' acknowledged usefulness in maintaining a
legal 'floor' to wage rates, woe betide them if they should encroach upon trade
union functions in sectors otherwise ripe for organisation. Bevin's evidence
before the Enquiry Committee was reflective of this feeling. He conceded that
his union's decline in membership in trade board trades was mirrored by 'a
similar fall in membership in non Trade Board trades, so it proves nothing.'
Nevertheless, he gave credence to the notion that trade boards could prejudice
union interests by asserting that they should only be extended to new sectors
'where Trade Union organisation appears to be absolutely hopeless.' 198 Other
trade union leaders were more strident. Peter Brennan, General Secretary of
the Boot and Shoe Makers and Repairers', insisted that 'Trade Boards are
detrimental to trade unionism. ,199
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However, such shrill hostility to trade boards was countered by trade
unionists equally forthright in appreciation of their virtues.i'" The Boot and
Shoe Operatives' believed that trade union efforts were handicapped more by
'having to deal with nearly 14,000 employers scattered about the country - the
majority employing only one or two men. ,201 In fact, it is likely that the nature
of trade board trades, being characterised generally by scattered small scale
firms employing a high proportion of female workers at low rates of pay, was
the over-riding factor for their low union density. This was acknowledged in
the TBAC's Report.202
To the argument that trade unions were helping non-unionists by
working through the trade boards, W. Orchard, an official of the Distributive
and Allied Workers', responded with the pertinent point, 'was it not the case
that all Trade Union work had this effect?,203 Furthermore, the TBAC
conceded that voluntary collective 'negotiations in the well organised trades
may have for the workers concerned something of the same remoteness as is
complained of in the case of Trade Boards.,204
As to the likely effects of a withdrawal of trade boards, Julia Varley
favoured their abolition as 'we shall not lose anything at all by Trade Boards
being curtailed' .205 However, the less strident attitude of Florence Hancock
was more typical of even those officials believing that union membership
would benefit from a withdrawal of the boards: 'I do not think ... that we
could very well advocate the withdrawal of Trade Boards because
undoubtedly they have been an advantage to the workers who are covered by
them' .206 Brennan's unyielding riposte to these qualms was that unorganised
workers must 'fend for themselves, as we are tired offending for them.,207
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Trade unionists who appreciated both the useful work of trade boards
and the inherent difficulties of organising in such trades believed that, 'Those
people who object to Trade Boards are living in an idealistic world of their
own, and fail to understand that the industrial system of the world is a very
complex one in its operation. The Juggernaught has under its wheels helpless
men and women, girls and children.V'" Similarly, G.F. Mayes was
exasperated by those trade unionists
who appear to still be obsessed by the fallacy that if you drive the
workers down enough they will revolt and organise for their
betterment. Such declaration also appears to fail to take into account
that many workers, thousands of them young girls, are beset with
threats of victimisation which would deter even the most determined
trade unionist. Thousands dare not join a Trade Union and, if
because they dare not, is it for organised labour to deny them the
protection afforded by Trade Board legislation [?]209
In the final analysis, the TBAC accepted the wisdom of A.E. Little,
Poole district organiser for the Workers' Union, who thought that 'a lot of
nonsense is argued both by the people who want to extend Trade Boards and
those who want to do away with them altogether. They were brought into
existence for a certain purpose and have fairly well served that purpose, but I
do not think they should serve any other purpose. ,210 The TBAC concluded
that 'existing Trade Boards must, for the time being, continue. ,211 However, it
emphasised its belief that the 'main object of the Trade Unions concerned in
Trade Boards must always be to make the workers recognise the necessity for
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and advantages of Trade Union organisation, and in these circumstances the
Trade Board should be regarded only as a temporary expedient.'212
Reflecting this merely lukewarm endorsement of trade boards, the
TBAC followed the spirit of the 1909 Act in sanctioning new boards only for
sectors characterised by 'unduly low' wages. Furthermore, it insisted that
there 'should be no Trade Board in any trade in which the circumstances are
such that it is reasonable to expect that machinery for collective bargaining
could be established. ,213 By contrast, eight years earlier, the TBAC had
protested that the similar recommendations of the Cave Committee were a
subversion of the principles underlying both the Whitley Report and the
resultant 1918 Trade Boards Act. In 1922, the TUC viewed the extension of
trade boards, which it then desired, explicitly as a means of ensuring that
'proper facilities for collective bargaining ... be secured to all workers. ,214
After a further eight years of low density trade union membership in an
economy characterised by modest general wage levels, persistently high levels
of unemployment and short-time working, organised labour decided to
scapegoat trade boards and regard them as antagonistic to the cause of
voluntary collective bargaining.
Unqualified appreciation of the potential benefits of trade boards was
thus absent amongst the TUC during Margaret Bondfield's tenure as Minister
of Labour between 1929-1931. As such, the pro-trade board instincts of this
former TUC Chairman were hamstrung in office. Given that Labour and the
Nation had promised to extend trade boards to cover those 'defenceless'
workers overlooked by Steel-Maitland.i" minimum wage enthusiasts in the
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Commons were disappointed by Bondfield's apparent volte-face. Turning the
pro-active ministerial initiative method for establishing new trade boards on its
head, Bondfield justified her inaction on the grounds that neither employers'
organisations nor trade unions had lobbied for new boards.r'" However, a
letter from one of Bondfield's civil servants to the TUC confirmed that 'apart
from the Catering Trades, she will await the result of the deliberations of the
[TBAC] ... having regard to the importance of the issues involved in further
replacement of trade union action under the Trade Board ActS.'217 The
catering industry was regarded as something of a 'special case' deserving of
trade board protection by organised labour and many Conservatives alike.
This was on account of the near-impossibility of organising such a scattered,
low-paid female workforce at the mercy of the tipping system.i" No other
attempt was made by the second Labour government to extend the trade
boards system.
TUC ambivalence undermined the campaign launched by the Co-
operative Union in 1934 for trade board extension across the retail and
distributive trades.219 However, organised labour's heel dragging on this
question eased from 1936 when the Shop Assistants' Union achieved a
measure of success in negotiating collective agreements with multiple grocery
firms. In these circumstances, 'the establishment of Trade Boards would be
less disadvantageous from a Trade Union point of view than had hitherto been
the case. ,220 Once again, the TUC recognised the value that criminally
enforceable trade board determinations could render in bolstering collective
agreements negotiated in only patchily organised trades. Where a 'critical
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mass' of worker mobilisation had been achieved by the trade unions,
therefore, trade boards were deemed useful in safeguarding these advances.
This reasoning explains Ernest Bevin's lobbying for the 1938 Road
Haulage Wages Act, which also enjoyed the sponsorship of the employers'
.. . he I d 221organisation covenng t e m ustry. Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, worried that the Act would set a precedent for the extension of
government interference wage determination m other industries.222
Accordingly, Ernest Brown, the Minister of Labour insisted that
It will be only where circumstances demand that the Government
will take the responsibility of assisting such workers. The
Government have no desire to take the responsibility of fixing and
enforcing minimum conditions. . .. We are using every effort to
assist the extension of orderly and well organised self-government in
industry. This Bill will aid responsible trade unions and employers
to secure better and more orderly conditions.i"
Bondfield's policy of leaving the initiative for trade board expansion to
interests within the industries themselves was thus perpetuated throughout the
1930s. Enduring psychological resistance on both sides of industry to the
notion of statutory minimum wage interference in 'normal' circumstances and
sectors untainted by 'sweating' saved the government from having to
undertake a major expansion of minimum wage machinery during the decade.
However, in a handful of trades where employers' organisations and trade
unions agreed on the desirability of trade board machinery in order to bolster
collective agreements by outlawing undercutting of such the Ministry of
Labour acquiesced to their joint request.224 Nevertheless, Frederick Bayliss
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was correct to observe that by 'attaching so much importance to agreement
between the two sides the Minister excluded from his consideration many
trades which satisfied the criteria laid down in legislation. ,225 After all, judged
on the low pay and lack of effective collective bargaining apparatus criteria of
1918, trade boards should have encompassed a majority of British industry
during the inter-war period!
Despite influential sections of employers, trade umons and the
government all, in tum, displaying hostility to trade boards between 1918 and
1939, they were successful in surviving, if not always prospering, the
challenges of the inter war years. As organised workers and employers
sometimes ferociously scapegoated trade boards for Britain's economic ills
during the 1920s and 1930s, this was no mean achievement. Of course, the
'lowest common denominator' nature of the consensus tolerating wages
boards necessarily meant that trade boards and similar machinery did not
enjoy uncontested endorsement by either representatives of workers and
employers or government spokesmen.
The TUC was forever sensitive to the danger that minimum wage
machinery could usurp their role, at least to the eyes of potential recruits to
trade unionism. Nevertheless, it accepted grudgingly their indispensable role
in guaranteeing a 'floor' to the wage standards of the most vulnerable workers
in society and the wage system generally. Temperamentally, trade unions had
difficulty living with the existence of trade boards but could not countenance
the consequences of living without them. Specifically, the existence of, and
patent necessity for, trade boards served as an embarrassing reminder to trade
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unions of their inability to be as effective as they aimed, and claimed, to be.
Nevertheless, a significant number of trade unions appreciated the value of
their trade boards for the purpose of giving legal force to collective
agreements.
Whilst employers instinctively disliked trade board determinations as
much as other forms of bureaucratic red tape and interference in their
managerial prerogatives, most of them appreciated that trade board minima
prevented their British competitors from undercutting wage rates. Ultimately,
employers recognised that statutory wages board machinery offered the same
protection to the employer paying 'fair' or 'standard' wage rates as they did to
the unorganised (female) worker vulnerable to exploitation. Like the trade
unions concerned, some employers' organisations valued the service that trade
boards could perform in compelling (smaller) unorganised firms to abide by
collective agreements which they had voluntarily agreed to be bound by.
The government recognised that, 'Even with the extension of the Trade
Boards which followed the Act of 1918, most people still felt that interference
with wages could be justified only in very special circumstances. ,226 Wages
boards, by virtue of their semi-autonomous representative composition, and
their limited application across industry, enabled the government to keep its
direct intervention in wage rate determination to a minimum. Robert Horne
reflected government thinking, and, indeed, that of the trade boards 'lowest
common denominator' consensus throughout the inter-war period, in
regarding them as the 'only solution of the complicated question of minimum
wages. ,227 Their very 'marginal' status, merely 'filling gaps' where collective
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bargaining agreements were not possible, helped secure wage boards an
entrenched position within the industrial framework by the late 1930s.
Sure enough, labour movement critics could suggest that though 'legal
regulation has effected a radical improvement in the worst-paid sections of
Trade Board occupations ... they have not up to the present ... ensured, for
ordinary time-workers at any rate, a minimum 'living' wage - that is wage
adequate to procure the elementary necessities of civilised life. ,228 However,
it is difficult to envisage how trade boards could have achieved such civilised
wage standards when even industrial sectors regulated by well enforced
voluntary collective agreements failed to ensure workers an adequate 'living'
wage. Although basic trade board minima were low, they were higher than
prevailing rates for lesser-skilled work in industry generally, especially with
regard to women's rates. Indeed, trade boards would have come under attack
from employers, trade unions and the government alike for usurping their
duties and threatening the integrity of voluntary agreements had they ventured
beyond pushing-up wages to the levels paid by 'good' employers.
Thus the true explanation for the failure of the trade boards to fulfil the
role anticipated for them by the Whitley Committee and the 1918 Act, namely,
substitute collective bargaining bodies in all weakly-organised trades, lies with
the lukewarm attitude of trade unions as much as with the orthodox
conservative hegemony in parliament and Whitehall. As has been
demonstrated, eight years after the Cave Committee Report, the TUC's own
enquiry report endorsed its recommendation that, although the existing trade
boards should remain, no expansion of their number should be entertained
unless all hope of genuine collective bargaining agreements in the trade was
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forlorn. Thus the arbitrary cancellation of trade board expansion in 1921, at
its half-completed stage, was allowed to remain government policy for the rest
of the inter-war period. Many trades that met the same criteria for statutory
minimum wage intervention as those incorporated under the Trade Boards
Acts prior to 1921 were thus left unprotected outside the system. The trade
unions, employers' organisations and the government alike consequently
endorsed this inconsistency in wage board policy. However, the result of
government industrial policies being influenced by corporate opinion was that
'socially excluded' (predominantly female) workers in sectors such as the
retail and distributive sector, for instance, were thus left without statutory
protection of their working conditions.
This tripartite acknowledgement of the benefits of trade boards, albeit
reluctant on occasion, should be borne in mind as the following chapter charts
the failure of 'bolder' minimum wage policy propositions in this field to win
the support of the unions, employers and the government alike.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A LIVING WAGE FIT FOR HEROES?
INTER-WAR 'NATIONAL' MINIMUM WAGE
POLICY INITIATIVES
The previous chapter demonstrated that statutory rmmmum wage
'interference' was accepted by 'middle' opinion during the inter-war period
only within the limited confines of the wages boards model. Bearing this
'lowest common denominator' minimum wage compromise in mind, this
chapter will analyse the promotion of other forms of statutory minimum wage
policies during the same period.
The unprecedented characteristics of the inter-war economy arguably
presented an opportunity for enthusiasts of a national minimum wage, by
offering skilled workers reasons to support it. Pay differentials, between
skilled and lesser-skilled workers, failed to revert to their pre-war patterns and
unemployment claimed a minimum of one million casualties, ten per cent. of
the insured labour force, throughout the 1921-1939 period. A minimum wage
could thus help trade unions maintain wage standards for those in work. Few
doubted the need for some insurance against the downward pressure on
earnings, caused by short-time working, reduced opportunities for overtime
and employers, under sharp competitive pressure in home and overseas
markets, anxious to cut rates. Nevertheless, the minimum wage issue was
never to ignite a majority of the labour movement.
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Before the onset of depression in 1921, prospects for universal legal
minimum wage coverage seemed brighter. During the 1918 election
campaign, Lloyd George endorsed the principle of a minimum wage for all
workers. I However, this policy was one of many commitments not delivered
by the post-war coalition government. An analogy can be drawn with the
housing issue. Lloyd George's promise of 'homes fit for heroes' symbolised
for many both the great hopes raised for social 'reconstruction' after the
carnage of the Great War and the dashing of those hopes by the time of the
trade slump in 1921.
This analysis of the frustrated proposals for 'national' minimum wage
legislation will be organised around five main categories. Firstly, the
government-sponsored National Industrial Conference (NIC) of 1919
produced the greatest encouragement for national muumum wage
campaigners; a government Bill was even published (ostensibly) to effect the
recommendations of the Conference in this context. Secondly, parliamentary
initiatives favouring national minimum wage legislation will be discussed.
Again the omens were apparently positive, as the Commons endorsed the 1919
Bill in March 1924. Thirdly, the attitude of the trade unions will be explored
and it will be suggested that their lack of support was a key explanation for the
ultimate failure of a national minimum wage policy to be taken seriously by
any government between the wars. Fourthly, study of the thwarted attempt by
the ILP to commit the Labour Party to its extensive Living Wage programme
prior to the 1929 election offers many insights into the mindset of the labour
movement regarding state interference in wage determination. Finally, other
initiatives by organisations and individuals will be looked at in the context of
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their challenge to the prevailing orthodox explanations and supposed remedies
for unemployment.
Orthodox doctrine held that if only workers would accept wage cuts,
production costs would fall and hence make British-made goods more
competitive in home and overseas markets. By contrast, unorthodox opinion,
championed by renegade economists such as l.A. Hobson and 1.M. Keynes,
argued that the remedy for unemployment lay primarily not in supply-side
measures, but in a state-induced stimulation of demand to revive the home
market.
Closer analysis of the initiatives identified as being in favour of 'a
national minimum wage' reveals that they were not what they appeared to be.
In fact, historians hoping to find a groundswell of opinion in favour of a
uniform statutory minimum wage akin to that which produced the legislation
in Britain in 1998 or the USA in 1937, for example, will be disappointed. For
instance, in 1922 the TUC General Council concluded that 'A single national
minimum wage is impracticable . . . legislation other than for particular
industries could not be profitably pursued at the present juncture'r' In
addition, the National Industrial Conference favoured an alternative to a single
national minimum wage: 'Minimum time-rates of wages should be established
by legal enactment and should be universally applicable." Even the ILP
programme for a Living Wage was not intended as a statutory minimum wage
policy, apart from workers engaged on public sector contracts." Indeed, most
of the 'national' minimum wage schemes proposed actually bore closer
lineage to the forms of wage-regulatory apparatus existent in 1918 than the
uniform national minimum wage model with which we are familiar today.
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This is no mere pedantic point. This chapter disputes the contention of
historians who maintain that a chasm separated 'moderate' advocates of wages
boards from the 'more radical' national minimum wage policy enthusiasts.
Referring the reader back to the assertion made in Chapter Two, above:
'Sheila Blackburn has constructed a false dichotomy between the uniform
national rate and the "rival" trade boards minimum wage policy option.' It
will be demonstrated that by interpreting policies headlined as 'a national
minimum wage' at face value and as identical forerunners of the type of
minimum wage currently operational in Britain, Blackburn has produced a
misleading thesis.
She alleges that trade board enthusiasts such as R.H. Tawney,
'undoubtedly led astray by pragmatic considerations' , disingenuously
L
exaggerated their success party because they 'hoped to undermine the
"campaign for a national minimum wage popularized by the Webbs since
1897.,5 Granted, Tawney, J.J. Mallon and others connected with the National
Anti-Sweating League did exaggerate the positive and downplay the negative
aspects of trade boards in operation. However, as Blackburn herself
acknowledges, 'Tawney felt that a positive image was necessary for the trade
boards in order to refute orthodox economists' belief that minimum wage
regulation was an unwarrantable intrusion by the State in the wages bargain."
Trade unionists, employers and politicians needed to be reassured of the
validity of the minimum wage principle. It is difficult to accept the hypothesis
that Tawney et al were able to browbeat mainstream political opinion
generally, and mainstream labour movement opinion in particular, into turning
against the idea of a national minimum wage in favour of trade boards.
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Rather, it is argued here that there was no need for a campaign to discredit a
national minimum wage policy because support for it as a practical policy
expedient was too insignificant amongst the British polity. By viewing the
policy of a single national minimum wage with disfavour, Tawney was
arguably thoroughly representative of the 'very moderate socialist indeed'
labour movement!
The National Industrial Conference met on 27 February 1919 against
the background of acute industrial discontent. The chaotic condition of
Continental Europe added plausibility to fears of Russia leading a 'domino
effect' of Bolshevik revolutions, whilst British rule faced strong direct
challenge in Ireland, Egypt and India. Back home, many trades were affected
by an eruption of industrial tension. A major dispute in the cotton industry
was followed by disorder in Belfast and Glasgow during the engineering
workers' strike. Troops and tanks were even deployed on the streets of
Glasgow against the strikers. Concurrent disturbances amongst the troops in
Kent, together with the police strikes of the previous summer, placed the
reliability of the forces of law and order in doubt during this highly charged
national mood. In the midst of the pandemonium of January 1919, the
announcement by the Miners' Federation that it would begin a nation-wide
strike on 19 March unless a six-hour day, thirty per cent. pay rise and
nationalisation of the coal industry was won, heralded the imminent prospect
of the long-feared 'Triple Alliance' strike, especially as industrial relations on
the railways were particularly tense.
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Whilst the appointment of the Sankey Commission averted the threat
of the coal-miners' strike in the short-term, the National Industrial Conference
was intended to provide an arena for trade unionists and employers'
representatives to discuss their grievances with a view to agreement on policy
remedies.' The idea for some national forum along these lines was actually
initiated by moderate opinion on both sides of industry. In October 1918, the
National Alliance of Employers and Employed advocated a national
conference of employers' and workers' representatives. Furthermore, it
drafted a scheme 'for the reorganisation of industrial life in the country'. To
complement industry-level Whitley Councils, a Central Industrial Board was
envisaged, and consideration of the national minimum wage issue was to be
amongst its duties.' After the success of the Caxton Hall Conference of the
previous November, Robert Home, Minister of Labour from January 1919,
was keen to promote this consensual policy as an antidote to the industrial
tension prevalent in many sections of industry.
Bearing in mind the strength of Conservative representation in the
1918-1922 parliament, even right-wing MPs were prepared to grant major
concessions to labour as a bargaining counter in the cause of increased
productivity, in particular, a permanent end to restrictive practices. During a
debate on a Labour motion calling for 'a higher standard of life and social
well-being for the people', Richard Cooper called upon the Government both
to summon a national industrial conference and legislate for 'a legal minimum
wage in all the industries of the country' .9
In the event, the Triple Alliance unions, the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers and the coal-owners boycotted the inaugural meeting of the
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National Industrial Conference, which comprised 800 delegates from both
sides of industry." The absence of such TUC 'heavyweights' doubtless
handicapped the long-term credibility of the conference and its policies.
Nevertheless, the Conference proved the shrewdness of the government's
strategy for calming down the industrial temperature: it gave a voice to those
on both sides of industry who sought dialogue rather than conflict with the
other side. 'Lloyd George showed no anxiety as to whether the Conference
was fully representative of all shades of opinion of both sides of industry.'
Furthermore, like Henderson, he recognised that for 'workers without the
"industrial muscle" of the Triple Alliance, national negotiations with the
expectation of concessions underwritten by statute were very attractive. ,11
At the 27 February conference, Robert Home emphasised that, so long
as production costs did not rise, the government had no objection to legislating
in favour of maximum working hours and minimum wages. Allan Smith, the
hard-line leader of the Engineering Employers Federation, emerged as the
dominant voice amongst employers represented at the conference.V At first,
his tone was dismissive; 'the whole experience of the last twenty years has
proved that if only the government will leave us alone we are far better able to
settle our differences than any agencies outside'. However Smith promised
'that employers are prepared to go much further than the workmen imagine' .13
A reading through the unanimous report of the Provisional Joint
Committee (PlC) of the industrial conference confirms that Smith kept his
word in this respect. The PJC was established at the first conference to draft
recommendations to address the causes of industrial unrest in time for the
second meeting of the full conference scheduled for 4 April.i" Applying
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pressure on the government to act on the PJC's report, Arthur Henderson
emphasised that both sides of industry had refrained from pressing their
extreme claims, thus ensuring unanirnity.i'' In view of the amicable spirit in
which the PlC report was produced, it was naturally endorsed by the full
National Industrial Conference on 4 April, 'a body which, in spite of serious
gaps, represented a very large portion of the field of industry' .16
The PJC report made three key recommendations. Firstly, the
establishment of a permanent national industrial council, comprising two
hundred representatives each of employers and workers presided over by the
Minister of Labour, with a standing committee of twenty-five. Secondly, legal
enactment of a maximum working week of 48 hours, with a provision for
variations in either direction subject to negotiated agreements in individual
trades. Thirdly, a universal minimum wages policy."
The minimum wage recommendations of the National Industrial
Conference have been misunderstood in many quarters from the moment they
were published. Accordingly, it is worth re-stating what the report did, and
what it did not, recommend. The NIC emphatically did not recommend 'that a
flat national minimum wage should be made universally applicable' .18 The
report clearly favoured universally applicable legal minimum time rates of
wages, emphasising the plural. Workers in organised trades were to be
protected by the legal extension of voluntary agreements, whereas trade
boards were recommended for less organised trades. In short, 'Whitleyism
with teeth'. The PJC recommended a minimum wage for all, minimum wages
in the plural sense, i.e. universal statutory minimum wage protection, but not a
universal minimum wage rate, a singular national minimum wage. All but the
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most fanatical followers of the minimum wage debate, from contemporaries in
1919 to modem day historians, have muddled this distinction. Even Rodney
Lowe, author of several comprehensive accounts of the National Industrial
Conference, has betrayed a lack of certainty on this point. He has frequently
referred to the NIC's endorsement of a national minimum wage (in the
singular)."
On 4 April Lloyd George gave an undertaking to the NIC that its report
would receive 'immediate and sympathetic consideration' by the
government.r" Accordingly, once Lloyd George had returned to Britain, the
War Cabinet met and endorsed the report of the Industrial Conference. Robert
Home felt that a legal minimum wage pronouncement would be popular with
the public." After all, they had been promised such a policy by the
electioneering Prime Minister just a few months earlier. Winston Churchill,
the minister responsible for the original Trade Boards Act, 'strongly approved
recognition of the principle of wage minima. In his opinion the real answer of
ordered society to Bolshevism was the frank recognition of minimum standards
and open access to the highest posts in industry.'
The easing of industrial tension coincident with the beginning of an
economic upswing during April 1919 may have lessened the government's
incentive to champion bold industrial reforms. The first detailed response by
the government to the PJC on I May offered it very few fruits for its labour.
True, Home read a letter from the Prime Minister to the meeting in which he
pledged, 'I accept the principle that minimum rates of wages should in all
industries be made applicable by law. ,22 However, whilst the PJC
recommended legislation endorsing the universal minimum wage policy
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followed by a commission to work out its detailed implementation, the
government proposed only a commission to enquire how such a policy might
be implemented. It also insisted that industrial workers only be covered by a
minimum wage, thus excluding low paid white-collar workers such as clerks
and post office workers. Arthur Henderson and Allan Smith had good reason
to question whether the government was matching the good faith they had
demonstrated in producing a unanimous report. Smith refused Home's request
for the establishment of the permanent National Industrial Council on the
grounds that the government had not yet legislated in favour of the minimum
wage and maximum hours recommendations of the conference.r' The Daily
Herald asserted that 'Labour wants legislation on the principle of the minimum
wage forthwith, and the settlement of the individual minimum afterwards - not
a Commission first (which may take years) and then possible legislation. ,24
Over the next few weeks, Home was able to make minor concessions to
the PlC regarding the proposed minimum wages legislation. For instance, he
agreed that the Bill should cover juvenile workers aged between fifteen and
eighteen." More importantly, the government agreed to declare in favour of
the minimum wage for all principle in the following preamble to the Minimum
Rates of Wages Commission Bill:
Whereas it is expedient that minimum time rates of wages should be
fixed for all persons of the age of fifteen years and upwards, and
should in the case of persons of the age of eighteen years and
upwards be fixed at such amounts that all such persons, whether
employed at a time rate, or according to any other method of
remuneration, will be afforded an adequate living wage; and that a
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Commission should be appointed to inquire into and decide what
those rates should be and the manner in which they should be
b ht i . 26roug t mto operation
The Bill was finally presented to the Commons on 18 August 1919, just
prior to the two-month long parliamentary recess, and over two months since
the PJC had emphasised its disappointment with the Bill as it stood!
Welcoming the belated presentation of the Bill and its twin, the 48 Hours Bill,
The Times applied a liberal coat of positive gloss to their long gestation period
and concluded, somewhat optimistically:
The interval, apparently prolonged, between the presentation of the
Committee's report in April and the introduction of the two Bills by
the Minister of Labour, has been occupied by full discussion of the
details of measures between the Government and the Joint
Committee, and as a result doubtful points which might have
impeded the passage of the Bills and hampered their working when
passed if they had not been cleared away, have been cleared Up.27
In fact the delay in the publication of the Bills was due more to controversy
surrounding the Hours of Employment Bill than the disappointment felt by the
PJC at the shortcomings of the Minimum Rates of Wages Commission Bill.
Indeed, contrary to the claim of The Times, this disagreement remained
emphatically unresolved.
From the start the government were insistent that certain groups such as
agricultural workers, merchant seamen and domestic servants could not be
subject to legislation limiting the working week to 48 hours and refused
accordingly to incorporate them in the proposed legislation. As Rodney Lowe
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has argued, this unilateral action was unnecessarily stubborn. The NIC
proposal allowed government-sanctioned exemptions from the maximum
working week rule and trade unions recognised the desirability of this caveat.
'All unions wished to be included in the Bill, however, so that they would be in
a stronger bargaining position - especially on overtime pay.,28 The labour
movement was particularly angered at the exclusion of agriculture from the
Bill, not least because of the overtime issue. Such discrimination against
agricultural workers provided the only occasion for a matter relating to the
National Industrial Conference being debated on the floor of an annual Trades
U· C 29mon ongress.
In response to the government's continuing bad faith regarding the
Hours Bill the labour side of the PJC refused to countenance the establishment
of a permanent national industrial council. A second blow to the government's
Hours of Employment Bill came in October 1919 with the inaugural
International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference at Washington's Eight
Hours declaration. This was because, as quid pro quo for Saturday afternoons
off work most British workers worked in excess of an eight hour day mid-
week, a practice forbidden under the Washington convention. Burdened by yet
another layer of controversy, the two 'NIC Bills' were effectively sunk in
October 1919.
The government made no senous attempt to re-float either the
Minimum Rates of Wages Commission or the Hours of Employment Bills. In
spite of repeated pressure in the Commons.'? the government refused to honour
its promise, renewed in the 1920 Kings Speech, to persist with the legislation.
T.J. Macnamara, Minister of Labour from March 1920, guilefully denied that
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the government had abandoned the Minimum Wages Bill whilst at the same
time stressing that there was no need for it since trade boards expansion was
proceeding at a good pace." In November 1920 Lloyd George, likely
betraying wilful dishonesty, even promised to re-introduce the Bill during the
1921 Session." However, no one was surprised when at the start of both the
new Session and the severe economic recession, Macnamara admitted finally
that the Bill had been abandoned."
At first sight it may appear surprising that the Hours Bill proved a more
controversial impediment to the success of the NIC than a Bill legitimising
national minimum wages. However, two factors must be borne in mind.
Firstly, by contrast with the 48 Hours Bill, the Labour side of the PJC had
already swallowed its disappointment at the inversion of the NIC's proposal
for minimum wage legislation. There seemed less point in opposing a mere
inquiry when a full-blown legislative proposal appeared flawed. Secondly, the
labour movement's refusal to surrender further ground to the government,
regarding the Hours of Employment Bill, reflected their firmer grounded
conviction that the state had a right and a duty to intervene in industry over the
question of hours. After all, the Ten Hours Act had been enacted in 1847 and
the TUC had first called for a statutory eight-hour day in 1890. Conversely,
trade unionists remained wary of government 'encroachment' into the wage-
bargaining question, which they regarded as their exclusive preserve.
The uncertain political atmosphere, that had fostered the National
Industrial Conference experiment in the spring of 1919, had evaporated by the
autumn. The early 1919 fear of a revolutionary mood, which led some
powerful people to contemplate widespread concessions to the labour
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movement, gave way by the summer to an overriding concern at the perils of
inflation. This change of mood was testament to the government's success in
diffusing the threat of concerted Triple Alliance industrial action. As Chris
Wrigley has observed, the cool nature of the government's true commitment to
the flagging NIC became apparent only after the long feared national railway
strike had come and gone by 5 October 1919.34 Rodney Lowe has
demonstrated how the resurgence of orthodox economic instincts was both
fostered and exploited by the Treasury from the summer of 1919 as part of its
drive to re-establish control over government departmenta"
Government acceptance 'in principle and detail' of the final report of
the Cunliffe Committee in December 1919, recommending the restoration of
sterling to the Gold Standard at its pre-war parity as soon as was feasible.l"
represented the triumph of the orthodox fight-back within Whitehall.
Thereafter, the likelihood of the government looking favourably upon a
comprehensive policy of legal wage minima was even more remote. Restoring
the pound to its pre-war exchange rate value necessitated sustained long-term
deflation and applied downward pressure on industry'S costs, of which wages
were naturally a significant element. Indeed, a revealing indication of this
explicitly negative line came from Robert Home in November 1919. Hitherto
the champion of the NIC within the Cabinet and the sponsor of the not-yet-
dropped Minimum Rates of Wages Commission Bill, he was embarrassed at
having to extend the provisions of the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act for
a second time. Nevertheless, he endorsed the view that 'the persistent
interference on the part of the State with the wages question would ultimately
bring disaster to the industries of the country' .37
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In November 1919 Home won an extra grant from the Treasury to
establish a further 100 trade boards, in order to counter the NIC's plan for a
minimum wage for all.
He was afraid that the [proposed Minimum Wage] Commission
might run away with wild ideas unless they had something better
than statistics to rely upon, and that they would arrive at a figure for
the cost of living which was hopelessly out of relation to the actual
facts. The result might be that minimum wages might be fixed for
trades without any regard to the economic condition of the trade,
with the consequence that the trade would be crippled or the State
would be involved in serious demands for subsidies in support of
. 38economic wages.
Of course, it is the contention here that had all of the proposed trade boards
been established, the Ministry of Labour would have travelled a considerable
length towards the hopes of the National Industrial Conference. For the one
hundred trade boards would have encompassed virtually all of the ill-organised
low-paid workers whose work could have been classified within a 'trade'.
Save for the necessity of provision for the legal extension of voluntary
agreements, whether negotiated through joint industrial council or 'pure'
collective bargaining machinery to protect vulnerable workers in otherwise
organised trades, a de-facto minimum wage for 'all' would have been well on
the way to realisation.
In any case, the fragile industrial consensus upon which the NIC
depended had all but collapsed by the autumn of 1919, along with the
government Bills to sustain it. As P.B. Johnson characterised the situation in
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October 1919; 'precisely when the will to go the extra mile was most needed,
neither side seems to have had the ultimate flexibility and vision. ,39 More to
the point, the NIC 'foundered on the unwillingness of any of the parties, not
least the unions, to compromise traditional rights. ,40 The government was
unwilling to surrender sovereignty over industrial policy to a national industrial
conference." Employers, particularly within Allan Smith's NCEO, were
instinctively resistant to government regulation and generally opposed to
minimum standards.Y Indeed, the EEF ethos tended to regard almost any
concession to trade unions as an assault on managerial prerogatives to be won
back come a suitable opportunity. In their tum, trade unions proved an equally
robust guardian of their turf. For instance, legislative realisation of one of the
NIC recommendations, the provision for legalisation of voluntary agreements
in the Industrial Courts Bill, was scuppered at the insistence of the TUC.43
In the final analysis, the incorporation of a policy such as the legal
'straight-jacketing' of collective agreements, which the TUC continued to
oppose, amongst the report of the NIC should alert the historian to question the
wisdom of taking the Conference too seriously. After all, leading elements of
the labour movement refused to do so from the start. Likewise, for eternal
optimists, the adherence of a hard line employer such as Allan Smith to a
programme of social reforms including minimum wages for all is evidence of
the enduring power of reasoned dialogue and compromise. Alternatively, such
jarring contradictions rendered the prospect of success for the NIC as slight
from the start. At no point in this period was there a sufficient basis for
consensus between both sides of industry for a project like the National
Industrial Conference to succeed. Indeed, this lack of consensus, graphically
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illustrated by the plethora of actual or threatened industrial conflicts, provided
the spur to the establishment of the National Industrial Conference in the first
place.
The surprising thing about the National Industrial Conference
between February and April 1919 was not its failure to achieve
consensus but the extent to which it achieved it in the report ... In
these months many employers were indeed willing to make
concessions to labour and to negotiate with moderate Labour
leaders... However, the period in which such employers as Sir Allan
Smith felt that way and can have hoped to carry their organisations
with them was fairly brief. As the threat of serious social unrest
receded and as the economy recovered from wartime abnormalities,
they, like the government, became more concerned with the
productivity of British industry in competing for markets in a world
economy recovered from the war and became resistant to further
concessions to labour beyond those extracted in late 1918 and early
1919.44
In short, the government was content with the role of the NIC in calming the
industrial tension during the spring of 1919. But if industrial relations were not
in a good enough state to preserve the NIC policy prescriptions, it was not
going to waste political capital on them.
Before moving on to the theme of parliamentary initiatives to re-float
the 1919 Bill, it is worth considering briefly the most likely outcome of a
Royal Commission on Minimum Wages. The government would have chosen
its membership with care, and the opinions of employer and trade union
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witnesses would have carried great weight. The single national minimum wage
policy was not amongst the Commission's remit and it is difficult to imagine
representatives from either side of industry lobbying for it. Assuming that the
Commission recommended a universal minimum wage policy, it would thus
have been on an industry-by-industry basis, i.e. the expansion of tried and
tested trade boards and joint industrial councils. Hence the apparent disparity
between the wages boards and 'national' minimum wage policies narrow to a
chink of interpretation and to an extent of application. This is especially so
when it is remembered that most 'national minimum wage' (singular) policy
propositions were technically misnomers for a policy of a minimum wage for
all.
The Labour Party's National Minimum Wage Motion of7 March 1923
was evidence of the above contention. Its sponsor, Dr. Alfred Salter,"
emphasised:
We do not ask for a universal, flat rate minimum applicable to all
industries and all districts alike. We recognise that that is
impracticable under present conditions, more especially as the cost
of living varies within wide limits between area and area and rural
and urban districts especially. The suggestion which we put forward
is that there shall be a national rate for each trade with zonal or
district variations. As to the method of securing that, we suggest that
there shall be established by law Wages Boards on the same
principle as Trade Boards, which Boards, after proper inquiry, shall
have power to fix rates which will be binding on employers in the
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trade with, of course, certain zonal and district variations fixed after
further inquiry. So far as regards trades where both employers on
the one side and workmen on the other are properly organised, and
by negotiation have come to agreement as to a minimum wage
figure, we ask that such agreement, by the fact of registration, shall
have the force of law and be binding on all concerned.t?
Labour MPs conceived the 'national minimum wage' within the context of the
National Industrial Conference's prescription of the expansion of existing
wage-regulatory apparatus and legalisation of voluntary agreements in order to
secure 'a minimum wage for all'. In fact, the Motion urged the government to
re-introduce the 1919 Minimum Rates of Wages Commission Bill. Salter
believed 'that it is quite impossible to set up Minimum Wage Boards to
determine rates of wages in each trade without a great deal of preliminary
inquiry, and without a great deal of data'. As to the basis upon which
minimum rates were to be fixed, Salter drew upon the work of Rowntree into
'physical efficiency' 'nutritional needs' standards and cited American and
Australian minimum wage cost of living 'living wage' criteria."
After two years of severe economic depression and an inexorable
decline in wage rates, albeit at a slightly less severe trend than the fall in prices
in most trades, the labour movement appreciated the concept of a floor to
wages.48 Or at the very least, its political wing did. Labour's commitment to
the 'national minimum', enshrined in Labour and the New Social Order,
embraced the conviction that 'the system of a legal basic wage should be
"extended and developed so as to ensure to every adult worker of either sex a
statutory base line of wages (to be revised with every substantial rise in prices)
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not less than enough to provide all the requirements of a full development of
body, mind and character'" .49
Although Salter's Motion received a sympathetic hearing from the
Liberal benches.i'' Conservatives were unimpressed that a Coalition measure
from 1919 was to be resuscitated. With doubtful nous, Salter cited the support
of Lloyd George for the original sm." Although giving yet another
performance in his role of the arch-individualist buffoon, Frederick Banbury
probably encapsulated the mood prevailing on the Tory benches when he
declared that 'extremely foolish' things were done in 1919.52 A. Boyd
Carpenter, the junior Minister of Labour, could point out that' A good deal of
water has run under the Thames since then'. He dismissed any minimum wage
other than the limited application of trade boards as impossible. 53 In the event,
given the healthy Tory majority in the Commons during the 1922-23
parliament, Salter's Motion did extremely well to come within thirteen votes of
victory. 54 The moderate nature of the motion, merely calling for a Royal
Commission into a minimum wage for all policy, accounted for this near
success.
Only twelve months later the political situation had been transformed;
the first Labour government was in office, albeit with precarious parliamentary
backing. On 4 March 1924 the Commons passed, without voting, Salter's
Motion. This event, along with the introduction of the government-sponsored
Bill in 1919, should represent the high water mark of the likelihood of a
realisation of the policy of a minimum wage for all during the inter-war era.
However, on closer inspection, the prospect of sincere government adherence
to the policy appeared as remote as ever.
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The debate exposed the discomfort of Tom Shaw, the Minister of
Labour." Anxious to reassure his backbenchers that the government supported
the Motion, in the same breath he refused to undertake to act on the resolution
on the timid grounds, even allowing for the government's lack of majority, that
the resultant Bill could encounter opposition. 'I am afraid that we should find a
tremendous amount of opposition and discussion in Committee, and the other
things that we think are more urgent would be badly held up. Quite frankly,
that is the position of the Government.' Shaw followed this assertion with a
passionate defence of the principle underlying the motion! Opposition MPs
naturally lambasted Shaw for his chutzpah.
The explicitly lukewarm support of the Labour government for this
policy was as much a reason for the 'nodding through' of the resolution as the
stronger representation of 'progressive opinion' in the Commons since the
narrow defeat of Salter's Motion in 1923. After all, faced with adverse
parliamentary arithmetic, there seemed little point in anti-minimum wage
forces rallying when there was little threat of a government actually
implementing it.56 Accordingly, a minor Tory frontbencher recited the Tory
Party stance as outlined the year before by Boyd Carpenter. 57
Joseph Compton acknowledged the misgivings within the labour
movement regarding a statutory minimum wage for all policy:
The larger trade unions may have something to say with regard to
the proposal. They may claim, and rightly, that for many years past
they have been able to conduct their own negotiations and look after
their own industries. But there are hundreds and thousands of people
engaged in various industries, where trade union effort has been
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handicapped, and where rates, even in the majority of trades to-day,
are not capable of maintaining a man, his wife and family in the
. . fl·ti 58common necessities 0 I e.
Labour movement unity faced no challenge from the phantom threat of the
government announcing a Royal Commission on minimum wages. On 13 May
1925 the third and final attempt by Labour MPs to induce the government into
this action was defeated by a resounding 227 votes to 132.59 Morgan Jones,
MP for Caerphilly, and sponsor of the 1925 resolution, appealed in vain to the
entrenched Tory majority: 'There is no need for them to be alarmed on account
of this Motion. The rapacious wolves of revolution will not be scratching at
their doors to-morrow morning on account of its being passed. Itmerely states
a principle which, I presume, is acceptable to all decent-minded men. ,60
The next Labour Motion in the Commons on 15 March 1927 was a
much more timid affair.61 Whilst bemoaning the low rates of wages prevailing
in industry, the resolution called upon the government merely to be a model
employer. This scaling down of ambition epitomised the retreat of the labour
movement during the initial post-General Strike period.62 The debate was
notable only for a breezy assertion by Sidney Webb that parliament had paid
insufficient attention to the wages question.f" In this, parliament was truthfully
representative of Webb himself. Since his election to the Commons in
November 1922 he had failed to contribute to any of its debates on the
minimum wage issue. Furthermore, he chose to forego executive
responsibility for the minimum wage by refusing MacDonald's offer of the
Ministry of Labour in January 1924.64 Nevertheless, those historians who
maintain that a dichotomy exists between trade boards and national minimum
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wage policies may be interested to know that even Sidney Webb, co-author of
the first call for a national minimum wage in 1897, paid a glowing tribute to
the trade boards. He regarded them as 'a great instrument for raising those
wages, which has proved more potent in these downtrodden industries than
even trade unionism ... The operation of the Trade Boards Act has led to a
miraculous improvement in certain industries. ,65
The above assertion by Sidney Webb would have touched a raw nerve
in many trade unionists. As shown in the last chapter, unions faced a dilemma
with regard to the issue of government encroachment into wage-rate
determination. On the one hand, they recognised that the existence of a
significant 'residuum' of unorganised, largely unskilled labour earning wages
at or near sweated level served to undermine wage standards all round.
Conversely, the TUC was resistant to ceding control of industrial policy to
even the political wing of the labour movement." let alone to the 'hostile'
agency of the state. Christopher Nottingham has offered a pertinent summary
of the unions' attitude towards the state during this period:
The state was an organisation with a history of bias towards the
employer, and it was futile to contemplate collaboration with state
institutions as a way of advancing the interests of workers. The
function of the political representatives was to neutralise the state so
that the unions could bargain more effectively. The welfare of the
workers was to be defined almost exclusively in terms of the wages
and conditions their unions could secure for them. Developments in
social policy would have to take place within these confines."
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This conception allowed little room for a statutory minimum wages policy,
deemed an interference with the inviolable principle of free collective
bargaining. Indeed, as was shown in Chapter Three, state regulation of wages
during the war often held wage-rates down, particularly of those skilled grades
well represented at the TUC. Rather, as a working class self-help industrial
interest group, organised labour perceived the true remedy for low wages to be
inexorably linked with its own fate: 'the main line of attack on low wages, as
far as we are concerned, is the vigorous extension of Trade Union
organisation. ,68 Nevertheless, in lieu of the day when a comprehensive
organisation of workers had been achieved in even the lowliest of trades, the
unions were prepared to support 'the extension of the Trade Board system in
suitable cases' .69
However, crushed by adverse economic conditions that facilitated a
relentless employer campaign to force wage cuts, even the spirit of the
'independent collier' was apparently broken in 1921. At the TUC Congress
that year, a Miners' Federation delegate proposed a motion calling for a
national congress to consider the fixing of a minimum wage for all workers.i"
Whether or not the TUC hierarchy were happy with the resolution, they could
hardly ignore it given that it had been passed with the sponsorship of the
mighty Miners' Federation.
Consequently, the General Council, m conjunction with the
TUC/Labour Party Joint Research Department, produced a Report in time for
the following year's Congress gathering." Acknowledging that the 'Labour
movement has always declared that the adequate remuneration of the workers
should be in practice as well as in theory, the first charge on industry', the
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report nevertheless asserted that it was 'difficult to translate into terms of
money what this minimum standard of life should involve.,72 The report
recognised 'the great difficulty of establishing through the wage system an
equitable and adequate standard of life for all workers', not least because that
adequate standard varied for each individual worker according to the number
of dependants, if any, he supported.r' Crucially in view of the variation in
prevailing wage rates between trades, the 'simplest plan' of a uniform national
minimum wage for all workers was deemed likely to 'result in Parliament
establishing a relatively low national minimum'. A minimum fixed at the limit
of what an industry such as agriculture could afford 'would be of no assistance
whatever to the worker in manufacturing industries, and if it were established it
would tend to depress wages, or at least hamper the increases of wages in
industries where the prevailing rates were above the legal minimum.' The
report was also careful 'to draw a distinction between trades where the workers
desire some form of legal minimum wage, and those in which the unions feel
able to maintain satisfactory rates by their own action.' Here, 'if no legal
interference is desired in particular industries by the Trade Unions concerned,
they should be left free to pursue their own methods of enforcing adequate
wage rates. '
Generally, the report concluded that 'there are practical difficulties in
the way of a single national minimum wage; and it is probable that more
substantial results will be obtained by the method of attacking the problem in
each industry.' 'Either by means of Trade Boards or some similar machinery,
industries could work towards the national minimum standard of life as rapidly
as circumstances allow.' Therefore,' legislation other than for particular
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industries could not be profitably pursued at the present juncture, and ... a
Special Congress, as suggested in the Cardiff resolution, is not advisable.'
Interestingly, the above report was to have included a paragraph
suggesting a national weekly minimum wage for men and women, namely 63/6
and 36/- respectively. The sums were arrived at by inflation-adjusting
Seebohm Rowntree's 'Human Needs Standard' figures for 1914. 'The feeling
of the majority of the Committee however, was strongly against this passage
being allowed to stand part of its Report and being made public. ,74 Rowntree's
mere subsistence level monetary benchmarks were conceived with the best of
intentions; namely to illustrate that a significant minority of working class
households lacked sufficient income even to maintain basic 'physical
efficiency'. However, many trade unionists were extremely sensitive to the
notion that working class living standards should be stereotyped at any specific
level. In their minds, a minimum standard intended to install a 'floor' to the
wage system could all to easily mutate into a 'ceiling' holding down working
class aspirations. In other words, minimum wages could become standard
wages, which could drag down the rates paid to higher grades of labour.75
More fundamentally, nutritional needs-based minimum wage standards
were an insult to labour movement psychology, as they indicated that the
proportion of wealth allocated to workers should be akin merely to that of a
serf on his landlord's estate or an animal to the farmer. Resentment amongst
organised labour at this 'fodder basis' produced a level of analytical blindness
towards the minimum wage principle. Trade unionists tended to concentrate
upon the standard proposed, which it feared would become a maximum, rather
than the meaning of the word minimum. The Webbs had forewarned in 1897
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that a subsistence minimum wage would 'be low, and though its establishment
would be welcomed as a boon to unskilled workers in the unregulated trades, it
would not at all correspond with the conception of a "living wage" formed by
the Cotton Operatives or the Coalminers. ,76 Fear that a 'legal wage rate which
compared unfavourably with the wage rates negotiated freely in almost every
industry' would serve as a 'state approved normal wage, the effect of which
would be to drag down wage rates in other industries'F determined the TUC's
continuing hostility to a statutory national minimum wage for sixty years after
1922.
Proof that fear of the state establishing a definitive benchmark measure
for working class standards of living extended to the summit of the TUC
hierarchy came in 1929. Walter Citrine spoke against a motion calling for the
Ministry of Labour to update its cost of living index so that its weightings more
accurately affected actual patterns of working class household expenditure. He
feared that
while collecting statistics for the purpose of an index figure,
something in the nature of an absolute living standard might be
attempted .... Just as Charles Booth many years ago endeavoured to
show that a workman and his family could live on a certain figure, so
there is a danger in this case of the investigation being aimed not
merely at obtaining an index figure, but obtaining a minimum
standard on which workmen and their families can live at the present
time. . . . with unemployment rife in our basic industries, the
tendency would be if an examination was made at the present time,
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to reflect a lower standard of living than ought to be taken if a basis
of this kind is to be established."
The following extract from a speech by a TUC delegate protesting at
'wage slavery' on a 'fodder basis' should caution the historian against
accepting Sheila Blackburn's thesis that adherence to a national minimum
wage policy represented the 'more radical' left wing standpoint:
In the main the condition of the working classes will always be a
figure round about the bare cost of existence, a thing necessary in
order to be material for the exploitation and gain of the capitalist in
the labour market. ... so long as the wage-system lasts we shall have
this fodder basis of living; we shall have this wage slavery. There
will be no freedom."
Radical socialists favoured abolition of the wage system, not a perpetuation of
'wage slavery' on less onerous terms. It was the more moderate trade unionists
such as Ben Turner who adhered to the minimum wage principle: 'It perhaps
would be as well to recognise that the wage system is going to last longer than
many of us thought it would do 20, 30 or 40 years ago. So long as the wage
system does last I want to see a minimum established and people receiving that
minimum not less than 52 weeks per year. ,80 This sentiment was responsible
for two more attempts during the inter-war period to revive the TUC's interest
in the national minimum wage question.
Motivated in all likelihood by his lukewarm attitude towards trade
boards, Joseph Hallsworth urged the 1924 TUC to back the 'opinion that a
vigorous campaign should be initiated immediately to secure an adequate
. I .. f II k ,81natrona rmmmum wage or a wor ers. Although the resolution was
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carried, the wry prediction of 1. Cross that the 'General Council, with their
usual generosity, would accept the resolution, and next year give a paragraph
or two in the report stating the difficulties in trying to find a solution of it'82
was not quite correct; the question was ignored completely at the following
year's Congress!
More explicit opposition to the 'desirability of establishing a uniform
National Minimum Wage for adult workers' was apparent at the 1926 TUC
conference." With the defeat of this resolution, discussion of the national
minimum wage issue was banished from the floor of a Congress for twenty
years. The emphatic tone of the TUC's 1922 report ('A single national
minimum wage is impracticable') clearly crystallised the confines of organised
labour's attitude toward the minimum wage issue for many years.
This was evidenced by the TUC's responses to the lLD's minimum
wage fixing questionnaire. The trade boards system was explicitly supported."
In fact, the TUC's responses to the questionnaire betray a distinctly 'Whitley-
ite' conception of the role of statutory minimum wages, encompassing trades
'in which organisation is defective or rates of wages are unusually low.'85
Revealingly, the TUC also offered Seebohm Rowntree's 'human needs' scale
minima as 'the most widely recognised living wage figures'i'" By confusing a
minimum basis of wages, albeit one designed to provide for a higher standard
of living than bare physical subsistence, with the much broader concept of a
living wage, the TUC offered one clue as to why it failed to adhere to the ILP's
Living Wage campaign.
This defensive conception of statutory minimum wages in terms of only
the wages board model was borne, at least in part, of organised labour's
254
insecurity during the 1920s. After all, apart from agricultural workers, who
were deemed a special case by virtue of the obstacles to their organisation and
their extremely low earnings, the vast majority of workers covered by wages
boards were women. Female workers constituted seventy per cent. of those
within the scope of trade boards. Trade Boards could thus be supported as an
expedient to help the woman worker; too 'weak' or transient a member of the
labour force to organise herself into a union that could fight for better
conditions. Conversely, a national minimum wage protected all wage earners,
the majority of whom were men. Support for this policy was an implicit
admission that trade unions lacked to strength to win for their members a
decent minimum wage. With declining coverage amongst workers throughout
the 1920s and the psychological blow of defeat in the General Strike, trade
union pride was not prepared to risk embracing a policy that could be
interpreted as an acknowledgement of its waning virility.
Besides, Bevin's famous victory before the Shaw Inquiry" soon
illustrated an important truism for the labour movement. Whilst the 16
shillings per day award was the most headline-grabbing element of the award,
it was also to prove the most short-lived. The depression soon whittled down
the daily wage minima. Trade unionists knew that whilst wage rates tended to
fluctuate with the general price level, other elements of collective agreements,
covering, for instance, hours, paid breaks and holidays and workplace
conditions, were not so readily discarded during economic downturns. In
short, wage-rates were a very important matter for workers, but they were not
even the sole determinant of earnings, let alone the be all and end all of union
organisation and effort.
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To assert that the labour movement was opposed to a national
minimum wage is not to dismiss the notion that a superficial level of support
for the idea existed amongst many low-paid workers. This applied to both
those organised into trade unions and more especially the millions of wage
earners that were not. It is right to remember that organised labour was not
synonymous with the working classes as a whole" However, union
membership did offer the most readily attainable means for the expression of
the wage earner's viewpoint, not least because they were run by and for the
benefit of the wage earning classes. The likely riposte of a (skilled) trade
unionist to the contention that the TUC's opposition to a national minimum
wage crowded out the 'voice' of a mass of unskilled and unorganised labour
who would supported the policy was that this hypothetical 'voice' remained
unheard was because it was not organised!
As industrial interest groups, trade unions were perfectly entitled to
view policies in terms of the perceived interests of their members and the
wider cause of organised labour. Trade unions were not philanthropic
societies. Paul Addison has characterised the common aim of Bevin and
Citrine as follows: 'to raise the status and influence of the trade unions in
society. They were not very interested in the part unions would play in the
socialist commonwealth of the distant future, but they did aim to improve
conditions in the capitalist present. ,89 The disapproval of overly ambitious
programmes by the TUC leadership and emphasis instead on winning practical
benefits for workers should be borne in mind as we tum to an analysis of the
failure of the Independent Labour Party's campaign for a 'Living Wage'.
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The ILP's Living Wage programme was adopted as party policy at their
April 1926 conference, under the banner of 'Socialism in Our Time'. Before
analysing the components of this policy in the light of the failure of both the
Labour Party and the TUC to support it, a short discussion of the context in
which the ILP launched its Living Wage policy is necessary. Essentially, this
involved a synthesis of strategic considerations with a manifestation of the
ILP's long held ideological non-conformity. Considering strategic motivations
first; as Dowse recognised, the restructuring of the Labour Party in 1918 left
the raison d'etre for the ILP's continued existence as a separate body in doubt.
During the Edwardian period, 'the I.L.P. was both the major constituency
organisation ofthe Labour Party and its main source of policy'r'" However, by
providing for individual membership, the 1918 constitution facilitated the
growth of constituency Labour Party organisations, whilst Labour and the New
Social Order, drafted by Sidney Webb, provided the party with a distinctive
socialist programme.
Labour was now committed to a Fabian notion of socialism, in
particular, the 'inevitability of gradualism'. Therein lay an opportunity for the
ILP. By the mid-1920s, radical socialists had identified an obvious void in the
belief, championed by MacDonald but widely accepted by the Labour Party,
that socialism would somehow 'evolve' from capitalism, namely that it offered
no explanation as to how this transformation was to occur." Formulation of a
distinctive and extensive political programme aimed at the establishment of
'socialism', thereby offering a de-facto definition of socialism in the process,
was thus the ILP's antidote to gradualism.
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The Living Wage campaign of the 1920s had its roots in the ILP's high
profile pre-war propaganda for a thirty shillings weekly minimum wage. More
specifically, it provided a means of shifting the policy orientation of the ILP
away from international affairs and towards a purely British dimension.f In
effect, the ILP hoped to find a solution to British economic difficulties, and in
particular the 'intractable million' of the workforce unemployed, within the
context of socialist policies tailored to the needs of the home economy. This
was in contrast to the prevailing wisdom which held that as the disruption to
world trade was a consequence of world international tension, a concentration
on winning better international relations offered the prospect of a reprieve for
Britain's hard-pressed export sector, where the bulk of the unemployed were
concentrated."
An orthodox political consensus coalesced around the notion that, in
order to raise the value of sterling towards its pre-war parity on the Gold
standard, workers must accept wage cuts so that British industry could regain
or retain competitiveness against foreign-produced goods." In practice, even
the Labour Party leadership embraced these assumptions. Given the
persistence of high unemployment throughout the 1921-1939 period, this
policy appeared both unsuccessful and masochistic to those unconvinced of the
wisdom of orthodox economic policies. 'Underconsumptionist' theory
appeared attractive to those believing that there must be some more effective
method of reducing the numbers out of work.
l.A. Hobson had championed under-consumption theory for many
years, rendering his ideas beyond the pale in the eyes of a majority of
economists." In essence, he identified a lack of purchasing power amongst the
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masses as being responsible for a level of demand in the economy insufficient
to match the increasing supply of goods possible under mass production
techniques. This 'under-consumption' In the economy produced
unemployment and depression. Accordingly, Hobson maintained that the
'only cure for under-consumption, as for the under-production it implies, is a
better distribution of income, more favourable to the workers on the one hand,
and to a larger revenue for social services upon the other. ,96
Underconsumptionist theory thus underpinned the trade unionist's case
for higher earnings in particular and a redistribution of income towards the
wage earning classes in general. Hobson acknowledged that many
businessmen and economists thought it preposterous to propose high wages
and high taxes as remedies for unemployment. Applied only to a single
business or a single trade, Hobson concurred. In order to effect an expansion
of demand for mass consumable goods on a general level, he recognised the
need for a nationally applied high wage policy, sponsored 'either by an
enlightened agreement among the leaders in most industries or by some State
policy of minimum wages'."
In spite of remaining pretty consistent in his beliefs, Hobson, hitherto a
leading apostle of New Liberalism, became an ILP member after 1918.
Influenced by the extremely severe depression that followed the collapse of the
short post war boom (official unemployment reached the unprecedented level
of 2.4 million in May 1921, 22 per cent of the insured workforce) Hobson
renewed his underconsumptionist arguments In The economics of
unemployment (1922). Hobson's arguments were attractive to influential
figures within the ILP who appreciated that they married several of the party's
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principle beliefs, namely; concern for the unemployed, adherence to the living
wage ideal, and a desire for a redistribution of wealth along socialist lines. In
particular, both John Wheatley, leader of the 'Clydesider' group of ILP MPs,
and H.N. Brailsford, editor of the ILP's New Leader, adopted Hobson's
underconsumptionist arguments with enthusiasm. Hobson agreed to chair an
ILP policy commission, which began its work soon after the ILP's spring
conference of 1924. Its membership included Brailsford, Clifford Allen (then
ILP Chairman), E.F Wise and Arthur Creech Jones."
Hitherto, Hobson's remedies for underconsumptionist causes of
unemployment were intended to make the existing economic system work
more humanely, harmoniously and hence more effectively. Arguably,
capitalism would be preserved in society'S glow of contentment radiated by
high-earning, fully employed consumers and profit-maximising mass
producers alike, even allowing for higher levels of personal taxation levied on
the latter group in order to aid a redistribution of wealth towards the former
group.
Under the ILP's aegis, however, Hobson's underconsumptionist
arguments were presented in a different way. The Living Wage Commission's
report99 turned Hobson's optimistic presumption that a living wage for all
workers was feasible under capitalism on its head; the inability of capitalism to
ensure to wage earners a living wage was made the justification for a radical
reorganisation of the economy on socialist lines. The Living Wage
Commission report stated that 'any attempt to achieve the ideal of a living
wage for industry generally . . . will lead us far beyond our original
objective. ,)00
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Asserting that 'the political and the industrial [labour] movements are
mutually dependent on one another', the report argued that state assistance was
required to foster conditions whereby trade unions could win a living wage for
their members and thus lift the 'limitation of the home market' caused by low
wages.i'" As an immediate means of income redistribution, the report
favoured a five shillings weekly family allowance paid direct to the mother in
respect of each child of an insured worker, 'to be financed entirely by direct
taxation. ,102 Furthermore, in order to achieve a stabilisation of the trade cycle,
the ILP Living Wage programme involved extensive powers of state control
over industry and commerce. The real value of the living wage was to be
maintained by a nationalised Bank of England determining credit policy so as
to prevent inflation, once the initial reflationary boost to the economy had been
administered. Potential price rises were also to be checked via government
control over the importation of foods and raw materials. Industries failing to
pay a living wage would be directed towards reorganisation by a central
Industrial Commission endowed with extensive powers of intervention,
including the direction of future capital investment to industry. Above all, the
Living Wage Commission considered it prudent 'to lessen, wherever it can be
done on economic lines, our own dependence on foreign trade. ... only by
expanding the home market by a sound wages and credit policy, will it be
possible to transfer labour easily from the depressed to the more promising
trades. ' 103
An ambitiously extensive programme indeed! At the risk of countering
the Commission's assertion that wages questions could not be disentangled
from the wider issue of the complex operation of the capitalist system, only
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those aspects of the Living Wage programme considered by the labour
movement directly relevant to the wages question will be focussed upon.
Principally, this concerns issues surrounding the proposal for family
allowances, the determination of the living wage itself, and the extent to which
this wage would be enforced by statutory means.
Brailsford's membership of Eleanor Rathbone's Family Endowment
Society influenced the ILP Commission's endorsement of her repudiation of
the labour movement's 'breadwinner' living wage shibboleth. Instead, the
Living Wage Report supported Rathbone's call for a system of family
allowances. It viewed family allowances a better means of fulfilling the
socialist maxim 'to each according to his need' than a 'breadwinner' wage
calculated on the basis that the 'typical' worker supported a wife and three
children. After all, just over half of all adult male wage earners had no
dependent children, whilst only 8.8 per cent. supported three children. A
slightly larger group, 9.9 per cent., had more than three dependent children.
Furthermore, forty per cent. of the nation's children were contained in these
larger families. The ILP proposed, therefore, to base the Living Wage on the
needs of a man and his wife, adding to it a weekly provision for each child.'?'
In addition, the Report assumed that 'where a man and his wife are both
wage-earners, that each is entitled to a living wage. The effect of increasing
the family income by paying children's allowances, would, however, usually
be to draw women away from industry.v'" This attitude of easing women out
of the labour market and thus creating more jobs for men by means of securing
'equal pay for equal work' was more in keeping with the ethos of many male
trade unionists! However, in an era when job opportunities for the vast
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majority of working class women were of an unmspmng 'blind alley'
character, the Committee's hypothesis that such women entered the labour
market primarily for reasons of financial necessity was probably correct.
However, trade unionists could not be expected to view the ILP's
rejection of the five-member family 'living wage' with equanimity. The TUC
justified this basis of wage determination '(1) because three children per family
are requisite to replenish the population with a moderate rate of increase and
(2) because a wage suited to such a family would at least provide an
approximation to a minimum which would be generally applicable. ,106
Besides, in the eyes of most trade unionists, Rathbone's assertion that two-
fifths of children would be inadequately provided for under a minimum wage
calculated on a 'two plus three' basis only served to underline the need for a
high base line to wages. A living wage based on the needs of two adults only
would be of lower value than one taking account of the needs of a five-member
family.
Trade unionists' hostility to any challenge to the 'breadwinner' living
wage was thus inevitable. However, the ILP was not guilty of simple
ineptitude in trampling over TUC sensibilities on this matter. Rather, the
rejection of the 'two plus three' living wage in favour of a 'man plus wife'
living wage, in conjunction with family allowances, reflected the sincerity of
the ILP's attempt to seek a feasible solution to the underconsumption-induced
weaknesses in the British economy. Experience in Australia, the one country
where an attempted to attach a figure to the living wage concept was made,
appeared to expose the fallaciousness of adopting a family living wage as
standard.
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Facing re-election in 1919, Australia's Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes,
promised a Royal Commission 'to enquire into the cost of living in relation to
the minimum wage, and would create effective machinery to secure a constant
1· . ,107ivmg wage. Accordingly, in November 1920, A.B. Piddington's
Commission, composed of three representatives each of employers and
workers, unanimously recommended the figure of £5 l6s. on the basis of a two
plus three family. 'But in reply ... the Federal Statistician answered that the
entire proceeds of industry in Australia, even if all profit were eliminated,
would fail to provide such a wage for every worker.' 108 The cost of providing
for 'phantom' children had proved prohibitive. Accordingly, the Commission
subtracted the cost of maintaining children, estimated at 12 shillings each per
week, from the original figure and issued a revised recommendation of a £4
weekly wage, catering for the worker and his wife only, together with a 12
shillings weekly family allowance per dependent child.lo9
By complementing a minimum wage strategy with family allowances
as a means of securing full employment, the ILP displayed an understanding
that three components were necessary in order to combat poverty caused by
insufficient working class household earnings. In order to secure a living
income, the worker required the payment of adequate wage rates for a full
working week every week of the year. As the Fabians had recognised prior to
1914,110 wages needed to be accompanied by other devices in order to adjust
for the differences in family size. In short, a minimum wage strategy could
only be effective in combating poverty amongst the working poor if
accompanied by full employment and family allowance policies. Substituting
family allowances for the provision of 'phantom' children, though offending
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trade unionists' committed to the 'breadwinner' wages principle, arguably
offered the increased prospect of a national minimum wage policy by making it
more affordable.
However, the unpopularity of family allowances within the TUC
prevented them from appreciating the wisdom of this three-pronged strategy to
ensure working class households a 'living income'. Indeed, trade unionists
feared that the introduction of family allowances would facilitate wage
reductions, or at least constrain their upward revision. Ernest Bevin spoke of
family allowances in terms of the unions being 'generally opposed to cutting
up wages' .111 Rhys Davies, trade unionist and Labour MP wrote that 'Family
Allowances, as a system, is a confession that industry cannot afford to pay a
decent wage to the workmen. It is also a confession that trade unionism, is
played out. ,112 Trade unionists' darkest suspicions of family allowances were
confirmed in the Report of Herbert Samuel's Royal Commission on the Coal
Industry in March 1926.
William Beveridge was the most influential member of Samuel's Coal
Commission. 'Beveridge saw family allowances as a means of facilitating
wage-cuts he believed were essential to make the British coal industry
competitive on world markets once the government's subsidy ended in April
1926.' 113 Adopting as a wage standard a mid-way point between Rowntree' s
austere 'physical efficiency' and his less onerous 'human needs' calculations
(i.e. 35s.), Eleanor Rathbone suggested before the Commission that a child
allowance for the coal industry could be financed entirely by cutting wages by
5s. 10d. per week. 114 'Beveridge won his fellow commissioners over, and their
report ... included a recommendation of family allowances as a means of
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ensuring that wage-cuts did not result in undue hardship.' liS To say the least,
this proposal was not welcome to the Miners' Federation, fighting the coal
owners on the slogan 'Not a penny off the pay: not a second on the day'. The
effect of this recommendation on the popularity of family allowances amongst
the TUC was illustrated in 1930, when Congress defied a majority
recommendation by the Labour Party/TUC Joint Committee on the Living
Wage and rej ected the policy. 116
The ILP could point to the fact that its proposal for non-contributory
family allowances was distinct in that it represented a redistribution of income
from the salaried and landed classes, via direct taxation to the working
classes.117 Nevertheless, the TUC and the Labour Party hierarchies clearly
accepted conventional orthodox notions regarding the strict ceiling on the
amount of taxation and public expenditure considered viable. Commenting on
the £125 million annual cost of the ILP's family allowance scheme, Walter
Milne-Bailey protested that 'No attempt is made to show that it is feasible to
raise this sum in additional direct taxation.' us
In reality, this carping was a reflection of the Labour movement's
preference for public money to be spent on collectively provided social
services rather than handouts to individuals which could be deemed an
interference in the wage system. At a hearing of Frank Wise's evidence before
the Labour Party/TUC Living Wage Committee, Ellen Wilkinson appeared to
express little faith in the competence of housewives' budgeting skills. She
urged that 'you might get higher social value if that amount of money [i.e. the
£125 m] is spent on social services than if it is spent in driblets, where there is
f keeni If' ,119no means 0 eepmg contro 0 It.
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The only hope of the ILP's Living Wage policies being adopted as a
government sponsored programme was if the labour movement could be
persuaded to adopt them. Hence the unpopularity of the ILP's proposal for
family allowances was a blow to this strategy. The unopposed passage of
Brailsford's 'Socialist Construction' resolution at the October 1926 Labour
Party conference'f" led to the establishment of the Labour PartylTUC joint
Living Wage Committee to investigate the practicability of the scheme.
However, twelve months later, Frank Wise had good reason to fulminate
against the dilatory progress of the Committee. 'It took nine months to get a
Committee together. It was not until July, three weeks before the holiday
season started, that the Committee actually met, and when it did meet it
proceeded to appoint its Chairman and Secretary, and apparently exhausted by
its labours, it retired for three months further rest.' 121
This heel dragging betrayed the hostile attitudes held by the leaderships
of both the political and industrial wings of the labour movement towards the
ILP scheme. MacDonald had contempt for 'flashy futilities' which jeopardised
Labour's chances of appealing to moderate opinion.122 At a meeting of the
TUC General Council on 22 March 1927,
Bevin said wage policies must spring from the Unions themselves .
. .. I am against bringing the Political Labour Party into this. If we
once get this wage problem into the hands of our own politicians and
have the Tory Party dealing with it, when they are in office, wages
will be the subject of political conflict. I prefer to keep quite clear of
the political movement ... the problem must be dealt with by the
Unions themselves.I23
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Rebuffing ILP overtures to endorse their campaign, Bevin asserted to Fenner
Brockway, 'You will discover that you cannot handle wages by attaching them
to the tail of a particular slogan.' 124 Faced with the abundance of such attitudes
amongst the trade unions, the ILP's attempt to win over the Living Wage
Committee was handicapped from the outset. A National Union of
Railwaymen delegate at the 1927 Labour Party conference 'did not think that
the policy of the Living wage was any use' .125 Purist socialists within the
labour movement felt that:
The Living Wage is a completely false presentation of the socialist
objective. It obscures the real issue of the conquest of production,
and places in the forefront an illusory issue of a change in the
national distribution of wealth while Capitalist production continues.
It places the socialist objective of the abolition of wage subjection by
an 'ideal' ... of a higher wage.126
Therein lay the ILP's predicament. Squeezed between the 'rock' of cautious
Labourites who were sceptical of the practicability of pro-active radical
initiatives and the doctrinaire socialist 'hard place' where all change short of a
complete transformation to 'socialism' was dismissed as futile, the 'third way'
constituency prepared to sponsor radical reformism was narrow indeed.
In order to 'steer the party away from Socialism in Our Time', 127 the
Labour leadership rushed out Labour and the Nation in 1927; a deliberately
vague reaffirmation of gradualist strategy drafted by R.H. Tawney. During the
run up to the 1929 general election the Labour leadership had thus ensured that
the party was absorbed in consideration of its new policy document, whilst
scrutiny of the ILP's policies was held up in the back-room Living Wage
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Committee. The ILP's ambition that Labour adopt its programme in time for
the forthcoming election was thus frustrated. Labour and the Nation's
adherence to the living wage concept was couched in conventional labour
movement terms. State supplementation of trade union action was to be
strictly confined within the perspective of existing wage regulatory apparatus,
namely trade boards, agricultural wages committees and the fair wages
resolution.i" This stance accorded with the limited extent of Labour's
manifesto commitments regarding the wages question between 1918 and 1924,
and likewise governed the tone of such commitments in the 1929 manifesto.F"
This cautious stance was confirmation that the moderates had tightened their
grip over the labour movement after the General Strike. From 1926 Walter
Citrine and Ernest Bevin's dominance over the TUC complemented the
entrenched orthodox Labour party leadership of MacDonald and Snowden.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the Labour
PartylTUC joint Living Wage Committee was incredulous at several of the
assumptions behind the ILP's policy. For example, regarding the question of
the definition of the living wage, Milne-Bailey censured:
Nowhere is there any appreciation of the fact that this is a
psychological ideal which not only differs from time to time, but
from country to country, and even from one grade of labour to
another in the same country at the same time. What the workers
want, and rightly so, is not some figure called a 'living wage' but the
greatest income it is possible to get by any means. If by some means
they could all get next year what they would vaguely call at the
present moment a 'living wage', next year's conception of a living
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wage would be beyond that again. This is as it should be, for it is a
universal feature of human psychology to want more than has yet
been obtained. The agricultural worker's 'living wage ideal' at
present would probably be scorned - as an ideal - by the skilled
printer or engine-driver.
In concentrating upon a definite conception of a living wage there
is a great danger of treating the position as being' static', whereas we
ought to have in mind the 'dynamic' conception of a constantly
rising standard of living. 130
This was a perfect encapsulation of the living wage concept as outlined by J.A.
Hobson in 1896. J3l The labour movement shared a genuine fear that any
attempt to impose a figure on the living wage necessarily undermined its
aspirational value.
In tacit acknowledgement of these sensibilities, the ILP's Living Wage
Report was noticeably ambivalent regarding the proposed level of the living
wage, apparently the centrepiece of its programme. Despite conceding the
pressing need 'to define what we mean by a Living Wage', the report side-
stepped the issue by proposing a 'Labour Commission to formulate in precise
terms and figures the vague claim which is in all our minds.' 132 The ILP
identified two main criteria for the determination of the living wage. Firstly,
the level of expenditure necessary to meet the basic 'physical efficiency' needs
of a man and his wife. Secondly, careful analysis of the level of national
income and the proportion of such enjoyed by the wage-earning classes was to
be undertaken, with a view to finding a means of doubling the earnings of
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approximately ten million lower-skilled workers who earned around £100 per
annum.
The ILP attempted to acknowledge the 'dynamic' concept of the living
wage and obviate the danger of stereotyping living standards at a fixed level by
urging that 'the figure should be estimated deliberately somewhat higher than
our present level of industrial efficiency would warrant.' 133 However, this
entrenched the perception within the TUC/Labour Party Living Wage
Committee that the ILP's scheme was pie-in-the-sky. As a clearly incredulous
Walter Citrine pressed Frank Wise, 'I do not see how it [the living wage] can
be morally binding if you tell people in advance that it cannot be paid .... You
are saying in advance that this is something higher than industry will bear.' 134
Indeed, the ILP's imprecise definition of the living wage added fuel to the
suspicion that its eponymous campaign was a deliberate misnomer for a
socialist programme of reorganisation. At the 1926 Labour Party conference,
MacDonald reminded delegates of the 'myth' aspect of the first draft of
Brailsford's 'socialist construction' (living wage) resolution that bore no
relation to Hobson's notions of underconsumption.t''' In addition, E.F. Wise
did little to persuade his sceptical audience on the Living Wage Committee that
the ILP's programme should be taken seriously when he appeared 'not clear as
to the difference' between the basic concepts of wages and incornes.v"
In fact, whilst the Living Wage Committee were deeply sceptical of
policies contained within the ILP programme.!" fundamentally they shared a
bitter resentment at the hypotheses underlying the proposals. The ILP Living
Wage Commission report outraged the TUC by its provocative assertion that:
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If the rule that wages are the concern of the Trade Unions
exclusively... is rigidly followed, it is difficult to feel confident that
any general improvement in the level of wages can be secured. It is
still more difficult to look forward to the removal of the gross
inequalities which obtain at present in the wages of various trades.
The trade cycle is a perpetual handicap to any continuous effort to
raise wages by combination. What seems to be won in the boom is
lost in the slump, and gains and losses alike are often illusory, since
the struggle rages around money figures, which have no constant
value. Trade Unions can rarely hope for success, if it comes to
struggle, save for a brief period in each cycle, and during the years of
slump they must expect to see their membership and their funds
depleted. But only by political action (for example through the
control of credit and the stabilisation of prices) can one hope to
lessen or abolish the oscillations of the trade cycle.138
Essentially, this assertion represented merely an uncomfortable home truth to
trade unionists. Understandably, however, Walter Citrine reacted furiously to
this challenge both to the wisdom of the TUC's political strategy and its very
self-esteem: 'my complaint is that in issuing this policy you are either
consciously or unconsciously discrediting Trade Unionism.' 'If you tell people
in plain English that what they gain in the boom they will lose in the slump, it
cannot be argued that Trade Unionism is effective.' 139
Having challenged TUC doctrine that wages questions were their
exclusive preserve, the ILP's insistence that it did not seek 'to enforce by
legislation a universal statutory minimum' appeared a spectacular non sequitur
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to the Living Wage Committee and a vindication of trade uruomsm by
default.l'" A resolution passed in the Commons enshrining the living wage
figure as determined by the proposed commission would bind public-
contracted work only, rather like the existing Fair Wages Resolution.'?' Whilst
the ILP witnesses before the Living Wage Committee could point to this policy
as proof of their commitment to trade union methods of wage bargaining, the
mood of the Committee was reflected in Milne-Bailey's cynicism and grasping
of a major inconsistency in the ILP's argument:
Instead of adopting the obvious 'political' step of planning the
enactment of legal minimum wage rates, the proposals definitely
reject this ... leaving it to the Unions to secure this level by
industrial action. But if the political action is necessary because
industrial pressure is 'apt to be weakest where it is most needed',
why leave it to this 'unequal' force to secure the living wage? If
political action is powerful enough and rapid enough to secure all the
conditions for enabling industry to pay a living wage, why not fix
such a wage at the same time, by law? The I.L.P. suggestion is
merely a sop to the Unions to cover up the belief obviously held that
in the reorganisation of the economic system and the securing of a
living wage, the Trade Union movement is practically powerless.Y
Herbert Morrison feared that raising municipal employees' wages in lieu of
any rise in general wage rates would be unpopular and exacerbate existing
wage inequalities. He cited the case of Bermondsey Metropolitan Borough
Council, which was forced to abandon its £4 weekly minimum wage policy for
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its own workers: 'The rates rose as a result of the action, and these had to be
paid for by people getting only £2 a week. ,143
The Living Wage Committee concluded that 'such of the proposals as
are in any way peculiar to the I.L.P. and might be on an 'immediate'
programme are at best useless and at the worst dangerous, while those which
are not an immediate possibility would require for their attainment so much
power that we could as easily get full socialism.' 144
Pressed by the Living Wage Committee on 14 December 1927 to
prioritise ILP policies into a provisional order of implementation, Wise and
Hobson both identified family allowances as the immediate means of setting in
operation forces which would enable the living wage to be realised.l'"
Accordingly, after quizzing Wise solely on family allowances, the Committee
decided to concentrate exclusively on this question. No doubt the leadership of
both the Labour Party and the TUC were delighted that the Living Wage
Committee had dropped consideration of the wider issues relating to the ILP
programme. Nevertheless, given that the ILP witnesses themselves indicated
that family allowances were to kick-start the living wage campaign, it made
sense for the labour movement to formulate its policy on this controversial
issue.146
The rejection of a policy of family allowances by both the TUC and the
Labour Party in 1930 effectively killed off the Living Wage campaign within
the labour movement, for by then this issue had become the totemic face of the
wider programme. This was in spite of official assurances to the contrary. At
the 1930 Labour Party conference, Arthur Henderson promised Maxton that
the Living Wage Committee would continue its work regardless,147 but in
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reality the Committee was mothballed. Besides, pressure on the Labour Party
to adopt ILP policies naturally evaporated following the latter's disaffiliation in
1932.
The doomed ILP Living Wage policy of Socialism in Our Time was
intended to provide unity and a renewed sense of purpose to the labour
movement. In view of the determined hostility of the labour movement's
hierarchy, this was a forlorn hope. However, Socialism in Our Time failed
even to unify and revive the fortunes of the ILP itself. The party's National
Administrative Council (NAC)'s report for 1928-29 admitted the
'unprecedented difficulty' the ILP faced, with a serious loss of members and
branches, acknowledging the Socialism in Our Time policies as a factor.v"
R.E. Dowse emphasised that large sections of the ILP misunderstood or were
only mildly supportive of the Living Wage programme.l'" This produced
inconsistencies in the party's promotion of its own policies and facilitated the
diversion of the ILP's energies into distractions from Socialism in Our Time.
In particular, ILP branches focussed primarily on the six-month mining dispute
just one month after the April 1926 conference endorsed the Living Wage
programme.P"
The ILP's work with the Miners' Federation was to produce another
blow to its Living wage campaign, in the shape of the Cook-Maxton Manifesto
of June 1928.151 This CPGB-inspired document, leading to the authors' Our
Casefor a Socialist Revival policy document four months later, with its calls
for confiscation of wealth and republicanism, jarred with the ILP's philosophy
of reformism. Maxton's undisciplined ego-driven indulgence placed his party
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in the ludicrous position of appearing before the electorate as committed to two
f di 1·· 152sets 0 contra ictory po teres.
In addition to left-wing critiques of the Living Wage strategy'<' the
policy was opposed by moderate figures within the ILP such as PJ. Dollan,
chairman of the Scottish Divisional Council. He believed that a universal
statutory minimum wage policy offered greater immediate hope to 'the 11Y2
·11· h . d' 154nu Ions w 0 were not organise . DoHan persuaded the 1928 ILP
Conference to endorse this policy together with a five shillings weekly family
allowance paid in respect of each dependent child of a wage earner.155
However, in 1929 the ILP Conference overturned this decision and endorsed a
new interpretation of the Living Wage policy drafted by an internal committee
charged with the duty of reconciling the Dollan policy with that endorsed in
1926.
Echoing the conclusions of the 1922 TUC Report, the ILP rejected a
universal legal minimum wage policy out~onsiderations of practicability of
"
application and anxiety that trade union interests would be better served if they
were left to secure the living wage for themselves.l'" Instead, the ILP came
down in favour of an industry by industry approach. Trade Boards were to be
'set up as rapidly as possible to cover those trades and industries which are not
already covered by an Industrial Council or Trade Board or other permanent
formal joint machinery now existing for negotiation and conciliation.' 157 In
this context, the ILP's Living Wage strategy to achieve Socialism in Our Time
by April 1929 boiled down, in practical policy terms, to little more than
'Whitleyism in our time' , coupled with a policy of family allowances.l'"
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'Tamed' or otherwise, the ILP's Living Wage agenda was steadfastly
ignored by the 1929-31 minority Labour government. Apart from increasing
the number of trade boards and agricultural wages committee inspectors and
attempting to extend trade boards to the catering industry, the second
MacDonald government refrained from direct intervention in the wages
question. Margaret Bondfield, the Minister of Labour and arguably the most
senior female trade unionist during the 1920s, stressed that, 'on the matter of
legislation on minimum wages, the Government will undoubtedly have to
proceed after the closest consultation with the official bodies which make up
the Trade Union Congress'v"
Maxton enjoyed one last chance to promote 'Socialism in Our Time'
via his Living Wage Bill on 6 February 1931. But as Milne-Bailey explained,
'The Labour Government and the majority of the Labour Party are opposed to
the principle of this Bill, which is, I may say, of a purely propagandist
character. It is true that the Bill received a second reading, but there is not the
slightest possibility of its passing into law. I think the second reading was
passed merely as a gesture of Labour members in favour of the living wage
idea, but the provisions of the Bill are generally thought to be quite
. . bl ,160impractica e.
By the time of Maxton's Bill, Oswald Mosley was preparing to launch
a rival campaign in support of unorthodox policies intended to cure the British
economy of unemployment. Mosley's 'Memorandum' stole the ILP's thunder.
The economic strategy championed by this flashy young 'aristocrat in a hurry'
was outwardly similar to Socialism in Our Time stripped of its living wage tag,
apart from Mosley's fondness for protective tariffs. Nevertheless, whilst
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Mosley's campaign eclipsed the ILP's own flagging crusade, it cut as little ice
amongst the Labour leadership as Socialism in Our Time had done. If
anything, the failure of Mosley to 'capture' the Labour Party in October 1930
reinforced Snowden's neo-classical response to the mounting economic
crisis.'?' Mosley was widely-distrusted by his fellow politicians and his rapid
conversion to fascism served to confirm in the minds of established political
leaders their doubts about his political judgement.
Mavericks within the Conservative Party who dared to challenge the
prevailing orthodox economic policy assumptions faced a similar credibility
problem amongst their peers as Mosley and Maxton had done with the Labour
Party leadership. Inspired, as Hobson had been, by the high production, high
wages and high consumption characteristics of the American economy and
convinced of the need for a more pro-active expansionist industrial policy on
the part of the British government, four young Tory MPs published Industry &
the State. A Conservative view in April 1927.162 Impressed by the
representative nature of trade boards and the role of appointed members in the
system, they advocated statutory wages boards for every important industry.163
Conservative reactions, however, were violent, and the authors were
denounced as 'cranks and theorists [who] must be disposed of.
Under the heading 'Socialists in Conservative Disguise', the Daily
Mail railed against their 'half-baked sentimentalism' and 'crude and
hasty theories characteristic of modem Socialism' ... The Sunday
Pictorial thundered that 'the suspicion long entertained by many of
us that the Conservative Party is honey-combed with Socialism has
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been proved up to the hilt. The Party must be purged of its woolly-
minded semi-Socialists. These Kerenskys will, unless they are
hauled up, only prepare the way for Lenin.164
Stanley Baldwin detested 'extremism', which he 'equated with any bold
experiment by the State in economic or social affairs.' 165Thus, throughout the
Baldwin-MacDonald era (1923-1937) inertia, espoused by the former as
'safety first', reigned in government.
Amongst the Liberal Party, unorthodox economic policies designed to
boost demand in the home market at least enjoyed active sponsorship from the
top. When he finally assumed the leadership of the much weakened party in
1926 Lloyd George financed a Liberal Summer School Inquiry into the future
of British Industry. Devised by the Cambridge economists J.M. Keynes and
Hubert Henderson, Britain's Industrial Future shared with Industry & the State
the notion that the legitimate grievances of workers, such as their subservient
status in the workplace and inadequate pay, should be addressed as a
precondition for industrial revival. Accordingly, the Inquiry felt that 'a
minimum below which no worker should fall' should provide a key element of
a 'just' wage system.!" Rejecting a universal national minimum wage as
impracticable, it recommended that 'the Trade Board system should be
extended to all industries insufficiently organised to be able to make and keep
general agreements,.167 Additionally, legal enforcement powers were to be
granted to the Joint Industrial Councils.
Nevertheless, although Lloyd George fought the 1929 election on the
basis of these 'Yellow book' underconsumptionist remedies for
unemployment, key sections of his party were left cold by this agenda. The
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Liberal Party of the inter-war years embraced as disparate a collection of views
as it had in the pre-1914 period. Prominent Asquithians had not forgiven
Lloyd George for his role in the breach of 1916 which had so handicapped the
party, and had little time for any cause he espoused. Furthermore, the new
ideas of Keynes, like those of Hobson before him, suffered from widespread
scepticism by reason of their very iconoclastic character. Hence, whether the
Liberal Party outside Lloyd George's entourage took these bold industrial
policies seriously must be open to question. In 1925 a party member
complained that four years after the National Liberal Federation had adopted a
comprehensive industrial policy, embracing a national industrial council on the
lines of the 1919 proposal with powers to fix minimum wages and maximum
hours, the leadership had yet to promote it! 168
The Liberal Industrial Inquiry's aping of the National Industrial
Conference Report's advocacy of legalising voluntary agreements is
noteworthy as it coincided with a thawing of the TUC's hostility to the
principle. Trade unionists had feared that legal sanctions on employers to pay
a certain rate of wages could be utilised to coerce organised labour to abide by
rates it no longer considered just and even to constrain the right to strike.
Additionally, trade unionists harboured a psychological resistance to granting
non-unionists the benefits attained by collective action. Nevertheless, with the
security of a Labour government in office, the TUC General Council agreed
with the Association of Joint Industrial Councils in 1929-30 a draft Bill for the
'Enforcement of agreed minimum rates' .169
No measure providing for the general legalisation of voluntary
agreements was likely in the 1930s. However, the imminent breakdown of
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collective bargaining in the symbolically important but depressed cotton
weaving industry together with the united lobbying of the organised employers
and trade unions concerned induced the government to pass the Cotton
Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act in 1934.170
In spite of the above measure, the 1930s proved another barren decade
for major government initiatives in the field of wage regulation.
Unsurprisingly, the chief domestic challenge for politicians of the time was
unemployment. Given that classical economic theory held that unemployment
was caused by labour offering itself at too high a price, the last thing orthodox-
minded British governments could countenance was a further significant
incursion into the minimum wage field. Any policy that could prevent
employers from cutting their costs and becoming more competitive was thus
ruled out of order. Predictably, the enveloping economic crisis of 1931
heralded a vigorous campaign for wage cuts by the NCEO. Even organisations
otherwise sympathetic to the notion of a minimum floor to wages evidently felt
that it would be wrong to 'risk' a bold legal minimum wage policy at a time of
already high unemployment. Labour Party conferences and TUC Congresses
were silent on the issue during the 1930s.
The 'economy of high wages' argument, whereby higher wages served,
over time, to reduce firms' costs via greater efficiency, would have left most
observers cold at this time, when many businesses appeared on the brink of
ruin. Although an expanded wages board policy on an industry by industry
basis could be supported, there was no serious pressure applied for a statutory
minimum wage. The manifestos of the three main parties failed to mention the
issue in 1931 and 1935. At a time when those in work, however poorly paid,
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could be considered luckier than their jobless neighbours, there was far less
concern by policy makers for the plight of the 'in-work poor'. 'In these days
of very severe unemployment, it is perhaps too hastily-assumed that those who
are fortunate enough to have employment are necessarily beyond the reach of
want. ,171 This was still the case as the worst of the unemployment eased later
in the 1930s, causing G.D.H. Cole to protest: 'We have heard too much of late
about the 'hard core' of unemployment. Let us not forget that employment too
has its 'hard core' of suffering, in these days often as intense ... as the
suffering of the unemployed in the depressed areas, and as deserving of a
speedy remedy. ' !72
The despondency produced by the world-wide 'Great Depression' may
have served to radicalise some, but a greater number would have recoiled from
untried policies which risked aggravating a bad situation further. Besides, it
would be a mistake to treat the period before the 1936 publication of Keynes'
General Theory, the high point of the intellectual challenge to classical
economic dogma, as one in which 'Keynesianism' existed. His views evolved
only slowly from underconsumptionist-influenced instincts.l'" Government
policies of deflation, retrenchment and minimal intervention in the workings of
the labour market, albeit coupled with novel policies of protection and low
interest rates from 1932, were thus the order of the day.
On the question of poverty, the picture was at least not uniformly
depressing: 'A problem of severe poverty, and a stratum of the very poor,
could ... certainly still be discovered in the inter-war years. Yet it is manifest
that the problem had shrunk ... there had been a contraction of the great body
of low-paid, unskilled labour, continually struggling for survival even in the
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best of times' .174 However, because of higher living standards generally, and
the growth of decent housing and affordable household goods available, the
problem of 'relative' poverty was as statistically significant as 'absolute'
poverty, the lack of sufficient income to provide for bare physical efficiency,
had been at the tum of the century. 'What had previously been a struggle for
existence had now become a struggle for something less easy to quantify, but
still to be highly prized: a semblance of decency and respectability.' 175
Conversely, advances in nutritional science in the 1930s 176 indicated
that the war against primary poverty was far from won. Naturally, this had
important implications for the minimum wage debate. Sounding the death-
knell to alarmist tum of the century eugenic-influenced concern at a
'progressive deterioration of the English race', it was now understood that a
balanced diet, rich in vitamins and minerals could enhance physique, mental
functioning, immunity to illness and life-expectancy. 'The political
implications were obvious: if nutrition was the most important factor in public
health, then it followed that the best weapon in public health was to ensure
proper feeding - from which stemmed the further ominous implication that this
could only be achieved if low income groups ... had enough money with
which to buy the necessary food.' 177 However, as John MacNicol has
demonstrated, the Ministry of Health, fearful of authoring a definitive
minimum needs cash figure, resisted monetary based poverty lines and refuted
evidence that demonstrated that poverty was the cause of malnutrition in the
UK.178
Influenced by these developments, lone voices were heard in support of
a comprehensive minimum wage policy during the 1930s. For instance, in
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recognition of the fact that a majority of wage earners were covered by neither
trade union nor wages board protection, a Brighton-based businessman, Alfred
Morris, conceived his 'Notification of Poverty' Bil1.179 Although the Bill
stipulated that local authorities must devise a 'living' wage figure based on
subsistence requirements, something which central governmenHet to attempt,
/.
it was a 'moral force' minimum wage proposal. Employers were to be
compelled only to notify their local government agency if they paid rates below
the set figure. As such, the proposal satisfied neither enthusiasts nor opponents
of the statutory minimum wage principle. Milne-Bailey's assertion that 'it is
very difficult to take this rather theatrical device very seriously'P'' was typical.
In the Commons the Bill was derided as a 'bad joke,.181 Similarly, its re-
launch in the Lords faltered against an unlikely consensus amongst their
Lordships that the trade unions' conception of the most appropriate remedy for
low wages, namely voluntary organisation supplanted by trade boards in
exceptional cases, was the most desirable.182 Of course, this stance justified
the status quo of minimal government interference in the wage system!
As with the ILP's Living Wage campaign, Walter Citrine was irritated
at the assumptions underlying Morris' Bill:
In your letter and in the Bill you again refer to unorganisable labour.
May I point out once more that we cannot regard any labour as
unorganisable. Organisation is more difficult in some sections than
it is in others, hut experience has shown that progress can be made
even in the most difficult areas. A strong Trade Union Movement is,
in our view, the surest method of improving wages and working
conditions.183
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Morris replied that he realised that
Trade Unions for every occupation are desirable, but are we to go on
year after year allowing thousands of our workers to live in
miserable conditions while public opinion or circumstances bring
about the desired organisation of occupations which appear to be at
. bl ?184present unorgarusa e.
However, Morris' plea fell upon deaf ears and the TUC leader once again
rebuffed him.
Government similarly ignored Seebohm Rowntree's views. In the light
of advances achieved in nutritional science since 1918, Rowntree re-wrote his
Human Needs oj Labour in 1937. He now drew 'a clear distinction between
minimum wages and wages above the minimum. The former should be
determined primarily by human needs, the latter by the market value of the
services rendered.,185 Assessing those needs on the basis of an adult wage
earner supporting a wife and three children he arrived at a weekly minimum
wage figure of 53 shillings for urban and 41 shillings for rural workers.186 As
was customary throughout this period, the minimum wage for women was
fixed at a lower level, 30s. 9d., justified on account of the fact that almost 88
per cent. of working women supported no dependants.i'"
Rowntree concluded that 'Trade Boards should be set up for all
industries where adequate minimum wages are not already being paid, and
instructed by statute to fix at the earliest possible date' rates according to his
calculation of minimum human needs. Conceding the need for industry to be
given time in which to adapt itself to this requirement Rowntree nevertheless
insisted that 'a definite limit must be set to the breathing space.' 'I allow a
285
maximum period of five years before the payment of the minimum wages,
which I suggest, should be made obligatory in all trades.' 188
Harold Macmillan incorporated Rowntree's recommendations into his
plea for a reconstructed managed economy providing all with a minimum
wage.189 Echoing the ILP's Living Wage proposals of a decade earlier,
Macmillan argued that an Industrial Reorganisation Enabling Bill be
introduced in conjunction with the Minimum Wage Bill, which would give
industry five years to meet the new standard.l'" Macmillan certainly was 'a
minor eccentric in terms of Tory politics. In the 1930s there were many
Conservative rebels who wanted to move the party to the right; Macmillan was
among a handful who wanted to move it to the left.'191 Regarded by his own
side as a 'boring crank', 192 Macmillan had no chance of influence over
Chamberlain's Tory Party.
Enjoying more influence amongst his own party was G.D.H. Cole. In
1938 he wrote a plea for 'the extension of the guaranteed minimum wage to
those occupations which are at present protected neither by Trade Boards nor,
in effect, by Trade Union bargaining.' 193He was motivated by evidence from
the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee, which revealed that in
about nine per cent. of cases, benefits paid to adult men were either greater
than or, more typically, just a few shillings lower than their previous weekly
earnings.!" Acknowledging the success of trade boards, and indeed, urging
their extension to the retail and distributive trades, Cole nevertheless argued
that they could not hope to protect low paid workers in widely-scattered trades,
service-sector jobs, or miscellaneous factory work on lower skilled processes
which belied 'trade' definition.
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Accordingly, he recommended the establishment of a General
Minimum Wage Commission. Cole proposed that the authority of this
Commission would 'extend to all insured workers not already in receipt of a
legal minimum wage fixed either by a Trade Board or under the Agricultural
Wages Act of 1924.,195 Cole acknowledged trade union sensitivities regarding
interference with their collective bargaining arrangements but insisted that,
even in apparently strongly organised sectors such as lighter engineering and
kindred trades, 'the less skilled workers undoubtedly need in many cases the
. f I I .. ,196protection 0 a ega rmrnmum wage .
Cole believed that because 'these bottom dogs of industry are those
who can least afford to organise and are most difficult for the trade union to
reach' a new Minimum Wage Act should fix weekly minimum figures of fifty
and thirty shillings for adult men and women respectively. He would allow
industry two years to meet this standard.i'" However, the TUC felt that it
'would be desirable to divorce consideration of the actual figures to be fixed
from the political atmosphere of Parliament and to use the sort of Commission
suggested by Cole.' 198
The TUC had little reason to worry. Ernest Bevin had by then played a
decisive role, with Hugh Dalton, in devising Labour's Immediate Programme
in 1937. Serving as a pointer to the actions of the Attlee government they were
both to serve in, it proposed widespread nationalisation, higher pensions and
extended state social services. But the programme's wages policy conceded to
Bevin's philosophy that it was not the business of government to intervene
directly: 'On wages generally, a Labour Government would co-operate with
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the Trade Unions in raising standards and with the I.L.O. in improving world
conditions. ,199
By the late 1930s, the political climate was less hostile to the principle
of minimum wages. Indeed, by the Road Haulage Wages Act and the Holidays
with Pay Act, both passed during 1938, the government indicated that wages
board machinery was back in favour. This can be attributed to two factors: the
less pessimistic economic outlook at home and noteworthy minimum wage
initiatives abroad. By the mid 1930s, much of the British economy had
recovered from the slump, helped by the boom in house-building, household
consumer durables (electrical engineering) and motor car production. The
modest rearmament programme facilitated an equally modest revival even in
the depressed black spots of the UK.
Abroad, a Labour government in New Zealand legislated in 1936 for its
'Arbitration Court to fix basic rates of wages at a level sufficient to enable
adult male workers to maintain a wife and three children in a fair and
reasonable standard of comfort. ,200 Although British trade unions could not
have tolerated such a means for regulating wages, the initiative at least
demonstrated that a universal minimum wage was possible. Furthermore, the
USA's Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937 demonstrated that a uniform
national minimum wage was possible in a populous country exposed to the full
. f k . 1· 201ngour 0 mar et capita Ism.
However, the prospects of any comparable radical extension of
minimum wage coverage in Britain were as remote as ever in 1939. Besides,
by the very late 1930s, the focus of British politics turned towards the ominous
international situation. As reminiscent of the eclipse of the Liberal
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government's likely endorsement of nation-wide wages board machinery in
1914, the outbreak of war in 1939 killed off any chances of a nascent national
minimum wage campaign. However, as with experience during the Great War,
an unprecedented level of state regulation of wages was to be a feature of the
wartime labour market.
In conclusion, it must be recognised that at no point during the inter-
war period was there any serious pressure for a national minimum wage, as we
understand the term today. The government's brief commitment to the
National Industrial Conference in 1919 represented the only plausible prospect
of universal minimum wage coverage. The one lasting effect of the NIC was
the rapid expansion of the trade boards system in 1919-1920. It is ironic that
this policy formed Robert Home's strategy for deflecting pressure for a
minimum wage for all given that some form of comprehensive wages board
machinery was envisaged by the NIC to realise this aim.
In an era when too many people felt that the state should not interfere
with free market wage determination, wages boards were the only policy
option open to adherents of statutory minimum wages. A consensus tolerating
this 'lowest common denominator' minimum wage policy embraced trade
unionists concerned to preserve collective bargaining methods from outside
interference; employers keen to avoid further erosions of their managerial
prerogatives; and governments anxious not to shoulder further responsibility
for industry during difficult economic circumstances alike.
By contrast, any universal application of minimum wages risked
alienating the TUC in particular and inducing its claustrophobia where state
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encroachment on its turf was concerned. Whilst there were sporadic calls
within the labour movement for a more comprehensive minimum wage policy,
it never demanded a national minimum wage during the inter-war period. The
Labour Party produced no policy, other than trade board expansion, to meet the
wages aspect of Labour and the New Social Order's call for the universal
establishment of the national minimum. Most minimum wage for all policies,
advocated during the inter-war years, failed to progress to the point where
government or employer opposition had to be overcome precisely because they
had 'fallen at the first hurdle', namely the need to win the labour movement's,
and especially the TUC's, support.
Even Sidney and Beatrice Webb had come to regard the trade boards as
a useful policy expedient, which offered a practical means of working towards
a national minimum wage in the longer term, and did not actively promote
their pre-war national minimum wage agenda during the 1920s and 1930s. Of
course, by the 1918 Trade Boards Act, the boards had made the 'quantum leap'
from an 'exceptional' policy to be risked only for sweated trades to a 'normal'
remedy applied to any trade where levels of organisation or prevailing rates of
pay were low, but not necessarily 'abnormally' so. Thus, with a flexible
interpretation of this new criteria for extending the trade boards system, a
policy encompassing their comprehensive application could be perceived as
perfectly compatible with a 'minimum wage for all' policy.
s
As noted with regard to the pre-1914 period, there exited a gulf
It
between the rhetoric of politicians paying lip service to the 'living wage'
concept and the policies advanced to win such a standard for workers,
assuming any were proposed beyond leaving its attainment to voluntary
290
organisation. Minimum wage for all policy propositions boiled down to an
expansion of existing machinery only: voluntary collective bargaining
supplemented by strengthened 'fair wages' public contracts, together with joint
industrial councils or trade boards to plug the gaps where voluntary apparatus
had little immediate prospect of functioning.
Outside the consensus embracing the wages boards compromise, only a
very limited constituency favoured a national minimum wage policy. From all
points further right along the political spectrum than cautious labour moderates
and strong trade unions jealous of their wage bargaining rights, the principle
was derided as either, but often both, impracticable or undesirable. Whereas
left of the receptive radical reformist element within the labour movement was
found 'pure' socialist opinion that wished for the complete abolition of the
capitalist wage system, and its replacement by a system granting full worker
control over industry.
Finally, it must be questioned whether a national minimum wage policy
should have been a priority, even for unorthodox thinkers, during the inter-war
period. For the majority who remained unconvinced by underconsumptionist
theory, a national minimum wage offered no solution to the problem of
inadequate working class household incomes arising from mass unemployment
and the even greater problems of short time working and other form~nder-
A
employment. Likewise, for breadwinners supporting large families, the level
of any prospective national minimum wage was unlikely to offer any material
assistance. Thus the ILP's concentration on non-contributory family
allowances and full employment policies arguably betrayed a sounder grasp of
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the policies needed to raise working class household Incomes than most
contemporaries were prepared to concede.
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CONCLUSION
The second challenge of 'total war' in little over one generation once again
stripped government of its peace-time inhibitions with regard to wage
regulation. Tension with the trade unions was minimised by Ernest Bevin's
appointment as Minister of Labour and National Service in May 1940. This
helped ensure that although labour was under the direct control of the state to
an unprecedented extent, trade union sensitivities and interests were not
overlooked. Trade union standard rates were given statutory force across
industry by means of 'Order 1305'.' However, measures were also taken to
avert the possibility that existing statutory wages boards apparatus would be
marginalised, as during the First World War. The 1940 Trade Boards and
Road Haulage (Emergency Provisions) Act streamlined rate-fixing procedures
and reduced the quorum for meetings to just one member each representing
employers, workers and the state. Additionally, the 1940 Agricultural Wages
Act empowered the Central Wages Board to fix a national minimum wage for
the industry.
Having first-hand experience of the corrosive effects on collective
bargaining caused by high levels of unemployment during the inter-war
period, Bevin breathed new life into wages board machinery by his 1945
Wages Councils Act. He wanted wages councils to serve as guarantors of
national collective bargaining in the event of a recurrence of a post-war
economic slump. The interests of representative industrial organisations were
thus placed ahead of the low wages justification for statutory intervention in
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the wages field. The 1945 Act can thus be regarded as the true heir of the
Second Whitley Report of 1917.
The constitutional straightjacket emasculating the functions and
potential of trade boards was discarded when they became wages councils.
The removal of the narrow 'trade' definition featured in the 1909 and 1918
Trade Boards Acts facilitated their much-needed extension into the service
sector. Principally on account of their expansion into the catering and retail
sectors during the 1940s, wages councils protected approximately 3Y2million,
mainly female, workers by the time of Bevin's death in 1951. Furthermore,
wages councils were empowered to fix general 'remuneration', rather than
merely specific classes of minimum rates, and could regulate hours, overtime,
and paid holiday provisions as they saw fit. 2 Thus the relationship between
voluntary collective bargaining machinery and legal wage regulatory
apparatus was made extremely close.
However, this assumption by the wages councils of general wage
regulatory, as opposed to merely minimum rate-fixing powers placed them in
a delicate position in relation to the trade unions. Indeed, as early as 1952, the
TUC were concerned that 'voluntary machinery should be encouraged with a
view to its finally superseding the statutory machinery, which has never been
regarded as more than a second best. ,3 This conviction amongst trade
unionists that wages councils were obsolete was accentuated over the
subsequent two decades; the years prior to 1973 being characterised broadly
by 'full employment', general prosperity and rising trade union membership.
Accordingly, almost half of the wages councils were abolished on a piece-
meal basis between the 1950s and 1970s, in cases where the government, trade
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unions and employers' organisations alike were confident that collective
bargaining could replace their function.
However, evidence revealing that in those sectors where legal wage
protection had been withdrawn collective bargaining had faltered and low pay
remained a problem helped trade unions rediscover an appreciation for the
virtues of wages councils after 1979. Facing the twin challenges of declining
membership and the return of high levels of unemployment, apparent since
1975 but especially severe from 1980, the remaining wages councils were
useful to trade unions in bolstering wage standards. This fact was not lost on
the Thatcher governments, committed to an economic agenda based on 'New
Right' principles which attributed unemployment to 'rigidities' in the labour
market and workers' 'pricing themselves' out of jobs by demanding too high a
level of wages.
In an echo of the trade board crisis of the early 1920s, the TUC
mounted a staunch defence of the wages councils. However, this was to be in
vain, for by contrast with the 1920s, the government, not the employers,
spearheaded the attack upon mmimum wage machinery." Until the
government could free itself formally from the International Labour
Organisation Convention 26 commitment to minimum wage machinery in
1985 it undermined the wages councils by whittling down their inspectorate
and pressurising them to award modest wage increases. The 1986 Wages Act
was a more overt assault on the system. Wages councils were stripped of their
wage regulatory role and permitted to fix just one basic adult rate and all
workers under the age of 21 were removed from their protection. The Major
government finished the job, abolishing the remaining wages councils in 1993.
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Included in the Labour Party's manifesto for the 1992 general election
was the promise to introduce a statutory national minimum wage. It is thus a
delicious irony that the primary political consequence of the Thatcher
governments' onslaught against Britain's modest minimum wage coverage
was to awaken the labour movement to the merits of a comprehensive uniform
national minimum wage! After all, for sixty years following the TUC's
emphatic rejection of such a policy in 1922 it had virtually no currency
amongst the labour movement.
Indeed, trade union hostility, together with Bevin's status within the
government, rendered Beveridge's 1942 plan for such a policy stillborn'
Fearing that a national minimum wage, necessarily fixed at a modest level,
could be regarded as a 'state-approved normal wage, the effect of which
would be to drag down wage rates in other industries', the 1948 TUC
Congress reaffirmed its rejection of the policy." In 1967 the Wilson
government responded to the contemporary 'rediscovery' of poverty by
considering the feasibility of a national minimum wage. However, it
concluded that selective social benefits tailored to individual needs were a
more efficient means of relieving poverty.i The TUC concurred, and
continued to oppose the principle of a statutory national minimum wage
throughout the 1970s. Having regard to the fact that women workers suffered
disproportionately from low pay, the Wilson government passed the Equal Pay
Act in 1970. However, this worthy measure could not help those women who
were low paid not because of sex discrimination, but on account of the nature
of the work they performed and the conditions under which it was undertaken.
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Both the TUC and the Labour Party became formally committed to a
national minimum wage policy in 1986. Two factors chiefly accounted for
this apparent volte-face. Firstly, most of Britain's fellow European Union
members had by then adopted national minimum wage systems.! Secondly,
the labour movement had become all too painfully aware that its prescribed
remedy for low wages (namely: expansion of trade union membership and
collective bargaining together with limited statutory intervention in those
instances where this policy was not deemed immediately practicable) was an
inadequate response to the unprecedented harshness of the economic and
political climate of the 1980s. The National Minimum Wage Act was passed
in 1998, at the end of the first parliamentary session of the Blair government,
and came into force on I April 1999 at the rate of £3.60 per hour.
In fact, the attitude of the TUC was instrumental to the course of
statutory minimum wage policy in Britain during the twentieth century. Pride
and fear in equal measure ensured that organised labour maintained a
consistently ambivalent attitude towards the issue throughout. Trade unions
tended to represent the higher-skilled classes of wage earners and were usually
able to bargain with employers on equal terms to safeguard and improve the
working conditions of their members. For those lower classes of workers who
remained unorganised the trade unions reserved a certain incomprehension
and contempt. Indeed, the labour movement as a whole remained aloof from
'the poor' prior to 1939.
On the other hand, the defensive, self-preservationist streak of
organised labour was aroused whenever government encroached upon their
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realm of activity. Thus although millions of unorganised, largely unskilled,
workers would have benefited from the protection of a legally underwritten
'floor' to wages, organised labour feared that state 'trespass' into the wage
regulatory field would remove for the workers concerned a prime justification
for trade union membership. The state was distrusted by organised labour as
an agency under the control of men whose background and interests were
inimical to those of wage earners. The TUC's perennial opposition to the
compulsory enforcement of voluntary agreements was generally couched in
these terms. To trade unions concentrating on winning higher 'living' wages
for their members, statutory minimum wages would in any case prove little, if
any, help. Furthermore, the desire of organised labour for the working classes
to enjoy a greater share of, and control over, the nation's wealth could not be
realised through a manipulation of the wage system alone.
Of course, trade unions did not hold a unanimous opinion on wage
regulation, any more than on other issues. Throughout the period of this
study, many trade union officials accepted the argument that in sectors
characterised by poor conditions a legal benchmark to wages provided an
essential pre-requisite to the organisation of down-trodden workers. Itwas on
these grounds that the National Anti-Sweating League persuaded the TUC to
support its campaign for legal minimum wages in 1906. The NASL
emphasised that it was seeking statutory wages boards only for those
'sweated' trades characterised by a high degree of female labour and home-
working, classes of workers almost totally outside the TUC's coverage.
Until after 1918, when trade boards were extended to the fringe of
major industries and could regulate wages-rates in sectors where the trade
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unions had a presence, albeit not necessarily a strong one, the attitude of the
TUC towards them could be described as one of 'benevolent apathy'. Before
the First World War, organised labour was still pre-occupied with questions
relating to its legal status and political representation. Arenas where state
intervention was welcomed were confined to such matters as the regulation of
hours, sanitary conditions and the 'Right to Work'.
The TUC could no longer ignore the existence of the trade boards
during the inter-war period. However, organised labour's attitude towards
state interference in wages questions was coloured during the war by its
generally suppressive influence, at least as far as the wage-rates of many
skilled male workers was concerned, and the sharp decline in trade union
membership after the collapse of the post-war boom in 1921. During the
1920s, trade board determinations were condemned by trade unions for being
both too low and too high! Where legal minima fell below trade union
standard rates they accused trade boards of legitimising low wages and
undermining rates won by collective strength. Conversely, when trade board
minima compared favourably with those rates governed by collective
agreements trade unions feared that their efforts were discredited and their
future role rendered superfluous.
Organised labour was thus resistant to any further significant foray into
statutory minimum wage regulation beyond the limited-application trade
boards system. This freed the government from ever having to consider
'universal' minimum wage policies. The TUC could support trade boards,
ostensibly for the protection of 'weak', predominantly female, workers unable
to organise themselves.9 However, the endorsement of any more
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comprehensive statutory minimum wage policy would have represented an
implicit admission by the trade unions that even their collective strength was
insufficient on its own to maintain wage standards. This apparent challenge to
their virile self-perception organised labour could not accept. The Labour
Party, careful to defer to the TUC's judgement on most 'industrial' questions,
adhered to this stance.
However, even the most powerful trade unions were prepared to
harness the power of statutory guarantees as armoury against recalcitrant
employers when they perceived such action to be in the immediate interests of
their members. This was demonstrated by the Miners' Federation's campaign
for a minimum wage in 1912. Furthermore, as the 1934 Cotton Manufacturing
Act and the 1938 Road Haulage Wages Act both illustrated, unions could
appreciate that legal powers could help bolster collective agreements against
the challenges of falling membership, high levels of unemployment and other
deflationary consequences. In fact, the relative strength of trade unions vis-a-
vis employers in a trade was an important determinant of attitudes towards
legal minimum wage protection. The strategy of the Garment Workers' Union
on the clothing trade boards highlighted the fact that for the less powerful
trade unions with only patchy coverage across trades, legal support of
voluntary agreements with employers was the only means of enforcing them.
The stronger trade unions, able to ensure the observance of their collective
agreements, naturally had less strategic interest in state interference into wage
determination. This was evidenced by their contemptuous dismissal of the
Joint Industrial Council machinery proposed by the Whitley Committee. With
regard to the TUC, Walter Citrine noted that individual trade unions were
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'intensely jealous of their autonomy and afraid of their authority being
usurped.t'" This fortitude was magnified several times over, against the might
of the state.
The 1921-1922 'employer backlash' thesis is inadequate on its own as
an explanation for the limitation of British statutory minimum wage policy to
a partial-application sectored basis only. It fails to take into account the trade
unions' own 'backlash' later during the same decade, which led the TUC to
endorse and so cement the cautious 'thus far and no further' tripartite
consensus regarding minimum wage regulation.
As the Cave Committee hearings confirmed, the employers' attitudes
towards minimum wage regulation was not simply one of straightforward
hostility. Again, although there was no uniform 'business' opinion regarding
the issue, employers' organisations shared, with trade unions, an instinctive
distrust of government intervention in industrial relations matters in normal
circumstances. In stark contrast to the trade unions, employers considered that
government was too influenced by the electorate, dominated by wage-earning
households, with too little weight being accorded to their opinions.
Furthermore, wartime regulation of industries had seriously eroded managerial
controls over the workplace.
In lieu of any realistic prospect for government endorsement of a
comprehensive minimum wage policy, the issue remained one of academic
interest only, to the vast majority of employers who were not affected by the
various forms of statutory minimum wage apparatus. 'Business'
considerations, such as the proportion of wages to the overall cost of
production, whether the product was intended for a mass consumption market
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which would benefit from higher working class disposable incomes, or the
price-elasticity of demand for the goods produced, thus may have determined
individual employers' attitudes to the question. Alternatively, employers'
private political opinions, for example, on the menace of sweating in
particular, the merits of welfare capitalism in general, or else the 'tyranny' of
state interference may have determined such views. The question of minimum
wages tended to concern the lesser organised, lower-paying trades. By
contrast, all employers had a stake in issues such as business taxation,
especially the rating system, and workplace safety and sanitary legislation,
whilst most employers outside the sheltered sectors were interested in the
tariffs question and Sterling's exchange rate.
However, for those trades that were characterised by weak or non-
existent employers' organisations, statutory wages boards provided a much-
valued protection for (organised) employers paying 'fair', or trade union
standard, wage-rates against undercutting by disreputable (invariably non-
federated) rivals. Industrial relations in the trade could thus be regulated and
collective agreements made binding on 'bad' as well as 'good' employers.
Employers' organisations allied to the Wholesale Clothing Manufacturers'
Federation (WCMF) were as keen as the clothing workers' unions to push
their voluntary agreements through the trade boards. David Little, a leading
figure within the WCMF, admitted that, 'though we do not say it is perfect, we
do say that we would rather be under a Trade Board with its imperfections
than be without a Trade Board at all' .11 Alternatively, employers used the
existence of legal minima determined by representative trade boards to justify
their refusal to negotiate separate collective agreements providing for higher
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rates. For this reason, most employers endorsed only a limited application of
the legal minimum wage principle.
Although they appreciated the protective value of bare minimum wage
standards, most employers did not want the coercive powers of the state used
to regulate 'standard' rates above this level. Hence, much of the controversy
surrounding minimum wages amongst employers and trade unions alike
concerned not the principle of such statutory intervention but the level of the
rates fixed. On this question, the old adage that the devil is in the detail
certainly applied! Confined merely to instances where conditions mitigated
against representative industrial organisations regulating their own terms of
contract, the employers' organisations could endorse a limited application of
statutory minimum wages policy on pretty similar lines to that of the trade
unions. In spite of periodic shifts in policy emphasis, both sides of industry
placed a premium on the sanctity of voluntarily agreed wage-rates in normal
circumstances. They both therefore endorsed a 'lowest common denominator'
statutory wages board policy, applied on an ad hoc 'trade' basis, only where
no immediate hope of fostering 'normal' industrial relations machinery
existed.
Impressed by this industrial consensus, governments of all political
colours willingly embraced this limited application minimum wage policy.
Indeed, apart from when the commitment to 'total war' demanded an
extraordinary level of state direction of the economy, government was keen to
limit its entanglement in the intricacies of the wage system to the minimum
level compatible with the consequences of universal suffrage. Government
was content to hide behind the sectional interests of representative
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organisations of employers and workers so as to avoid confronting
fundamental weaknesses in the workings of the free market economy. In
particular, the non-comprehensive trade boards policy overlooked the manifest
insufficiency of wage levels prevailing for lesser skilled workers, even III
sectors where higher skilled workers were well organised.
The support, of both organised labour and employers, for the limited
application minimum wage policy thus awarded an apparent legitimacy to the
government's abdication of responsibility towards millions of unorganised,
low-paid workers. Indeed, in all likelihood, the tripartite corporate consensus
in favour of this policy did not extend beyond the organised sectors of
industry. Statutory regulations governing industrial conditions, were generally
resented more by non-federated employers than by their organised rivals, who
were more likely already to be in compliance with them. On the other hand,
unorganised workers, earning wage rates at or below existing levels of
statutory minima, probably would have welcomed such legal safeguards.
Perhaps governments were guilty of nothing more than reflecting
contemporary attitudes, in remaining sceptical of the judiciousness of state
intervention into the economic and social relationships of its citizens. For all
the collectivist initiatives of the Edwardian governments, laissez-faire
principles were not abandoned in Whitehall until 1915/1916, and then only
under duress and for the duration of the war. Furthermore, although minorities
were radicalised by the depressingly high persistent level of unemployment
from 1921, a majority of the British polity remained pessimistic that state
initiatives could somehow induce a return to prosperity. In any case, if wages
boards were to be reserved only for those sectors where a substitute for
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collective bargaining machinery was deemed necessary, this precluded their
application throughout industry. Instead, the government endorsed the TUC's
urgings to workers to join trade unions and help enhance the prospect that
voluntary agreements could be negotiated and observed.
Such a 'minimalist' minimum wages policy meant that wages boards
were used merely to eliminate 'unfair' competition for the benefit of 'good'
employers and downtrodden workers alike and raise 'sweated' wage rates to
the average level current in the appropriate sector. This did not necessarily
induce any upward pressure on real wage levels in those trades where
prevailing rates were low. In fact, aside from the agricultural minimum wage
machinery, where the vast majority of the workers covered were male, the
government gave no formal guidance to trade boards, intended primarily for
female workers, in respect of wage-fixing criteria.
However, such lack of government direction to trade boards helped
them become entrenched in the industrial relations structure, for when they
collaborated trade unions and employers' organisations could override
independent members and minority interests on their own side of the trade
board and enjoy considerable autonomy over the legal regulation of conditions
in their trade. The devolved structure of minimum wage fixing bodies enabled
the government to minimise its direct involvement in rate fixing. Civil
servants, political parties and industrial organisations were all keen to concede
that semi-autonomous boards, representative of their trade, were intrinsically
better qualified to fix minima, taking account of conventional wage payment
systems, than any central authority.
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In fact, the contention that the trade board model of minimum wage
regulation provides the key explanation for the initial acceptance and later
direction of the policy, between 1906 and 1939, is fundamental to this study.
Indeed, a minimum wage policy was deemed practicable only within the
perimeters of the trade boards model.
Apart from concerns about levels of minimum rate evasion, without
question an Achilles' heel of the trade board system, even inherent flaws in
this method of minimum wage implementation served to further enhance their
status. For instance, motivated by the need to secure competent and articulate
representatives, Whitehall awarded a far higher proportion of seats on the
trade boards to members of employers' organisations and, even more
strikingly, trade unions, than their coverage in those trades strictly warranted.
The true representative nature of trade boards was thus exaggerated.
However, by this expediency, trade boards could mirror more effectively
existing voluntary negotiation machinery, thus lessening potential opposition
to their presence amongst trade unions and employers' organisations.
Likewise, a major drawback of the trade boards method of attacking
low wages was, that only those workers whose jobs could be categorised
within 'trades', won minimum wage protection. Millions of low paid workers,
engaged either in very small, geographically-scattered occupations where the
administrative cost of a trade board would have proved prohibitive, or else in
miscellaneous factory or service sector employment belying definition under
the scope of the Trade Boards Acts, were thus excluded. In lieu of any
realistic prospect of a uniform national minimum wage policy prior to the
1980s, a universally applied district or regional wages board structure
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remained the best hope of implementing a truly comprehensive minimum
wage strategy. However, in the eyes of trades unions and employers'
organisations, this form of minimum wage machinery would have contrasted
unfavourably with the close alignment of trade boards with collective
bargaining apparatus. Meanwhile, the government remained resistant to
underwriting a minimum wage for all workers.
Ironically, the modestly successful record of trade boards in raising the
wage levels of the poorest workers covered by their scope helped confirm their
limited application status. Trade unions welcomed the levelling up of lowest
wage levels but were content that trade boards frequently achieved little more
than this because it bolstered their claim that workers would only win a living
wage by voluntary collective action.
Despite containing both staunch paternalistic wages board enthusiasts
such as Henry Cavendish Bentick and irreconcilably hostile opponents of state
intervention such as Frederick Banbury within the parliamentary party, the
Conservatives were prepared to sanction minimum wage regulation on similar
grounds to that of the trade unions. Trade boards were endorsed, but were a
policy expedient to be applied sparingly as an anti-sweating remedy. During
the inter-war years, the Conservatives' adherence to trade boards allowed
them to avoid any serious consideration of more comprehensive minimum
wage policies.
The Liberal and Labour Parties were keener, in principle, for a bolder
application of the trade boards than the Conservatives, who dominated
government so successfully between 1916 and 1939. The Liberals,
increasingly impotent as a political force following the Asquith-Lloyd George
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schism, continued to proclaim their pride in sponsoring the original Trade
Boards Act, and Britain's Industrial Future envisaged statutory minimum
wages board machinery for all trades.
Similarly, the Labour Party were greater enthusiasts for trade boards
than their TUC brethren, viewing them, like the Webbs, as the best available
means of fulfilling the wages aspect of the 'National Minimum'. Generally
speaking, and to the occasional frustration of the TUC, the political wing of
the labour movement, enjoying a more balanced gender profile, was slightly
less encumbered with matters of sectional concern to its industrial wing when
policies intended to improve the lot of the poor were considercd.f
Additionally, as a governing party at national and local level by the 1920s,
Labour overcame faster its distrust of the state. Nevertheless, the Labour
leadership ensured that the TUC was not provoked by party policy on
industrial questions moving too far ahead of organised labour's. Besides, even
allowing for the negative economic context, the two minority Labour
governments of this period were characterised by timidity and inertia on the
domestic front. Overall, the broad de-facto acceptance of the 'lowest common
denominator' trade board consensus was illustrated by the general absence of
the minimum wage issue from all parties' general election manifestos during
this period. Thus, for most of the three decades prior to 1939, trade boards
were endorsed, albeit sometimes grudgingly, into obscurity.
Of course, trade boards did not always endure the dubious fate of being
smothered by bipartisan embrace. During the 'reconstruction' plans emerging
during the latter half of the First World War, trade boards broke free from
their limited, anti-sweating, homework and gender-bound chrysalis which had
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encased the minimum wage debate for the previous decade. Although these
arguments were crucial determinants in the decision of the British polity to
sponsor the novel experiment in statutory minimum wages determination, the
1918 Trade Boards Act jettisoned the anti-sweating criterion of the original
Act in favour of a much broader 'substitute collective bargaining' role. It was
thus the latter measure which held out the prospect that the Trade Boards Acts
would produce a radical shift in government policy towards minimum wage
regulation, rather than merely represent a symbolic radical advance in
principle. Although the 'Whitley-ite' policies suffered the fate of other
reconstruction policies with the onset of depression in 1921 it was the 1918
Act which pushed trade boards 'out of the shadows' and ensured that they
were established in sufficient numbers for them to be counted amongst the
general industrial relations machinery. Henceforward, trade unions and
employers' organisations were both affected by, and, in their tum, helped
determine, trade boards policy.
The close involvement of the trade unions and employer organisations
within the workings of the trade boards helped ensure that the notion of a
national minimum wage enjoyed almost no credible support during this
period. Sidney Webb, co-author of the 'National Minimum' concept, was
representative of the British polity in regarding the universal minimum wage
principle as futile, on account of the low level at which it would have to be
fixed. Concurring with this logic, the labour movement had very little interest
in this policy, in spite of occasional pressure from its grass-roots membership.
The thirty shillings weekly minimum wage policy, endorsed by the
labour movement until 1916, was little more than a clarion call for the
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campaign for higher wages. The TUC, ILP and Labour Party hierarchies had
little faith in its suitability as a practical policy expedient. After all, they could
barely decide both whether or not the thirty shillings figure was to apply
nation-wide, and to women as well as male workers.
In fact, only after the Second World War did three factors emerge
which can be considered as pre-requisites to the credibility of the national
minimum wage concept. Firstly, the development of national collective
bargaining was deficient until after 1940. Although it had been given a great
fillip during the First World War, even where national agreements were
concluded during the inter-war period, they tended to provide only for uniform
national variations on differential district rates. Regional wage disparities thus
remained significant.
Secondly, Equal Pay legislation in 1970 removed a major impediment
against the national minimum wage. Women's rates were only a little over
half the level of men's prior to 1939. Thus, a uniform national minimum wage
would have been fixed either at too Iowa level to be of benefit to lowly paid
male workers or else a gender variation would have had to be instituted.
However, such an emphatic legal endorsement of sex discrimination risked
offending women, who formed a majority of the electorate from 1928. No
less importantly, the trade unions would have been roused against the danger
that the lower minimum rate would herald a greater substitution of female for
adult male labour and erode wage standards generally.
Thirdly, as trade boards were meeting their limited objectives, the onus
was on advocates of a national minimum wage to prove the superiority of their
policy in terms of its practicability and beneficial effects. However,
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international comparisons were scant. Apart from Australia and New Zealand,
Britain's wages board apparatus amounted to the most comprehensive system
of wage regulation in the industrialised world. Antipodean methods of
minimum wage enforcement via industrial courts were completely
unacceptable to the TUC. The 1938 American Federal minimum wage
experiment failed to provide the necessary illumination. As first implemented,
the USA's 25 cents hourly minimum was scarcely more inclusive than the
British systems, for it embraced only blue collar workers engaged in inter-state
commerce, agriculture excluded.
Thus although Sheila Blackburn is correct to charge NASL stalwarts
such as R.H. Tawney and J.J. Mallon with exaggerating the success of their
trade boards progeny, her argument that this diverted the labour movement
away from the 'rival' national minimum wage policy is not tenable. This
argument represents an unconvincing attempt to transpose contemporary
standpoints on to the very different political and industrial context of the pre-
Second World War period. In truth, there was no dichotomy, in principle at
least, between 'rival' national and wages board policies during this period.
This is because the term 'national minimum wage' was used as shorthand for
'minimum wage for all' policies, or, more accurately, for nearly all. Thus a
'national minimum wage', as we understand the term today, was not then
considered a realistic policy by any industrial or political institution.
Accordingly, the policy alternative to the limited application of trade
boards was a more all-embracing wages board policy during this period.
Advocates of 'minimum wage for all' policies invariably followed the Whitley
Reports' prescription for the expansion of wages board machinery for ill-
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organised sectors combined with the compulsory extension of voluntary
agreements in the better-regulated trades. In essence, this policy formed the
basis of the ILP's Living Wage programme, in conjunction with a
strengthened commitment by the government to paying its own workers fair
wages.
Even the Webbs, typical of the pre-1939 'national minimum wage'
enthusiasts, thus viewed wages board apparatus not as the rival to their
objective, but as the means of implementing it. Admittedly, given the inability
of 'trade'-defined wages boards to protect many low-paid workers, trans-trade
district level boards were occasionally advocated as having greater potential
for universalising minimum wage protection.
Wages board policies were embraced during the two instances where
the prospect of government implementation of minimum wage for all policies
seemed greatest. For instance, the Liberal Cabinet in 1914 may have been
poised to commit to a policy of district wages boards throughout England and
Wales, covering town and countryside workers alike. Similarly, the
government-endorsed 1919 National Industrial Conference recommendation
for universal minimum wage protection envisaged trade boards as the best-
available means of implementing the policy in those sectors of industry not
regulated by voluntary agreements. It was thus paradoxical that the
government adopted a policy of major trade board expansion as an
'alternative' to the NIC's proposals! Of course, the abrupt curtailment of the
trade boards expansion in March 1921 meant that they were never to escape
their limited application roots.
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However, for twenty-two months after the Armistice, the government
underwrote a minimum wage for all by means of the 1918 Wages (Temporary
Regulation) Act, which extended wartime arbitration machinery. By the
judicious policy of twice extending this universal minimum wage guarantee
until after the economy had readjusted itself to peacetime conditions and the
optimism induced by the 'reconstruction' spirit had faded, the government
were able to evade a more permanent commitment to upholding a minimum
wage for all.
Nevertheless, without the implementation of policies complementary
to universal minimum wage protection prior to 1939 the policy would have
been found wanting as an anti-poverty precaution. Individuals and
organisations who gave serious consideration to the minimum wage policy, for
instance Seebohm Rowntree and the economist, A.C. Pigou, together with the
Fabians and the ILP, recognised that it provided only a partial solution to the
need of households for a minimum income. Until the post-1944 commitment
to full employment, coupled with a comprehensive system of social insurance,
the credibility of the national minimum wage principle suffered because a
worker so 'protected' lacked an assurance that the rate could be earned for a
full week's work all year round. Even more importantly, a minimum wage
could not address the problem that the wage system itself took no account of
the individual needs of the worker. A 'living' wage for a worker with few or
no dependants was naturally much lower than for the 'breadwinner' trying to
support a large family. The role of a minimum wage in helping to establish a
minimum income was given greater plausibility following the introduction of
family allowances in 1946. This was a policy having also to overcome the
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hostility of the TUC and the inertia of governments, unwilling to undertake
further welfare responsibilities during the inter-war period.
This study, which has sought to reconstruct the course of the debate
surrounding the minimum wage issue prior to 1939 by bringing alive the
voices of its main participants, has two central conclusions. The first is that
the semi-autonomous, representative constitutional structure of trade boards
proved crucial to the notion of a statutory minimum wage being accepted by
the political establishment. Indeed, for ninety years after the Australian State
of Victoria first experimented with statutory minimum wages board machinery
in 1896, the minimum wage concept in Britain was accepted only within these
confines. The close relationship between the trade boards and the existing
structure of voluntary collective bargaining apparatus helped foster a broad
tripartite consensus in favour of statutory wages boards as an, ostensibly
temporary, 'second best' to voluntary agreements. It is illustrative that the
breakdown of this consensus during the 1980s was due to a change of heart by
the government, not either of the two sides of industry. The second major
conclusion of this study is that official trade union ambivalence towards the
idea that the state should intervene in 'its' arena of wage bargaining had a
strong influence on the (relatively modest) development of minimum wage
policy until recent years. The conservative, limited application of trade boards
consensus could never have been achieved had the TUC not placed the labour
movement at its centre. This helped ensure that whilst the question of
universal minimum wage coverage was never entirely extinguished, it failed to
ignite in the mainstream political arena until the breakdown of the 'lowest
common denominator' trade boards consensus after 1979.
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